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Abstract
This research (the first long-term ethnographic study of FOI in Britain) investigates concepts at the heart
of FOI—transparency, trust, secrecy, truth, private, public, power and agency. Eighteen months
participant observation fieldwork, alongside policy-makers, practitioners, and end-users facilitated
in-depth, study of the radical subject-object transformations that FOI requires, and the aesthetics that
underpin it.
The introduction of FOI entailed a ‘culture change’—from a culture of secrecy to one of
disclosure—driven, in Scotland, by the Scottish Information Commissioner through conferences. These
were an opportunity for practitioners to come into new knowledge about the Act, their shared knowledge
dissolving the divisions between them. But new divisions then opened between practitioners and
colleagues; culture change being in the replication of a form of a relationship that previously lay between
government and citizens.
In their replicated form, individual practitioners disappeared—were made ‘transparent’—only to
reappear on being differentiated, leaving them acutely aware of the personal relations this fissure
disclosed, and throwing into sharp question a theory of people’s division as indicative of their ‘secrecy’.
Transparency, here, depended on whether people were divided or combined—acting in their own
capacity, or that of the organization.
While making personal relations absent from new disclosures was necessary for FOI compliance,
this concealment hid a complex network of relations, and turned knowledge into ‘information’. Yet the
division between information and knowledge was not crisp: end-users continued to read practitioners’
personal relations in disclosed information, thus relations were both absent from and implied in the
information released.
Whether information was public (and accessible) depended on the undifferentiated status of those
who created, handled, or were the subjects of, information. As people came into new knowledge,
invoking their divided or common footing, they alternated between appearing ‘private’ or ‘public’—
person or thing—a division between individuals reflecting a division within each of them.
1Preface
Setting the Scene
The Freedom of Information Act
This is a study of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (‘FOISA’). Freedom of Information
(‘FOI’) was introduced in Scotland in 2005, giving people anywhere in the world the right to obtain
recorded information held by a Scottish Public Authority. FOISA came into force in Scotland at the same
time as the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 (‘FOIA’). There are, in general, few differences
between the two laws, except that FOISA is said to be a much stronger Act. Ministers of the Scottish
Parliament (‘MSPs’), interest groups, public authorities, end-users and Scottish Government policy-
makers, taking a draft of FOIA, crafted their own Act to place a stronger emphasis on the disclosure of
official information; FOISA states that information should not be disclosed only if it generates substantial
prejudice among the public (as compared with ‘prejudice’ in FOIA)1. The enactment of FOISA was
prompted by the 1999 consultation document ‘An Open Scotland’ in which Jim Wallace, then Deputy
First Minister, wrote:
‘Openness is central to a modern, mature and democratic society and serves to strengthen
government and empower people’
Openness was one of the core principles of the new devolved Scottish Parliament, and FOI was a
key component of the Liberal Democrat-Labour partnership agreement establishing the principles for
Scotland’s 1997 coalition government.
Hutton, Butler and the Iraq War
FOISA was enacted against a backdrop of events marking unprecedented levels of public interest in and
access to government information. Lord Hutton’s investigation into the circumstances surrounding the
death of the UN weapons inspector, Dr. David Kelly, in 2003 followed by Lord Butler’s Inquiry in 2004
into the intelligence used to justify the war against Iraq revealed an unprecedentedly high level of public
demand for official information, information which never before (and possibly since) would have made it
into the public domain. Both Inquiries were conducted prior to the enactment of FOI in Britain in 2005.
As soon as FOI came in, it was perhaps predictably put to use to find the facts surrounding the decision
by then Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, to support the legality of the use of military force in Iraq. An
unprecedented level of public distrust at this time appeared to be the result of a Blair Government
1 Source: http://www.itspublicknowledge.info/Law/FOISA-EIRsLinks/FOISA_FOIAComparative.asp
2notorious for its spin. In the eyes of Government, it seemed this issue of distrust might be resolved
through encouraging Government and public officials to provide information that the public considered
withheld, through promoting and enforcing openness and transparency. Access to information brings
with it decisions that must be made over whether information is public or private, and involves striking a
balance between risk and responsibility, secrecy and truth.
This flurry of activity served to highlight issues that were, in any event, coming to a head
concerning access to information and the right to know, and threw into question the existing relationship
between citizens and government. Such issues were tempting ground for an anthropologist with an
interest in social relations, and more particularly, the flow of knowledge between people, and people and
institutions. While the seeds of FOI were sewn in the 1980s, long before the Hutton Inquiry, Butler
Inquiry and the Iraq War, the widespread demand for transparency in government, coupled with decisions
that had to be made over what was public and what was private, in the context of FOI, spawned questions
such as: How are decisions over what can be disclosed and what should remain private to be made? How
does the public handle information that is released under FOI? What issues arise concerning trust in the
information received, or in the people giving it?
For an anthropologist, FOISA was a gateway to exploring issues of access, claims, and difference
or division. It could be used as a magnifying glass put up against these issues in our own society and now
appeared the right time to be exploring them with a view to seeing FOISA unravel from the very
beginning—from prior to its coming into force in 2005 to several years into the new regime.
An Anthropologist’s Approach
As an anthropologist doing ‘anthropology at home’, and one who lives and grew up in the contemporary
Britain she describes and analyses, my approach to the study of FOISA, access to information, trust,
transparency, private and public will, of course, be somewhat self-reflexive. That is, this thesis not only
contains concerns and insights that I leave behind me and are about ‘the field’, rather the contemporary
concerns and practices that it addresses, the insights that it offers, apply equally to my own practices and
concerns as an anthropologist and as a person. Like the FOI practitioners I describe, I too in writing this
thesis must make decisions over what should and should not be disclosed (in other words between public
and private).
We, you and I, are making decisions over public and private every day. We are also deciding what
and what not to trust, as citizens, professionals, relatives. In this respect we share the same concerns as
those who use and enforce FOISA. FOI highlights concepts such as trust and transparency and contrasts
information that is deemed public with that which is deemed private. What do these notions reveal about
us, our thoughts, our practices and our behaviour as modern subjects engaged in modern ways? It is these
questions, among others, that this thesis will address.
3It is perhaps unusual to take legislation as a subject of anthropological study, if nothing else
because the effects of legislation are difficult to trace. They are everywhere—in this case, dispersed
throughout Scotland: in the changed behaviour of public authority employees, in the actions that follow
on from the information that is released to citizens, and in the questions and predicaments that the
legislation raises for policy-makers.
Methodologically, I traced the impacts of FOISA by participating in and observing the day to day
work that this Act creates: with public authority employees responsible for handling FOI requests as they
respond to and organize those requests, with end-users as they construct and submit requests, with
Scottish Government policy-makers as they evaluate various organizations’ quarterly reports on the
impact of FOISA. Through participant observation fieldwork such as this, I collected stories. This
qualitative data, in the form of case-studies, or more precisely a collection of moments, is contained here
and forms the bulk of the thesis and informs my analysis of FOISA. The fact that my thesis is largely
made up of stories about people and what they say and do, and that these inform my analysis, of necessity
gives the work a narrative style.
Different moments, each of which constitutes part of a single case-study—about a hospital,
council or group of people—are drawn on in different chapters. This means that the same people,
buildings and topics will come up in different chapters, since although part of the same case-study, I will
be focussing on a different moment, drawing out and extending a different aspect of the case-study, or
providing more detail of one particular moment. In some cases, a conversation or happening that started
in one chapter is taken up or referred to in the next. This repetition of moments and case-studies is to
extend and develop a key insight made in relation to a particular observation. Moments are in themselves
particular. The context in which they were perceived and gathered, and in effect play themselves out,
means that each is distinct and unique. Sometimes the same moment reveals several insights and is used
in different parts of the work to illustrate each of those varying insights. What may appear at first sight as
repetition, or lack of variation in source material, or even laziness on my part is, in fact, a reflection of the
uniqueness of moments and the fact that sometimes no two moments will do the same work for the
purposes of revealing and explaining particular insights.
A Note on Words
Before I introduce the layout of the thesis and a chapter-by-chapter summary, it is perhaps worth offering
a few words on descriptive terms. That is, an introduction to the language of the Act that I use
throughout this thesis—in case-study descriptions, analysis, the introduction and conclusion. This in
some ways becomes my language. Other terms and phrases will be highlighted in boxes and explored as
they arise.
4What is a Practitioner?
This is a term used to describe public authority employees engaged in a specialist activity, irrelevant of
whether this activity is in health care, Freedom of Information, sports and so forth. It refers to the
putting of specialist knowledge into practice.
What is an Officer?
Individuals responsible for enforcing FOI within their authority and handling and responding to FOI
requests were generally referred to as FOI Officers.
What is an Applicant?
An applicant is the official (or legal) term used to describe people who request information from a public
authority under the Act.
Who is the Scottish Information Commissioner (‘SIC’)?
The Scottish Information Commissioner promotes and enforces FOI in Scotland. He has an Office (the
Office of the Scottish Information Commissioner, or ‘OSIC’, and a team of 21 staff who work for him, an
investigation and policy team, a records manager and an operations team.
What is meant by the terms Public and Private?
‘Public’ means both information that is in the public domain and information that is available to the
public under FOI legislation but is not yet in the public domain. ‘Private’ means information that is not in
the public domain and is not to be made available to the public, either because it falls within specific rules
under FOI or because it is outwith FOI.
5This might also be a good place to distinguish between a few words that will come up often and have
important meanings: data, information and knowledge.
What is data?
This is a term that I use to describe information in its raw state, as collected and before any analysis is
done or any context is placed on it. An example might be as simple as the fact that a set of traffic lights is
showing red. On its own this is a mere fact. To the uninitiated it means nothing, but to those of use who
are road users, it means something very important. That is because it has had context added to it. At that
point it ceases to be merely data.
What is information?
This term I use to describe data that has been analysed or contextualised in some way to give it meaning.
In the example above, a road user seeing a red light in front of them receives information, in this case the
instruction to stop.
What is knowledge?
Knowledge is information that has had further layers of context added to it. To extend the above
example, I might know that a particular set of traffic lights stays on red for a longer time than normal and
also know that a traffic policeman is often parked around the corner. Although I might become impatient
at the slowness of the lights, I know that there will be consequences to jumping them. This is knowledge,
gained by adding further layers of context to information.
Introducing the Thesis: Layout and Approach
This thesis is made up of eight chapters: an introduction, six core chapters and a conclusion. Although
the six core chapters stand alone, there are also connections between them, each following on from and
providing context for the next. After introducing the Act in chapter one, each subsequent chapter
addresses either of a pair of opposites or a pair of conjugates, most of which give their names to the
chapters: public and private, subjects and objects (in the chapter on culture change); secrecy and truth;
power and agency; transparency and trust. The paired notions in each chapter are ones that public
authority employees, end-users and policy and decision-makers regularly employed in their descriptions of
what FOISA was about and what it would achieve. These notions, in other words, form the core of FOI
rhetoric in Scotland. I approach each chapter, and the notions that they address, from two perspectives.
The first is to explore these concepts as they are discussed in official documents and rhetoric in relation to
FOISA. The second approach is to explore how these notions are thought about and acted on by people
6in the field. In the appendix is a guide to FOISA, legal terms, and how the Act is used, and also picture
examples and illustrative figures pertaining to this section and to other sections of the thesis.
Chapter-by-Chapter Summary
Chapter One: The Right To Know
In this chapter, I offer a brief history of FOI in Britain and elsewhere. (In the thesis appendix I outline
some necessary, and noteworthy, technical details—an overview of what the legislation covers, what it
entails and how people use it). I set the contemporary scene and offer a glimpse of the context in which
FOI was enacted. I provide an initial assessment of FOISA, thoughts from an anthropologist, which in
turn frames and introduces core points made in the main body of the thesis. This assessment offers a
taste of what an anthropologist might see in FOISA, the questions that FOISA raises and the interest
provoked by the climate in which it was enacted, and why this study is particularly timely. I discuss my
methodological approach and the ethical issues such an investigation and its documentation entails.
I also provide a theoretical ‘took-kit’. This is where the bulk of the theory, on which I draw
throughout the thesis, lies. I will refer to the theory mentioned here as part of and in support of the
analysis in each chapter. Worth noting, however, is that among those on whose work I draw, and that I
acknowledge in this section, there will be a handful of writers to whom I particularly and repeatedly turn
throughout the thesis, whom I acknowledge here.
Chapter Two: Public and Private
In Chapter two, I examine the relationship between Public and Private that lies at the heart of FOISA.
While FOISA provides access to information, it also has provisions for the retention of information
where it is deemed ‘personal’. But decisions over what constitutes personal information are often difficult
to make. There is a tendency for practitioners to consider information about individuals as always being
personal, on the grounds that individuals are disclosed through the disclosure of such information. I
argue that public and private are relational, and in constant flux. Given this, people and organizations, and
the information they hold, could be considered public or private depending on the relational context of a
particular situation. As such, a division between people who stand in a public position and those who
stand in a private one reflects a division within people themselves as they appear either public or private in
their relations with others. I draw on some of the decisions that the SIC has made over public and
private, and look at his reasoning. A particular case is that concerning National Services Scotland (‘NSS’)
and Donald—a researcher at the Scottish Parliament who sought information from NSS that he was
refused. I also introduce a case-study to which I return later in the thesis concerning Duncan, at
Lochhead Council, who has difficulties persuading colleagues to release information they deem private.
7Chapter Three: Culture Change
Chapter three offers an overview of what culture change entails according to official rhetoric and the
intentions of FOISA, including what is expected of public authorities and organizations or persons
working for or in conjunction with them. It addresses the varied manner in which individuals on the
ground respond to the expectation placed on them to disclose information that they hold and, as a result,
the changed way in which people come to perceive themselves, their actions, and their relations with
others. It is the social relations at work in this process that participants appear to fail to recognise. Or
rather, the social relations that were prevalent in chapter two seem to disappear here, or to be made
absent.
In this chapter, I draw on four separate case-studies. The first concerns a case-study that I return
to again in later chapters, that of NHS Glendale in which I consider Colin and Samantha who are its
principle FOI Officers and their responses and thoughts on disclosure. The second concerns the
conferences and meetings that, for FOI practitioners, formed a key part of getting to grips with FOISA.
These conferences provided people with an essential means of meeting other FOI practitioners with
whom they would share their experiences of FOISA. In the third and fourth case-studies, I look at the
thoughts and attitudes to FOI of Morag, a Records Manager for Glendale University, and revisit Duncan
at Lochhead. While the practitioners concerned have different job titles, they are each responsible for
making sure their authority (which is often vast with hundreds of employees), comply with the new
legislation.
Chapter Four: Secrecy and Truth
A change from a culture of secrecy to one of transparency underpins FOISA. This chapter brings
together the findings of the first two chapters: that people ‘know’ through their relations with other
people (chapter two); and that people know in the absence of these relations (chapter three). When these
two ways of knowing come together, not only do people know differently, but people also have different
perceptions of each other’s behaviour. Thus ‘secrecy’ is described from two different perspectives, or
sides—that of FOI practitioners handling and responding to FOI requests and that of applicants whose
story is told in the words of practitioners and in the letters they write and complaints they lodge with the
FOI authorities. It is in putting together two different sides of the same story, that of practitioner and
that of applicants, that two ways of knowledge are made visible. It is as a result of the failure to see the
social relations on which knowledge here depends (one way of knowing) that applicants perceive secrecy
where there is no secrecy (leaving public authority practitioners bewildered and confused). On the other
hand, knowing relationally (the other way of knowing) gives rise to different versions of the truth. The
contradiction between these two different versions of the truth can also be read as secrecy.
8This chapter draws on two case-studies, that of Samantha and Colin once again, at NHS
Glendale, and that of George, an applicant and resident of the small town of Edenside. While Samantha
and Colin have difficulties persuading FOI applicants that they have no information to provide and are
not being secretive, George described insists that I have information that I refuse to, or at least cannot,
share with him—I too, as a researcher, am thought of as secretive.
Chapter Five: Power and Agency
FOI campaigners, and policy-makers, considered power to be a key reason why public officials were
‘secretive’ and sought to withhold information from others—to sustain their own power and deny others
agency. The axiomatic relationship between knowledge and power is one that has been much
documented. That is, power and agency are that which people do or do not have as a result of the
knowledge that they either have or are denied—but as we see from the previous chapter, people are not
always secretive when they are thought to be so. Power here itself is relational, since it depends on the
knowledge that people perceive others to have, and the relationship between them. In this sense it could be
argued that no person or organization, intrinsically, ‘has’ power.
The French philosopher Michel Foucault argues power is an outcome of people’s assumption
that there is a truth to know, and consequently they search for it. On the basis that power is not locatable
in any one person or place, Foucault traces the relationships between statements, persons, things to
explore how power flows through them. But it is not Foucault’s approach to power that I seek to
reinforce in this chapter, rather to challenge his outlook. It is through challenging Foucault’s notion of
social relations as that which only connects discrete entities together in a chain through which I challenge
his view of power. I draw on Marilyn Strathern’s (2006) notion of the relation that is made up of two
parts—a relation through which entities are mutually constituted, and a relation that connects.
Acknowledging the dual characteristic of the relation makes the relation the focal point, rather than the
individual him or herself as at the beginning and end of this relationship. This alters our perception of
power.
In this chapter I draw on two different case-studies. The first concerns NHS Glendale, and Colin
and Samantha’s difficulties with applicants who think that they are being denied information, this time
looking at the applicants’ view that Samantha and Colin are exercising their power to conceal information.
The second concerns Bankside Council, and introduces Robert and Iain who together developed a
framework for the implementation of FOISA at Bankside. Robert and Iain suffer from a brief
confrontation with the SIC, as a result of which they, for a time, lack power.
9Chapter Six: Transparency and Trust
Transparency and trust are core values behind the enacting of FOISA. Of course, in as much that
transparency is also the flip side of secrecy, parallels can be drawn between the findings in this chapter and
chapter four on secrecy and truth —that is, it is the concealment of the relations on which knowledge
depends that in the case-studies leads to perceptions of secrecy and also to non-transparency. Thus calls
for transparency are calls for the disclosure of information that is thought of as concealed.
Much has been written on transparency and trust, separately, and in conjunction with the
evaluation of different FOI laws around the globe. In particular, the recently published book Transparency:
The Key to Better Governance? (Hood and Heald 2006) provides insight into different scholars’, thoughts on
transparency in relation to FOI, all of them prominent in this field of research. Treating transparency
heuristically, I ask what transparency looks like in relation to FOISA, and the impact it has on trust. I
principally argue that, in their efforts to resolve the differences perceived to exist between them, and to
comply with FOISA, people seek to obtain the same knowledge through liaising, conversing and making
contact with others, for example, at large FOIA meetings and conferences. It is through resolving the
divisions between them, that individuals make themselves disappear, or transparent, and the relationship
between them transparent also. Given the absence of relations through which people are themselves
constituted, trust between people appears redundant—an excess of sorts. But treating transparency
heuristically, means transparency here in the form of ‘transparent persons’ throws into question a theory
of transparency ‘as revelation’ on which most theory on transparency is centred. That is, rather than the
divisions between people being explained in terms of people’s non-transparency, might they be explained
in terms of their divided interests and as yet non-conformity?
In this chapter I draw on two case-studies, or rather a string of moments detailing the way in
which FOI practitioners liaise, converse and make contact at meetings and conferences in order to share
their experiences of FOISA, and obtain official and unofficial guidance. The second case-study concerns
that of McBride ferries, which has experienced some difficulties with FOISA, vexatious requesters and the
SIC himself.
I now turn to my first chapter: The Right to Know.
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1
The Right to Know
The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002
The Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 (‘FOISA’) came into force in Scotland in 2005 at the
same time as the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 (‘FOI’) that covers England, Wales and Northern
Ireland. FOISA states:
‘A person who requests information from a Scottish public authority which holds it is
entitled to be given it by the authority’
(FOISA, First Principle)
Each FOI law, to varying degrees, provides people with a right of access to information that public bodies
(in each jurisdiction) hold. In Scotland, the legislation is said to be particularly strong because information
has to cause substantial prejudice (rather than just prejudice) before it can be withheld from those who
have requested it. FOI in Scotland was enacted at a time when the newly devolved Scottish Parliament
was findings its feet. FOI was seen as a means of establishing an open and transparent Scottish
Government, and was one of the key principles that underpinned the 1999 Liberal Democrat-Labour
Partnership Agreement, which established the grounds for Scotland’s (then) coalition government.
As an anthropologist studying FOISA, I contribute to (and challenge) a developing field of
research within on organizations, ‘ways of knowing’, and Scotland. I also build on and provide fresh
insight into contemporary research on FOI legislation and the issues that FOI raises, largely explored to
date within Political Science. It is some of these fields of research that I touch on in the following
paragraphs.
Shared Interests, Divided Origins: A Theoretical ‘Tool Kit’
Freedom of Information
To date, no social anthropologist has conducted research on FOI in Scotland, and very few have taken
FOI legislation in Britain or elsewhere as a research topic. With the exception of Michael Powell (2003),
an American social anthropologist who recently conducted fieldwork research on FOI legislation in
Poland, scholars seem to touch on FOI by way of their interest in concepts with which it is associated,
such as transparency (Marcus and Powell 2003), trust (O’Neill 2002), and government secrecy (although
non-FOI related) (Lattas 1998; Tefft 1980).
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It is a field of research that is dominated by political scientists, lawyers and scholars in business
and records management (Banisar 2006; Birkinshaw 2001; Burt and Taylor 2007; Florini 2007; Hazell
1999; Holsen and Glover 2007; Roberts 2006). Research on FOI in the political sciences and law tends to
fall into two main areas: academics fruitfully trace the history and development of FOI legislation in
jurisdictions such as America, Canada, and New Zealand where FOI was introduced relatively early on
(Banisar 2006; Birkinshaw 2001; Florini 2007; Roberts 2006), and draw attention to its strengths,
weaknesses and the response of public organizations. Others focus on the benefits and implications of
FOI in jurisdictions where the legislation has yet to be introduced or was passed relatively recently (Burt
and Taylor 2007; Neuremberger 1987; Hazell 1999). While some academics take an adversarial stance, for
example Birkinshaw (1990, 2006) puts forward FOI legislation and the right to know as a human right,
others weigh up the benefits and disbenefits of FOI, gathering statistics on the use to which the legislation
is put or the volume of information released (see Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007; Glover and Holsen
2007). Such examinations tend to be evaluative (see Hood and Heald 2006), posing questions such as:
does FOI mean more information, and more information mean better? Does transparency enhance or
reduce trust and efficiency?
Most well-known for his study of FOI legislation around the world, government secrecy and
transparency is the academic and lawyer Alasdair Roberts (2004; 2005; 2006a; 2006b). His work holds
prominence with and is drawn on by academics within the disciplines of law, political science, and now,
anthropology, as well as FOI policy-makers and the Scottish and UK Information Commissioners, as they
promote and enforce FOI legislation in Britain. In particular, Roberts’ has published work on the UK,
US, and Canadian FOI Acts. His extensive knowledge of these Acts enables him to draw comparisons
between different FOI laws around the world, their contents and use. In placing each (newly enacted or
established) FOI law within the wider comparative and political framework in which it sits, he scrutinizes
the weakness and strengths of each law. Roberts is particularly interested in the responses of public
institutions to FOI, and the manner in which institutions seem to simply adapt their systems and methods
to work around, rather than work with FOI. Indeed, as he notes in his recently published book, Blacked
Out: Government secrecy in an Information Age (2006):
‘..the struggle for openness is far from over […] politicians and bureaucrats around the world
have used [tactics] to preserve government secrecy […] profound changes around in the
structure of government—privatization of public services, the rise of powerful international
organizations, the growth of tightly knit networks of security agencies—are complicating
campaigns for openness’.
A highly regarded specialist in the field of FOI, government related transparency, and
government secrecy, I draw on Roberts’ work throughout this thesis.
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Anthropology of Organizations
The fact that there has been little research conducted by anthropologists on FOI to date seems partly
because anthropological methods—primarily participant observation field research—require
anthropologists researching FOI to gain access to particular people working for particular organizations,
which is often problematic.
While many anthropological field sites are often initially inaccessible, and require an
anthropologist to be actively incorporated into a field by those already in it—whether this ‘field’
constitutes a village or an Act of Parliament—the anthropology of organizations is particularly difficult
since it demands access to a closed space; the anthropologist’s subject of study lies behind solid, often
impenetrable walls. As such, some argue that anthropologists are still busy finding a way in to the study of
organizations (Ouroussoff, pers. com.). Most literature on organizations is perhaps for this reason written
in the form of a guide to the study (Gellner and Hirsh 2001). It has also been suggested that—on
obtaining access—anthropologists are often too close to management, and themselves too familiar with
bureaucratic practice, to either realize or question the familiar structures in which they work (Alvesson
1993, Ouroussoff 1993, 2001).
Anthropologists have, according to Corsin Jimenez’s (2007) recent publication on the Anthropology
of Organizations, been studying organizations for over sixty years. Over this time, anthropology in and on
organizations has made significant contributions to social and organizational theory. Indeed, in her study
of organizations and of government, Wright (1994, 1998) uses new ways of examining corporate
structures to further ideas about ‘culture’ more generally.
Strathern’s edited volume on Audit Culture (2000b) focuses on issues of accountability and ethics
in corporate environments, including Academia. She remarks on the subtle persuasiveness of
accountability that people who work in organizations of various kinds unknowingly accommodate. Audit
practices, she argues, ‘have direct consequences, and, in the view of many, dire ones for intellectual
production’ (2000b: foreword). In examining these practices, alongside others featured in the volume,
Strathern questions and analyses practices that both occur within and extend beyond the ‘organization’.
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Ways of Knowing
While anthropological methods appear harder to conduct in some places than others, understanding what
knowledge is and how it works for different people in different social contexts is often considered at the
heart of the discipline of anthropology. As such this study concerns ways of knowing, and in particular,
ways of knowing that pivot on the social relationships in which people are enmeshed, and that they make
either obvious or absent.
I am not the first to explore ways of knowing. Many anthropologists have taken this up as a
subject of study, drawing on their own knowledge of what their subjects of study think, say and do in the
field—Amazonia, Africa, Melanesia and so on.
Harris (2007) writes in his edited volume, Ways of Knowing: New Approaches in the Anthropology of
Experience and Learning: ‘that there are multiple ways of knowing the world has become a truism’. This
volume is a collection of works by anthropologists concerned with the way in which other people, as well
as themselves, come know the world and the different ways in which they know it. Writers in the volume
explore knowing as a practical and continuous activity and the implications of this understanding for
anthropology. Knowing the world, Harris writes, is always bound up with the world. That is, a person
does not leave their environment behind to know, nor do they stop to know, they continue knowing.
Thus the individual papers this volume contains could be said to explore ways of knowing,
phenomenologically: part of the appeal of phenomenology (the study of things as they are perceived, not
things as they are) is its insistence that any attempt at objectivity is always mediated by the context and
personalities within which knowing objectively is framed. This raises the question, is it indeed possible to
know ‘objectively’?
At the same time, as anthropologists work alongside those with whom they engage in the field in
practical activities, some consider the possibility that people come to know through doing, or such
practical activity. The question this raises for anthropology is whether tacit (practical) and perceptual
(phenomenological) ways of knowing are different modes of apprehension or fundamentally the same?
Harris’s volume is part of series of works arising out of similarly themed conferences organized
by the University of St Andrews Social anthropology department, over the twenty-five years of its
existence. The first conference was on Power and Knowledge, published as Power and Knowledge:
Anthropological and Sociological Approaches (1985). The relationship between power and knowledge was
perhaps topical of the time, particularly in light of the extensive work of the French philosopher Michel
Foucault well-known for his study of power during the 1960s, 70s and 80s, to his death in 1984. In this
volume, those contributing to the conference and published volume seem concerned with the power
relationship between them and their subject of study, and studying how their subjects of study conceive of
this relation (if it is one that exists for them at all).
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Dominic Boyer (2007) in Harris’ volume, citing Crick (1982), states: ‘the anthropology of
knowledge is not a subfield but merely a reminder of what anthropology is centrally concerned with’. In a
special issue of Ethnos (Volume 70, Issue 2, June 2005), Boyer continues: ‘In truth, it would be hard to
locate anthropological research if it did not, at some level, speak to and about human knowledge […] how
could any investigation of meaningful action and experience not also, at once, be an investigation of local
schemes and settlements of knowledge and modes of knowing?’ (2005: 141). An explicit engagement with
knowledge and knowing was key to the disciplinary development of anthropology in the twentieth
century. In particular, debates in texts like Tylor’s Primitive Culture, Frazer’s The Golden Bough, and Levy-
Bruhl’s How Natives Think concerned the question of the universality of knowing. Were different ways of
knowing equivalent or some more scientific and valid than others? While these questions are ones that we
have indeed resolved, the matter of the different ways in which people know remains central to the
discipline. In fact, many would say is the discipline of anthropology.
Scotland
This study also takes Scotland as its regional focus, through the fact that I seek to explore the particular
effects of FOI in Scotland. A handful of anthropologists have made Scotland their research focus. While
more commonly anthropologists take an interest in the Islands of Scotland such as Islay (Whitehouse
n.p.), the Hebridean islands (Ennew 1980, Mewett 1982, Parman 1990, Macdonald 1997, Kohn 2001),
Shetland (Byron 1986, Cohen 1987) and Orkney (Forsythe 1980), some have focused on mainland
Scotland including the Highlands (Jedrej and Nuttall 1996), the east coast (Nadel-Klein 2003, Scheldeman
2006, Rapport 2008), the Scottish Borders (Neville 1994, Gray 2000), the south west (Smith 2006; 2008)
and Ayrshire and Angus (Strathern and Stewart 2001). In this thesis, I particularly draw on the work of
Anthony Cohen (1987; 1996) who writes on issues of identity in the Shetland Isles. His interests lie in the
manner in which individuals negotiate their discreetly different and collective identity there. I also draw
on the work of Nigel Rapport (1997; 2008) (with whom Cohen has written on the conscious self, 2005)
who draws on his understanding of people in the English village of Wanet, and puts forward a theory of
‘individuality’ that he sees also at work in Scotland (see for example, Rapport’s University of Edinburgh
Institute of Governance, Identity Briefing No. 10, January 2006, and his more recently published book
2008).
Worth mentioning is the impact of the Age of Enlightenment in Scotland, and the Scottish
Enlightenment. Largely because the Scottish Enlightenment had an influence on many institutions and
architectural arrangements (e.g. Robert Adams’ National Archives Building was a modification of Jeremy
Bentham’s Enlightenment inspired Panoptican) that we still recognize in Scotland today and will be
indirectly addressed in this thesis. The Scottish Enlightenment also provides some background to the
legislative framework in Scotland within which we currently operate. The Scottish Enlightenment was a
project by leaders of the Scottish professional middle classes to reinvent Scotland as part of a modern and
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dynamic Britain, in a manner that would give Scots access to expanding world markets through economies
of scale and the protection of the British navy (Murdoch 2007). In particular, it brought with it an
emphasis on national unity leading to the formation of a Union between Scotland and England. The
problem lay in how so-called fragmented parts might be united, that is, Scotland united with England.
Most in Scotland were in favour of a federative model (a political association of equal States), yet some
also seemed to consider that an incorporative union (in which the government and institutions of the
smaller state would be absorbed into those of the larger) was more conducive to imperial expansion
(Manning 2002). While the potential fragmentation of the Union that emerged in 1707 remains in the
minds of policy and decision-makers today, it is perhaps an awareness of potential disharmony that
accounts for people’s behaviour in the field of FOISA, suggesting that the emphasis on union instilled in
individuals by the Scottish Enlightenment remains.
In addition to the above, the Enlightenment emphasized the flattening of inequality, perceived a
result of people’s lack of access to knowledge. Visibility and illumination tropes were particularly
emphasised by Enlightenment thinkers since it was through shedding light on persons and things that
people might come into and challenge the truth (Jay 1993). A Freedom of Information Act, providing
citizens with a right of access to information that public authorities hold, flattens perceived inequalities
that are the outcome of the lack of distribution of information, and sheds light on the inners workings of
various levels of government thereby making organizations ‘transparent’ only seems to embody the
Enlightenment ethos.
In the paragraphs that immediately follow, I explore some of my main theoretical supports, individuals on
whose work I explicitly and regularly draw throughout this thesis. In the sections that follow, I touch on
the work of scholars more generally pertinent to this thesis, and on whose work I implicitly draw.
Main Theoretical Supports: Anthropology, Law, Policy and Governance
This thesis draws on recent anthropological scholarship in the area of law and policy. In particular, I draw
on the work of the anthropologist Annelise Riles, who is also an academic of law. As a lawyer and an
anthropologist, her work focuses on the knowledge-making practices of law, which she contrasts with
those of anthropology (Property as Legal Knowledge, 2004). Her doctoral research (The Network Inside Out,
2000) concerned the practices of United Nations delegates at the Fourth UN World Conference on
Women in Beijing in 1995, as a result of which she has subsequently made ‘documents’ (pillars of
bureaucratic practice) her research focus (Documents: Artefacts of Modern Knowledge, 2006), the study of which
she describes as a way of obtaining insight into modern ways of knowing: documents are paradigmatic of
modern knowledge practices and thus ‘provide a ready-made ground for experimentation with how to
apprehend modernity ethnographically’ (2006: 2)
In the context of the Fourth UN World Conference on Women, Riles attended delegate meetings
and she describes the way in which legal documents were generated at each level of meeting by cutting
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and pasting words, sentences and paragraphs taken from other legal documents. ‘[T]he skill of the
exercise lay in the detail… The objective was not so much to achieve transparent meaning as to satisfy the
aesthetics of logic and language’ (2001: 79). Her experiences of the drafting and transfer of documents in
relation to the Beijing Conference is in some ways similar to my experiences of the document culture of
FOISA. Here, documents—reports, consultation or policy documents—were drafted according to a logic
provided by documents drafted in previous meetings. Through her focus on the drafting of documents,
Riles underlines the failure of lawyers to see meaning in the way an anthropologist might.
I also draw on the work of Marilyn Strathern, in particular her more recent work on kinship and
law (Kinship, Law and the Unexpected: Relatives are Always a Surprise, 2005). At the heart of this research is the
issue of how anthropologists come to ‘know’ of others’ knowledge making practices. Since in seeking to
uncover culture or historical constructs, anthropologists are bound by ways of knowing that create—as
much as uncover—these constructs. The subject of her research is ‘the anthropologist’s relation’, so-
called because knowledge of social relations was something that anthropology—a discipline emerging out
of the Enlightenment—came into in its search for the truth(s) about human beings. This knowledge gave
anthropologists a means of studying relations elsewhere, only to realize that outwith the modern world,
their lack of knowledge in this area suggested they were the ones who were not so advanced.
Strathern’s work on knowledge and information is particularly relevant to this thesis. For
example, in her examination of 18th century scientific information gathering practices, Strathern argues
that what emerged from, but was by no means invented by, the scientific revolution was:
‘…knowledge capable of looking to more than one source. Truth might rest in the
persuasiveness of concepts, as logically connected to other concepts, or truth might rest in
the persuasiveness of persons, bringing with them the guarantee of professional expertise,
and in either case relations had to hold’ (11).
It is the latter way of knowing on which she later draws but it is the former way that informed
scientific ways of knowing, where scientific truths were determined by the quality of the information to
hand, not in its presentation, and individual actors were screened out of the evaluative process. The value
of writing lay in how it stood up to other claims about the world. However, the author became part of an
assembly of authors. Strathern quotes Shapin (1994) writing on the problems of trust engendered in the
collective-character of empirical knowledge-making: ‘scientific knowledge is produced by and in a network
of actors’ and ‘knowledge about people was constitutively implicated in knowledge of things’ (2005: 61).
What counted as knowledge, depended, it seems, on what people were willing to attest. Accountability
was above all a social matter: it was relations that produced knowledge out of information, and it was by
virtue of being relational that knowledge was accountable (Strathern 2005: 62). What seemed to be
uncovered were the relations that made something true.
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I also draw on the work of Tony Crook (2000, 2006, 2007), an anthropologist whose research is
largely inspired by his experiences of knowledge practices in Bolivip, Papua New Guinea. Here, in
Bolivip, knowledge is imagined as ‘a bodily resource’ that can be extended or combined with others.
Crook contrasts ways of knowing in Bolivip with ways of knowing in anthropology that imagines ‘it is
possible to separate and divide social and analytical relations, whereby knowledge travels between persons
as a thing’. It is Crook’s (2007) re-description of Riles’ work (a contemporary of his as a postgraduate at
Cambridge), his research concerning ‘secrecy’ in the context of other anthropologists’ study of it and of
Bolivip (2006, 2007), and his work on ‘responsibility’ in relation to genetic modification (2000) on which I
specifically draw here.
I also turn to the work of Michel Foucault. Foucault’s power analytics and his work on power in
relation to knowledge or Truth (in Gordon 1980) are particularly relevant to this thesis. But while
discussing Foucault’s work in depth throughout the thesis, it is not his theory of power that I uphold—
rather drawing on my ethnography, I challenge his power analytics.
Max Weber and Bureaucratic Practices
In her examination of documents Riles (2006) draws on the work of the sociologist Max Weber. Weber is
considered one of the founders of modern sociology. In his examination of Western society, Weber
considered behaviour in the West as increasingly and primarily dominated by goal-orientated rationality.
Weber began his studies of rationality in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in which he showed
that the Protestant ethic was behind a shift in emphasis in Western society towards economic gain. The
rational roots to this doctrine he explores, in his later works, in the context of bureaucracy.
The document, according to Weber, takes up a special status as part of the foundations of the
organization and is a so-called effective means of knowledge transfer: ‘The management of the modern
office is based upon written documents (the files)’ (Weber 1948: 197). It seems documents, as Weber
describes them, have a particular function to bridge ‘gaps’ in knowledge. Weber highlights persons in the
context of the bureaucracy as if cogs in the machine:
‘…the position of the official is in the nature of a duty. This determines the internal
structure of his relations … Entrance to an office … is considered an acceptance of a
specific obligation of faithful management in return for a secure existence’ (1948: 199)
He continues:
‘[Bureaucracy’s] specific nature, as welcomed by capitalism, develops the more perfectly the
more the bureaucracy is dehumanised, the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from
official business, love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements
which escape calculation. This is the specific nature of bureaucracy and it is appraised as its
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special virtue’ (Weber 1948: 216)
The effective transfer of knowledge through the use of documents of which there is no change in
meaning and in which people (are assumed to) take uniform interest is secured by the fact that persons
take on the form of things. In other words, the individuality of people is not implied in the use of or
perception of these documents—those handling and producing them could be anyone. This perhaps
points to why Riles would see them as paradigmatic artifacts of modern knowledge-making practices, and
why the management of the modern office is based on them.
Scholars writing on openness and government secrecy also popularly draw on Weber. Secrecy,
Weber argues, is characteristic of bureaucratic life:
‘Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by
keeping their knowledge and intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to
be an administration of ‘secret sessions’: in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action
from criticism […] The concept of the official secret is the specific invention of bureaucracy,
and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude… In facing a
parliament, the bureaucracy, out of sure power instinct, fights every attempt of the
parliament to gain knowledge by means of its own experts or from interest groups…
Bureaucracy naturally welcomes a poorly informed and hence a powerless parliament – at
least in so far as ignorance somehow agrees with the bureaucracy’s interests’ (Weber 1948:
233-234)
A familiar equation that takes ‘knowledge as power’ also suggests that at the root of secrecy is
power (Roberts 2006; Wilson 1984), and a well-governed public whose lack of knowledge of what else
there is to know guarantees their equality in each other’s eyes. Secrecy, here, in other words, conceals the
inequity that it establishes.
Jeremy Bentham, his Panopticon Design, and his Critics
Jeremy Bentham, inspired by Enlightenment thought that emphasized visibility and access, designed his
Inspection House or Panopticon, which in his eyes would facilitate transparent governance. The
Panopticon was a circular building made up of many cells with a central observation tower from which the
all-seeing inspector could supervise numerous inmates simultaneously. Each cell had a window on the
outer side of the building and also on the inner side corresponding to the windows of the tower. The
central observation tower did not always have to be occupied by a warden for inmates to feel the effects
of power. This was a building designed to illuminate the persons it contained as well as Bentham’s own
management of them (Bentham 1823). It was an architectural and management arrangement that
Bentham imagined might be applied to hospitals, factories and schools, and in fact acted as a model for
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language laboratories where teachers could listen in to pupils’ conversations without them knowing.
Bentham continues to influence the design of buildings such as hospitals, libraries, and prisons today.
Jeremy Bentham is regarded by scholars with an interest in government secrecy as one of the first
thinkers to conceive of and actively promote transparent governance through his design of the
Panopticon. In the opening pages of his book on government secrecy, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in an
Information Age, Roberts (2006) notes the importance of Bentham’s Panopticon design for governance
since, in principle, it reverses the power relationship between government and citizens, who are no longer
the ones governed, ‘The eye of the public makes the statesman virtuous’ (Bentham 1785). However,
rather than reversing the power relation between citizens and the public, there are those who consider the
Panopticon facilitates a kind of power that remains firmly in the hands of government.
Foucault and His Followers
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher, is known for his work on power, and the relations of power,
and in particular on the axiomatic relationship between power and knowledge. Although it is not
Foucault’s power analytics that I take up in this thesis, but challenge his notion of power drawing on my
ethnography, it is worth touching on his ideas here.
Foucault appears centrally concerned with how persons turn themselves into subjects and treat
others as objects. This has occurred, he argues throughout the course of recent history, in one of three
ways: by ‘dividing practices’2, ‘scientific classification’, and self-scrutiny or ‘subjectification’.
Dividing practices he describes in instances where lepers are isolated from those who are healthy,
the mad separated from the sane, poor from the rich, men from women. This method of separation both
objectifies subjects and normalizes certain ways of being, thus ‘human beings are given both social and
personal identity’ (Rabinow 1982: 8).
The second method of objectification of the subject is through scientific classification3. Here, he
points to the way in which ‘the discourses of life, labour and language were structured into disciplines’
that, like natural science, appeared to deal with the universals of human social life and progress logically
(Rabinow 1982: 9). Their discontinuity, however, and apparent conceptual break from preceding
disciplines enabled Foucault to approach such means of classification in terms of knowledge and power;
the way in which life, labour, and language was structured was the outcome of different systems of power.
Thirdly, Foucault points to ‘subjectification’ where the person turns him or herself into a subject.
Rather than passive individuals who are subject to the power of others, Foucault points to instances of
self-formation where the person is active. Psychiatry might, for example, be a form of subjectification of
2 See Foucault Madness and Civilisation and Birth of the Clinic, and later in Discipline and Punish, where individuals are
separated and classified in relation to others.
3 See Foucault The Order of Things
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the self, since it entails self-correction at the hands of the psychiatrist, and at the same time, is an example
of a dividing practice where a division is made between the psychiatrist and his or her patient.
It is in light of this framework of analysis that Foucault also looked on Bentham’s Panopticon as
a means through which this power flowed: while those overseen by the warden became ‘objects’ of power,
the warden him or herself was enmeshed in a network of power that flowed through people, statements
and things, and turned them into ‘subjects' of power.
Following Foucault, Shore and Roberts (1995) critically analyse new systems for assessing quality
in university research and teaching, and in particular the Government White Paper entitled ‘Higher
Education: A New Framework’ that distinguishes between ‘three mechanisms designed to ensure quality
in Higher Education … Quality Control … Quality Audit [and] Quality Assessment’ (1993: 4). Similarly
to Foucault, they describe new management practices in higher education as disciplinary technologies that
are geared to enhance efficiency and productivity, and ‘control, classify and contain teachers’ (1).
While power flows through people, things and statements, the relations between which, Foucault
argues, points to what is true, there continues to be debate within anthropology as to what governs these
relations and determines what we come to know—and thus what we might look on as ‘true’. In a way, we
return to the question of knowledge and ‘ways of knowing’.
Meaning and Value
Strathern (2005: 63) writes, ‘One grasps a piece of information as knowledge by being aware of its context
or grounds, that is, of how it sustains a relationship to other pieces of information; in short, knowledge is
gained through knowledge’ (italics added). In the current study, as information was passed between
people handling information requests under FOISA, they were aware of its changing meaning and how it
might be (unpredictably) used by those receiving it. Data might start out as data, and be turned into
information when in relation to other data. However, it was as information came into relation with other
information, itself attached or associated with particular important persons, that information also had
meaning—that is, appeared something to be thought or acted on.
Georg Simmel (1990) in The Philosophy of Money, argues that value—and therefore our interest in a
particular thing, whether information or otherwise— lies in the scarcity of an object: we desire objects if
we think they will be difficult to achieve or to obtain. The value of an object is, then, proportional to its
availability. ‘I [have shown]’, Simmel argues, ‘that [the] process of the formation of values develops with
the increase in distance between the consumer and the cause of his enjoyment… distance, measured not
in terms of enjoyment, in which the distance disappears, but in terms of desire, which is engendered by
the distance and seeks to overcome it’ (69). As an advocator of FOI, Wilson (1984) also argues that
people withhold information so as to increase its value. Value, here, appears to lie in the availability of a
particular thing.
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But in writing in the context of gift and commodity exchange, and the value attributed to the
thing being brought or exchanged, and the reason for its particular value, other scholars argue that the
value of an object lies in the persuasiveness of persons with whom it is associated. They thus explore the
value attributed to an object as a consequence of its attachment to a subject and through this challenge the
subject-object distinction itself.
Subject or Object?
Marcel Mauss ([1950] 1990) writing on Polynesian gift exchange in The Gift, draws a distinction between
gift and commodity exchange. On gift exchange he writes, ‘What imposes obligation in the present
received and exchanged, is the fact that the thing received is not inactive. Even when it has been
abandoned by the giver, it still possesses something of him’ (11-12). The value of the gift object, here, is
in the person who gives it and the gift as a result seems inalienable from them. That the thing exchanged
is inalienable means that an alliance is not temporary but, Gregory (1982) explains, persons seem bound in
perpetual interdependence. Gift exchange appears to establish ‘a personal qualitative relationship between
the subjects transacting’, (Gregory 1982: 41-42). It seems that in a gift economy persons and things take
on the form of persons, whereas in a commodity economy, people and things take on the social form of
objects. Mauss examined gift giving not only in terms of from whom or what an object derives value and
agency but in terms of what an object in the process seems to become. He thus appeared to go some way
towards challenging the distinction between subjects and objects, persons and things. However, as
Henare, Holbraad and Wastell (2007: 19) note in their edited volume, Thinking Through Things: Theorising
Artefacts Ethnographically, while Mauss comments on the inadequacy of persons and things as categories
with respect to Polynesian gift exchange, he stops short of revising these categories altogether. But it was
in challenging the distinction between subjects and objects that Mauss also explored where value itself lay.
In his attempt to fashion a different approach to art objects, Alfred Gell (1998) sought ‘to
produce a theory of art objects that looks anthropological…’ (Reed 2005: 222). Reed argues, ‘he wants his
theory of art to take the form of analysis anthropologists adopt when examining more conventional
subjects such as kinship, gender or exchange’. Gell sought to question, or at least explore, the relationship
between persons and things, and in so doing went some way to highlight their interchangeability (Reed
2005). Yet he did not entirely break down the distinction between them. Indeed, in arguing that a theory
of art objects might look like one of kinship or exchange, he seems only to sustain the very distinction. As
Leach (2007) comments, Gells casts objects only as secondary agents: their agency remains irreducibly
human in origin, that is, the value and agency of an object is attributed to the persons doing the
exchanging, and objects themselves remain inanimate.
Reed (2005), in his exploration of text production, as well as the kind of knowledge
anthropologists might have of texts, draws on Gell’s examination of art objects. In particular, the ways in
which objects can substitute for persons, which was, he agues, what particularly intrigued Gell (Reed 2005:
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222). Writing on text production in the context of weblogging, Reed states that, as with art objects, one
might argue that webloggers (or bloggers) consider weblogs as substitutes or extensions of themselves:
‘…unlike many text producers in the academy (including anthropologists), these keepers of
online journals or diaries are explicitly concerned with substituting texts for persons.
Bloggers do not spend much time interpreting weblogs, they are far more concerned with
the network of relations that these digital texts mediate and with the kinds of agency weblogs reveal’ (224-
25, my italics)
It is themselves that bloggers seek to depict. Bloggers put themselves forward unreservedly:
blogs are of the moment, a record of how individuals felt or thought at the time, often constituting rants
about work colleagues, friends, family, and a way of exorcising oneself onto the page. Bloggers get a
certain thrill out of their blog being a public document, something that might be read by anyone. It is the
bloggers themselves that readers of blogs seem to be consuming. Browsing or reading text elicits a
response, similar commentary, or a question from other bloggers. As it does so, and like the relations
between data, between information and between persons that I later describe in relation to FOISA, a
network of intersecting text organically grows. This network, Reed explains, is akin to a network of
bloggers, text depicting their views as if replacements for them. It is in this manner that Reed explores
how text (objects) substitute for persons in depicting their particular form. But text also takes on a life of
its own. It has new form and new meaning in relation to other texts. As people’s accounts are joined by
those of others who comment on what bloggers write, a network of text builds up which has new
meaning in relation. People, Reed argues, come to substitute for text as it appears to say new things about
them—to depict persons differently. Individuals who first know each other through weblogging, on
meeting in real instances do not quite know what to make of each other. Text appears an agent with
agency in its own right, and to mediate relations between persons instead of persons.
Reed here reveals text or objects as acting as subjects and also collapses the distinction between
them. His description of bloggers’ postings that form a network of interrelating statements is not unlike
my own description of information disclosed under FOISA that has new meaning and new form in
relation to other information, such that true meaning appears lost—a tactic used by practitioners to hide
the meaning of information, and an issue that also concerns them. The point is that objects appear as
subjects in the manner in which their form and meaning changes in relation to other subjects. Thus value
appears to lie in their (changing) form (or meaning) and is not solely derived from the subjects with which
or whom objects are associated, as if things themselves are secondary agents and inanimate. Form, but
also value, is the consequence of a network of relations and the connections that people can read between
subjects.
Allan Pottage (2004), an academic of law, turning to social anthropology, addresses the (new)
dilemma lawyers face in determining what constitute persons and things: ‘In Western legal systems’, he
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argues, ‘persons and things are now problems rather than presuppositions. One could point to
technology, and biotechnology in particular, as the main factor here, but there are other reasons for the
implosion of the old legal division between persons and things’ (2004: 1). The boundary between persons
and things itself appears an artefact of modern knowledge practices, and must be worked out in legal
practice.
Translation and Purification
It is the relations people can read between subjects (information and persons) and their interests in them
that gives information particular meaning on which people might act. It is also these connections that
appear to determine decisions over public and private, what constitutes valuable information and thus
what is in the public interest to disclose. However, it is these connections that decisions over public and
private also conceal: information is public and disclosed for the very reason that it says nothing about
individual persons, their interests and the connections that can be read between subjects in relation.
Latour (1993), writing on modernity and its constitution, argues that modernity—truth and its
discovery—comes with our ability to separate practices of purification from practices of translation.
These two practices must remain distinct if we are to remain modern. The practice of translation
‘…creates mixes between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture’. It corresponds to
what Latour calls networks and:
‘…would link in one continuous chain the chemistry of the upper atmosphere, scientific and
industrial strategies, the preoccupations of heads of state, the anxieties of ecologists;
[whereas purification] would establish a partition between a natural world that has always
been there, a society with predictable and stable interests and stakes, and discourse that is
independent of both reference and society’ (10-11)
So long as we consider translation and purification as separate processes, Latour argues, ‘we are
truly modern – that is, we willingly subscribed to the critical project, even though that project is developed
only through the proliferation of hybrids down below’. But as soon as these processes are seen in
conjunction, and to work together, we are no longer modern and things appear no longer pure. As Latour
states, ‘As soon as we direct our attention simultaneously to the work of purification and the work of
hybridization, we immediately stop being wholly modern…. we become retrospectively aware that the two
sets of practices have always already been at work…’ (11).
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History of FOI in Britain and Elsewhere
A General History
Freedom of Information, popularly translated into the counterpart, ‘the right to know’, is a global
phenomenon. Over seventy countries around the world now have access rights to information (Banisar
2006), such the United States, Canada, New Zealand and more recently China. Alasdair Roberts (2006) is
most notable for his detailed theoretical research and practical investigation of Freedom of Information
laws and Government secrecy around the world. It is with his expertise and good work in mind, that I
offer a brief history of FOI here.
FOI took root in Finland and Sweden much earlier than elsewhere. Sweden has had a Freedom
of the Press Act as part of its constitution since 1766, which gives the press the right to disseminate
information in printed form—enacted, it has been said, because it was useful means by which the King of
Sweden could obtain information on others. A key and remarkable feature of the Swedish Freedom of
the Press Act was that it gave citizens the right to demand documents from government bodies.
Centuries later, the 1966 American Freedom of Information Act followed the Swedish and
Finnish FOI Acts. The American FOI Act was at the time considered a bit of an oddity. The FOI laws
in Sweden and Finland provided the right to official information, but most information accessible under
the American FOI Act would not have been considered ‘official’ (Roberts 2006: 14). The phrases
‘freedom of information’ and ‘the right to know’ were first coined by members of a group of American
journalists who, after World War Two, campaigned for a right of access to information. Kent Cooper
(1956) coined the phrase ‘the right to know’, while Herbert Brucker (1964) first used the term ‘freedom of
information’ (Marcus and Powell 2003: 329). While during war-time journalists reasonably expected
information to be censored and carefully channeled in the interests of national security, it was during
peace time and in light of the fact that the American government continued to operate an oppressive
regime of information control, that journalists (and others) began campaigning for access to information
and increased government transparency in the United States.
Before American journalists took a stand to propose an American Freedom of Information Act,
progressive reformers recognized the need for bureaucratic power to be held in check. In 1946 the
American Congress adopted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which ‘required federal officials to
provide notice about proposed new rules in the recently created Federal Register, and provide interested
parties an opportunity to comment. It… gave citizens a right to fair treatment and a right to appeal unfair
decisions… [as well as] a rough guarantee of access to information’ (Roberts 2006: 13).
Yet a rough guarantee of access was still not enough. In 1950 journalist Harold Cross was
commissioned by the American Society of Newspaper Editors to write a report on the problem of
government secrecy. This included noting the weakness of the APA. It was Cross who first proposed a
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new FOI law (building on the notions put forward by Cooper and Brucker) that acknowledged the right
to know and created and enforced the presumption that all citizens have access to all government records.
It was he who first conceived of an American Freedom of Information Act (Roberts 2006: 13).
As the post-world war Truman and Eisenhower administrations tightened their grip on secrecy in
the early part of the Cold War, journalists became increasing interested in a right to know, and by the early
1960s in America a growing number of consumer and environmental campaign groups also supported the
notion. It was in 1966 that the FOIA was eventually introduced, establishing a right to information held
by government agencies. It articulated the presumption that government documents should be publicly
accessible, and included provisions to ensure that officials complied.
Three Waves
The American adoption of an FOI law in 1966, and the strengthening of access to information in the
wake of the Watergate scandal in 1972, started the modern history of FOI. Birkinshaw (2001) notes there
have been three distinct waves in which FOI legislation has been adopted around the world. For various
reasons, Canada, Australia and New Zealand all adopted FOI legislation in the early 1980s and over the
next ten years FOI legislation was adopted throughout Europe and the Commonwealth. This constituted
the second wave of FOI laws, the first consisting of its enactment in Sweden and America. It was not
until the 1990s that FOI began to emerge as an international norm, marking the third wave of enactment.
This was partly because the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’), the
World Bank, and the Council of Europe championed it. FOI legislation was passed in the UK in the third
wave of FOI development, comparatively late, and behind five of its G8 counterparts and ahead of two—
which were Germany and Russia (McDonald 2006: 129).
Despite its profound influence, twenty years on from its enactment, only eleven countries had
comparable FOI laws (Roberts 2002: 14). Previously considered a luxury, motivated by calls from civil
society organizations, the media and the international diplomatic network for increased transparency,
many more countries—such as China and Jamaica—have recently begun to adopt FOI. Only in the last
ten years have over half the FOI laws around the world been passed, and in the last two that dozens of
countries have adopted access to information laws.
The change has been particularly dramatic in Central and Eastern Europe. The fall of the Berlin
Wall and the crumbling of the USSR led to a spate of FOI laws in the region—with the Ukraine and
Hungry adopting FOI in 1992, Azerbaijan in 2005, and Macedonia in 2006. Its more widespread adoption
in Europe is largely attributed to the work of George Soros’s Open Society Institute, that took the lead in
promoting transparency as a means of developing democracy in the transition from the Cold War era
(Banisar 2006). While the European Convention (‘EC’) on Human Rights does not strictly include a right
to obtain information from public authorities, it does specify that information must be provided in certain
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cases, for example, where a refusal to provide information infringes individual rights with respect to
private and family life (article 8)4.
Interest in FOI in the Americas has been strong. Mexico has one of the strongest FOI laws,
overseen by an advanced information system that keeps track of all requests and ensures that they are
answered on time. Laws have been adopted in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, Panama, Peru,
Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, Antigua and Barbuda. In most countries, pressures have come from
the World Bank and the Organization of American States.
In the Asia-Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand were the first to adopt FOI laws. South
Korea and Thailand adopted laws in the 1990s, and Japan adopted a national law in 2000. India adopted a
weak national law in 2002 following the adoption of laws in a dozen separate states with stories of their
use by activists against corrupt local governments. This national FOI law has more recently been
strengthened.
In the Middle East, only Israel has adopted a national FOI law. In Africa progress has also been
slow. Many Governments have been pressed to adopt access to information laws, but the old era of the
Official Secrets Act still predominates. In Uganda, an FOI law was more recently approved, and the
Kenya and Nigeria have committed to adopt an FOI law (Banisar 2006).
Most FOI laws offer the same basic provisions, generally because they have been modelled on the
American FOI Act. Anyone can ask for recorded information, while some newer Acts state that
individuals have the right to information in any form. Some legislation—such as Scotland FOI Act—
distinctly stipulates from which bodies individuals can obtain information, while other legislation relies on
a more general statement of designation—public bodies that exercise a public function (Banisar 2006).
4 The Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe). Research Paper 01/17. p. 22.
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The UK adopted its FOI Acts relatively late, behind five of its G8 counterparts and ahead of two. The
following shows the year in which each G8 country adopted FOI legislation:








The motive for adopting FOI legislation appears to differ for each jurisdiction. ‘…by the 1990s
many countries were adopting FOI for quite different reasons: to win credit with donors and, in
particular, to fight corruption…. Individual statues are commonly the product of local political struggles,
and their design is influenced by the objectives of the campaigners and legislators engaged in those
struggles’ (McDonald 2006: 130). Thus there is danger in cross-comparing different legislation that was
formulated and introduced under different conditions.
FOI in the UK and Scotland
In the UK, as in the United States, a climate of continued information control and civil repression after
World War Two, despite less pressing issues of national security and defence, gave rise to tensions
between citizens and government, and threw into question issues of rights and individual freedoms. But
unlike the precedential creep towards openness exhibited in the US, the challenges that faced Britain were
different. The Official Secrets Act, first enacted in 1911, had made the unauthorized disclosure of
information an offence at the start of World War One.
5 The Act to Regulate Access to Federal Government Information was adopted in June 2005 and came into force in
2006.
6 The Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs was approved by the Diet in 1999,
after a twenty-year effort and came into effect in 2001.
7 Chapter V of Law No. 241 of August 1990 provides limited access to administrative documents. The 1992
Regulations give a right to demand information for legal purposes. Amended and relaxed in 2005 and relaxed to
mean individuals can ask forto provide information proven to be in the public interest.
8 In 1983, the Access to Information Act provided Canadian citizens and other permanent residents and
corporations in Canada the right to apply for and obtain copies of records held by government institutions.
9 Article 14 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man called for access to information about the budget to be
made freely available (Banisar 2006).
10 The 1978 Law on Access to Administrative Documents provides for a right to access by all persons to
administrative documents held by public bodies (Banisar 2006).
11 Some states have provided access to records for over a century. Court records and legislative materials have been
open for years. The Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966 and went into effect in 1967.
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It was a young Margaret Thatcher who, as a newly elected MP in 1959, took the first steps
towards openness by attempting to introduce a bill to make local councils open their meetings to the
public. Mrs. Thatcher wanted the circumstances in which the press where excluded from meetings tightly
defined, which was rejected by the then Conservative government on the basis that meetings were closed
‘in the public interest’ – a broad phrase that government might apply as it liked.
Attempts made in the late 1970s by the then Labour government to promote access included the
so-called Croham Directive, named after Lord Croham the former head of civil service. This promised
the release of background papers to policy decisions, although very little was disclosed under it. In 1978,
there was an attempt to introduce Freedom of Information legislation in the form of a private member’s
bill introduced by Clement Freud MP. However, this bill fell through when the 1979 election was called.
Throughout the 1980s there were concerted attempts by the UK Campaign for Freedom of
Information (CFoI) to introduce an FOI bill in Parliament. In 1984, David Steel MP introduced in
Parliament a Freedom of Information Bill, drafted by the CFoI. The Bill received significant support, and
all eighteen Liberals and all four Scottish Democratic Party Members of Parliament as well as Plaid Cymru
and Scottish Nationalist MPs put their names to it. But, surprisingly in view of her earlier position with
regard to Council meetings, it did not receive the support of the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher,
and as a consequence it received the support of few Conservative MPs and it was not passed. However,
the Data Protection Act was passed in 1984, giving citizens a right of access to their personal information
and making it an offence for people to share information about others without their authorization.
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UK Campaign for Freedom of Information
UK Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFoI) was established in 1984, by Des Wilson, former
chairman of the charity Friends of the Earth. While directed by Des Wilson, CFoI is governed by its
member organizations and has campaigned for the right to know since its inception. Today its director is
Maurice Frankel.
There is also a CFoI in Scotland, part of the UK CFoI. This is co-directed by David Goldberg and Derek
Manson-Smith, who work closely with Maurice Frankel of the UK CFoI.
Failing the enactment of FOI, the CFoI introduced a number of compensatory Acts throughout
the 1980s considering that it was not politically the right moment to put forward a second FOI bill. In
1984, it put forward a Local Government (Access to Information) Act, giving the public wider rights of
access to council meetings, reports and papers. Similarly put forward was an Access to Personal Files Act,
which was passed in 1987, again promoted by the CFoI. It gave people access the right to see manually
held social work and housing records about themselves. The CFoI also promoted and drafted an Access
to Medical Records Report Act that was passed in 1988. It gave people the right to see any report
produced by their own doctor for an employer or insurance company. In 1988, it promoted an
Environmental and Safety Information Act, giving people the right to see enforcement notices issued
when organizations breach laws dealing with environmental protection and safety.
In 1990, an Access to Health Records Act was passed after being twice ‘talked out’ in the
Commons—MPs deliberately discussed the bill until they ran out of time to formally pass it. This allows
people to see information put on their medical records after November 1991 (unlike FOI, it is not
retrospective). In 1992, the CFoI drafted a second FOI bill, but the bill did not get a second reading.
Also in 1992, Labour published the Right to Know Bill, which Labour promised it would introduce if
elected. This largely replicated the FOI bill drafted by the CFoI in 1992. Roy Hattersley MP, then
shadow Home Secretary, at this point also promised an FOI Act if Labour won the election. The Right to
Know Bill was introduced in Parliament, and obtained a second reading, but was also ‘talked out’.
In the early 1990s, Thatcher’s successor, John Major, Prime Minister and leader of the
Conservative government, took more significant steps towards implementing openness after a series of
promises of action. The 1994 Code of Practice on Access to Government Information provided two new
legal rights to information—access to manually held personal files and to health and safety information.
Other information might also be released at the discretion of a public authority and those handling
information, to be overseen by the Parliamentary Ombudsman. In 1995, the Code of Practice on
Openness in the NHS also came into force that provided access to NHS information and was similar to
the central government Code—it provided the same right of access, under similar conditions, but applied
to different information. This was a significant advance but it seemed the Codes of Practice also had
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substantial weaknesses. The CFoI persisted that there was still a need for ‘a Freedom of Information Act,
creating a statutory right of access to information across the whole public sector.’12
What is an Ombudsman?
An Ombudsman carries out independent investigations into complaints, for example, about Parliament,
the NHS, Public Services, when they have not acted properly or fairly, or have not provided a fair service.
Both Labour and the Liberal Democrats in their 1997 general election pledges made an offer of a
UK Freedom of Information Act. In December 1997, the newly elected Labour government published a
White Paper, Your Right to Know, and promised to publish a draft UK FOI Bill in early 1998. A draft
bill was published for public consultation in May 1999. It was drafted by the CFoI, and appeared largely
modelled on the American FOI Act.
In Scotland, FOI was a devolved matter. In November 1999 the Scottish political partnership
then in place between the Liberal and Labour parties published a separate consultation paper, An Open
Scotland, as part of the 1999 Partnership Agreement that established the principles for a devolved Scottish
Parliament13. A devolved FOI Act provided the new Scottish Parliament with the opportunity to
introduce its own legislation—some say stronger since information has to cause substantial public prejudice
before it can be justifiably withheld and the maximum cost for information (which if exceeded means
public authorities can refuse a request) is higher. Designed and enacted as a new devolved Scottish
Parliament put down its roots, this seemed the Act and the perfect moment in which Scotland could make
clear what it stood for, that perhaps distinguished it from the rest of the UK. An Open Scotland was
followed in March 2001 by a consultation on the Draft Freedom of Information (Scotland) Bill, on which
individuals, organizations and campaign groups were invited to comment. The FOI (Scotland) Bill
received Royal Assent in May 2002, two years after the UK FOI Act was passed in November 2000. Both
Acts came into force at the same time, in January 2005, which many argue gave Scottish public authorities
less time to prepare—and some say less time to shred important documents they sought to keep under
wraps.
A Note on Methodology
Before describing my fieldwork, what I did, and with whom I met, it is worth writing a few words on how
I approached fieldwork on FOISA, which I conducted between October 2004 and April 2006. A project
such as this—an examination of FOI in Scotland, involving an investigation of the manner in which FOI
is being used by citizens, the way in which practitioners respond to FOI requests, and the basis on which
12 http://www.cfoi.org.uk/ombud1.html
13 Partnership for Scotland set out the key principles of the Liberal Democrat-Labour partnership forming the 1999
coalition Scottish Government
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decisions over public and private were being made—can only be done through long-term, in-depth
ethnographic fieldwork. However, carrying out fieldwork on FOISA in such as way as to reveal its effects
proves a little more difficult.
I based myself in the city of Edinburgh from where I could quickly and easily travel all over
Scotland. My field study was multi-sited (Marcus 1995) and involved locating myself wherever FOISA
was being implemented, enforced, and used in Scotland. It seemed immediately obvious to base myself in
the public authorities covered by FOISA in order to observe the manner in which FOISA was being
implemented within these authorities, people’s responses to the legislation—practitioners as well as
applicants—and a way of making contact with applicants.
While I anticipated that obtaining access to people working for these public authorities would be
difficult, civil servants, government officials, Members of the Scottish Parliament (‘MSPs’), Scottish
Executive policy makers, the Scottish Information Commissioner and his staff—to name just a few—all
assisted me with my research, and were extremely welcoming, open and generous with their time, and
themselves. Practitioners whom I approached by writing a letter to introduce my research aims and to
request an interview with them, would invite me into their organizations, sit me down, offer me a cup of
tea and biscuit, and after speaking with me for a while, would generously ask if there was anyone else I
wanted to interview or meet in the organization. They could easily set up a meeting, find someone who
would be really good to speak to, and perhaps even contact their friend in another authority who could
help me out.
It was in this way that I eventually made contact with individuals who were happy to let me come
and work for them for a short period of time, on a part-time basis for a two to three months. Much of
my fieldwork involved me sitting and working alongside FOI practitioners in large council buildings,
hospitals, an NHS health board, a police headquarters and Universities helping them and their colleagues
handle requests for information under FOISA. I also carried out small tasks and worked on short FOI
projects, such as preparing an authority’s publication scheme (on-line catalogue of all the information they
hold). These were tasks or projects that the people with whom I worked did not always have time to do.
So in return for access to the field, I offered practitioners a spare pair of hands, which in light of the fact
that I was an unpaid volunteer, were generally gratefully received.
It was interesting at this point to wonder why people were so generous—who did they think I
was, and was there any sense that I could do something for them? Was the fact that people so easily
opened up to me, indicative of an already ‘open’ field? It is perhaps difficult to say. When asked about
their generosity, people would often remark that they, and their organization, had always been open.
In addition to participant observation fieldwork, I found much of the background information I
required for this study was already available to me—on the internet, in public, council and government
libraries, and freely distributed amongst the public in the form of annual reports, brochures and leaflets.
FOISA—and a new right of access to information—was being firmly planted in the minds of the public:
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information about it was freely available in public buildings and on the television. The legislation, of
course, embodied an image of itself, it not only promoted access but information concerning it and how it
was to be implemented was to be made accessible in authorities across Scotland.
Ethics: Problems of Description
Participant observation fieldwork such as this entails some ethics issues—in particular concerning the
description of people, what they think and do, and the use and exchange of personal information that is
considered reflective of those it is about. Interestingly, an issue that is pivotal to FOISA—a decision over
what is public and what is private information—is one that is pivotal to a study such as this.
FOISA emphasises the public nature of information often retained by public authority civil
servants. Yet in so doing, it highlights the personal nature of information also, as shown by the difficultly
that people often have deciding what information is in fact personal and what is not—information
appears personal at every turn. That is, as information was passed between people, those handling or
creating it did not seem to be able separate themselves or their interests from what they handled or
created. Decisions made under FOISA over public and private in fact serve to illuminate the extent to
which information was thought of as personal—introducing the issue of how to decide what is not? Both
from an analytical perspective, and in light of people’s own awareness of what information disclosed
about them, the names of all people and places have been changed in this thesis
But it is perhaps also worth keeping in mind that the moments that I collected in the field, stories
of events, descriptions of people, instances of concealment, discovery or confusion, were in fact
constructed by me. Wagner (1977) writes, in relation to systems of categorization in the life sciences and
social sciences, that as soon as something is one thing, there is always the potential to be something else.
Things, people, information both resist and incite the manner in which they are arranged. There are
always new possibilities and different links—different insights—to be made. A particular description,
interpretation, representation and decision about what something is, can be eclipsed by a different
description, interpretation, representation, from a different angle—simply a thought from a different
perspective, a result of someone’s different interests, will be revealed in the author’s very description. So a
description about a person or an event that has the potential to reveal someone’s true identity, is rather a
question about the author and their particular interests, relationships and thus what they create, impose,
and construct, rather than what they reveal.
Fieldwork: Tracing the Threads of FOISA
I started fieldwork in October 2004, three months prior to FOISA coming into force. It involved tracing
the effects of legislation that was designed to roam anywhere within the public sector and set trapped
information free. Since FOISA could be used by anyone anywhere in the world and served as a point of
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comparison for advocates of access to information laws in other jurisdictions, its impact was potentially
endless, as was the ‘field’.
Basing myself in the city of Edinburgh, and not far from the SIC, I travelled from the Highlands
and Islands to the Scottish Borders to attend FOI meetings, interview users of the legislation, work
alongside FOI Officers in public bodies as they dealt with requests for information, and to meet with
decision and policy makers involved in the implementation and enforcement of the Act. The field
consisted of a network of relations through which I travelled. Like a document that ‘unfurls’ (Reed 2006),
it was on speaking to one person that I was motivated (by others) to get in touch with another: an
applicant, public authority FOI Officer, end-user or member of the FOI Campaign in Scotland. But a
vast field of options rapidly became one in which names were repeated in conversation, conference
speeches, minutes to meetings and on websites, and one made up of a handful of people many of whom
became my main informants.
Prior to embarking on fieldwork, I had made contact with the Office of the Scottish Information
Commissioner (OSIC) in St Andrews. I met with the SIC’s Head of Policy and Information and I
arranged to meet her on a regular basis while I was in the field to gain knowledge of the Act, the events
running up to its implementation and current developments. I soon established contact with the directors
for the Campaign for Freedom of Information in Scotland, members of the Scottish Executive FOI Unit,
researchers at the University College of London Constitution Unit (those researching the impact of the
UK FOI Act in the UK), Alasdair Roberts, at the University of Syracuse in the United States and
individual FOI Officers as well as users of the legislation. It seemed there were multiple groups and
persons with whom I could liaise. While I was aware that my involvement with multiple groups implied
divided loyalty, my informants were not. Yet relations between different groups were often strained. The
Scottish Executive FOI Unit, for example, both responsible for FOI policy and covered by the new
legislation seemed considered neither a public authority by those working for public authorities nor a
decision-maker. It had the capacity to appear neither as one thing nor another, which left individuals
involved in the enforcement and implementation of the Act and FOI practitioners entirely unsure as to
the basis on which it was acting at any one time. The Unit seemed to have the power to turn things their
way, but was subject to the same legislation and obligations.
Early on, members of the CFoI in Scotland established a Scottish FOI Strategy Group which met
every four months and of which I became a member. One of the CFoI in Scotland directors, was friendly
with the Information Compliance Officer at Lochhead Council who, he suggested, would be willing to
assist me with my research. It was from pursuing suggestions such as these that I made contact with users
of the legislation and FOI practitioners and was able to voluntarily help out on a number of small FOI
projects in Scottish public authorities. I worked for Glendale Council on a voluntary, unpaid basis,
compiling an end-user questionnaire and collating the statistics gathered from this. I also worked for
NHS Glendale helping FOI Officers to collate and organize frequently made requests under topic
34
headings such as MRSA, staff, or car parking, so that they might proactively disclose information or
advertise its availability on their website. And I worked for the Scottish Executive FOI Unit tabulating the
trends that emerged from reports from different sectors on the volume and types of FOI requests
received so far.
It was through meeting and speaking with FOI practitioners that I made contact with requesters.
End-users were not always easy to find: it was clear that the legislation was being used since public
authorities had record of its use, but short of going through public authority records and public authorities
themselves, there was very little chance of catching people submitting requests. From the divisions on
which FOISA is premised (citizen versus public authority), it might be surprising that FOI practitioners
were often on friendly terms with regular users of the Act. While FOISA required practitioners to ‘advise
and assist’ requesters in making their requests—provide information on what their public authority held,
how to phrase a request, and what they might reasonably expect to receive—practitioners were also often
genuinely happy to help requesters and me (as a requester of information of sorts). This meant that, if
agreeable with this applicant, they were also happy put me in touch with them. Many of the individuals
with whom I spoke I have remained in contact with. Some frequently used the legislation as a means of
regularly gathering information to compile reports, respond to a public consultation and campaign against
the amendment or closure of a public service and became adept at using their ‘right to know’. Others had
used the Act only once or twice, and were happy to recall their experiences. I also, although with less
success, contacted applicants through the Citizens Advice Bureau, a service in Scotland and the Scottish
Civic Forum (now disbanded).
My informants and I would meet at FOI conferences and events throughout the year, giving me
the opportunity to less formally catch up with them. I was generally wholly reliant on the kindness of
people, practitioners, the SIC and his staff, and users to allow me to attend meetings, and gain some
understanding of the field of FOI in Scotland. There were what seemed like endless invitations, and
endless avenues to pursue.
Introductory Comments on FOISA from an Anthropologist
When citizens, organizations and government are presented with the opportunity to acquire information
on themselves or on each other, how do they respond? When disclosures create new social
knowledgeby knowing new things about one’s self or otherswhat decisions and actions follow on?
That is, when people come into knowledge about something or someone, they have now to negotiate that
knowing. New dilemmas are created in which decisions have to be made over how to act. These new
decisions involve new ways of acting and relating.
FOI legislation came into force in Scotland in 2005. It contains within it the presumption that
publicly funded information both belongs to no one and to everyone, and should be set free so that others
can use it. It seems citizens, by their common relation of access to common information, come to share a
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relation in common, as a supplement to or indeed, model of society. But public bodies and their
employees do not always to let go of the information that they hold, and free flowing knowledge is not
always of interest to those who receive it.
As the first anthropological study of its kind, my research on the FOI Act in Scotland follows my
undergraduate study of knowledge and how it was formally and informally shared amongst employees of a
well-known large accountancy partnership in London. People there were interested in the connections
they could read between information and persons; knowledge as an independent object stored in a
database was activated (as a subject) through its embodiment in a Partner.
In this study, I examined two distinct knowledge sharing networks: formal knowledge sharing practices in
which employees formally submitted knowledge to knowledge sharing databases that stored such
knowledge as was deemed useful; and information knowledge sharing practices in which employees came
into knowledge through their interests in relations with others. I described the manner in which, while
there appeared a distinct lack of interest in knowledge that was more formally stored, this knowledge was
activated through its connections with knowledge sharing networks—gossip between secretaries, advice
received from Partners, and chats by the water cooler or over coffee.
Knowledge appeared to be socially constituted. It seemed knowledge was contained in, was
attached or belonged to, and was an extension of, the person or persons who shaped and developed it.
Formal knowledge that was categorized, documented and storied in a database had the effect of detaching
the knowledge from the persons who shaped it. Consequently, although formal knowledge was
sanctioned, such knowledge was nevertheless de-socialized—employees felt separated from the
knowledge they had fashioned. In contrast, knowledge circulated in lose verbal networks in which
participation was voluntary, and the distribution of informal knowledge was uneven. Significant gaps and
overlaps between the two systems meant formal knowledge started as information knowledge and a good
deal of formal knowledge, although valuable, remained uncaptured by the informal network.
FOISA, by comparison, seemed informed by a notion of persons and things that discounted the
relations through which they are formed. It seemed purposefully designed to make obvious the absence
of social and political relations, and to remove any trace of a decision-making political process that
contravened a duty of accountability to the citizens in whose name a public body operates. Relations were
both made irrelevant to information dissemination and yet also seemed crucial to its transfer.
I originally entered the field with the following aims:
1.To analyse the reasonings, cultural assumptions, and social objectives designed
into the formulation of FOI legislation—for example, what are the bases upon
which decisions over public and private are made?
2.To investigate and describe the uses to which the legislation is put and how new
rights to information are exercised—for example, what social uses or ends are
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perceived in FOISA and what motivates people to seek out particular things about
themselves or other parties?
My actual findings are considerably more profound than these initial aims suggest. This thesis centres on
the kinds of subject-object transformations that were a result of the way in which, as social relations were
made obvious or hidden by those sharing and receiving knowledge, persons appeared as persons, or as
things, and knowledge appeared as knowledge, or as information.
Such subject-object transformations were a result of people either considering themselves as
acting in the capacity of the organization, and undifferentiated, as ‘anyone’, or in a personal capacity.
Perceiving themselves as acting on a common or shared footing, people thinking of themselves as one of
many, rather than one alone. As practitioners and applicants came into the same knowledge and the
divisions between people disappeared, people, and the relations between them, disappeared also—or were
made ‘transparent’. This form of transparency, ‘transparent persons’, throws into question (and
elucidates) a theory of transparency that explains the divisions between people in terms of secrecy
(chapter six).
Running through all six chapters of the thesis is the manner in which people, things, concepts
appear divided and combined in different moments; their separation and unity a consequence of their
divided and combined form. People’s simultaneous division and combination points to two kinds of
relation at work: a conceptual relationship through which entities are divided and an inter-subjective
relationship through which they are combined. It is these two relationships operated together that enables
people’s shifting perspectives, thought and social action.
Both a division between persons, things, concepts as well as their lack of division points to a
relationship between them and illuminates how people, concepts, things are in fact dependent on a
relationship for their composition. Put simply, and in terms of people, one person’s viewpoint elicits
another. This gives rise to not just one, but two different perspectives on the same thing. The differences
between people, in this case, is their perceptions of the same thing from two different angles.
Marilyn Strathern (1992) writing on English kinship in the late twentieth century explains
difference comes from the fact that something might always be considered from a new or different angle.
She states:
‘Difference… becomes apparent from a simple fact of life: it is a connection from another
angle. That is, what looks as though it is connected to one fact can also be connected to
another… [such that] one thing differs from another insofar as it belongs to or is part of
something else.’ (1992: 73)
It seemed people’s changing perspectives on the same thing, their difference from some people
and similarity to others in different moments, was a result of their divided and combined interests in a
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particular thing (relation). Often to the confusion of those with whom they interacted, practitioners,
citizens and policy-makers’ changing interests in a particular relation meant they appeared to undergo
endless permutations in form, and offer endless different perspectives on the same thing.
Each perspective might either be classed as ‘public’ or ‘private’, and it is how practitioners made decisions





Decisions over public and private lie at the heart of FOISA. FOISA intersects with the Data Protection
Act that gives the public a right to access their own personal information and at the same time, prevents
others from accessing it without permission. Thus, while FOISA provides people with a right of access to
information in general, it also contains provisions for the retention of information that is ‘personal’.
However, practitioners and decision-makers find that decisions over what is personal and what is not are
often difficult to make: persons, in their private capacity, are seen as disclosed through the disclosure of
information with which they are associated. To which others, such as the SIC, often respond that the
information people seek to withhold is not personal and merely reflects the role a person is performing or
occupying as originator or handler of the information.
At another level, it is not only information that is disclosed under FOISA, but data also. In
response to requests for data, some practitioners argue that data alone is meaningless. It is the relation
between (bits of) data that turns data into information, gives it meaning and form. Data itself is seen as a
relational subject and appears in a particular form in response to other subjects. The relationship between
data, information and knowledge are discussed in this chapter, as well as the subject-object aesthetics that
these terms imply.
Often considered fixed and something to be uncovered, this chapter argues that it is the relation
between things that invokes their public or private form. Whether persons or information are public or
private depends on the relational context of any one moment. Rather than an innate quality, public and
private is the form that persons and information take. I shall further argue that a public-private division
between entities also marks a public-private division within them.
The relationship between public and private is one that has captured the interest of
anthropologists. Some, for example, investigate the way in which music and sound reconfigure the
boundaries between public and private (see Georgina Born’s most recent work on sound, in press).
Marilyn Strathern (1992) in her study of the quintessentially English ‘Bed and Breakfast’ and the domestic
image it presents (part of a broader study of English kinship), argues the difference between public and
private:
‘had its analogue in the way objects of knowledge were created. The English imagined the
‘real’ nature of something lay within. Thus one looked inside the genteel person and found
morality […] one went into the front room of the house, thinking the real home was behind
closed doors’ (129-130).
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The home within a home, and the public-private division it evokes, belongs to an epoch that we
have now left behind she continues.
The relationship between public and private is also one that has entered into anthropology more
practically. Malinowski is most well-known for establishing a separation between public and private in the
form of his fieldwork diaries and private diary based on a distinction he made between public objective
and private social data, one that has been collapsed in anthropology. In terms of ethics, ethnographers
must also make decisions over what constitutes public and disclosable information and what is private and
not disclosable. In many respects, this is a decision resolved through changing the names of people and
places so that they are not identifiable from the text (which I have done here). However, the issue
remains that public and private is a very real dichotomy with which anthropology must contend, although
not always without question.
In this chapter I draw on some of the decisions that the SIC has made over public and private.
These decisions are widely referred to and discussed by practitioners and used as guidance by them. I also
touch on the claims that people—practitioners, end-users, and policy-makers—make over information
that, in conflict with others, they consider either personal or public. I present a particular case concerning
National Services Scotland (‘NSS’) and a researcher from the Scottish Parliament who sought information
that NSS refused to disclose. I also discuss some of the issues that Duncan, at Lochhead council, faces as
he tries to convince colleagues to disclose what they deem personal information.
Decisions over Public and Private
Apart from the question of the privacy of the subject matter of an FOISA request, public authority
employees often appeared to consider that the information they handled or originated concerning
themselves or other people would disclose them and others in the form of persons, their individual
motivations and intentions becoming revealed along with the requested information. It was this, it
seemed, that often deterred them from complying with requests as promptly as they perhaps should, their
dalliance thought of by other practitioners to indicate their concern over getting a response wrong but
above all seeming to indicate their concern over differentiation, and also an awareness of other’s concerns
over their differentiation also. It was on being differentiated that employees and others who were the
subject of information, or had helped create it, might be disclosed as acting in their own person and not in
the person of the public authority.
Yet, and here there is a degree of reflexivity, whether information was public or private, when and
for what reason persons (themselves included) might be disclosed along with the requested information,
was for individual public authority FOI Officers to decide. FOI Officers might refer to a number of
things before reaching a decision: the SIC’s guidance, briefings on Confidentiality, Personal Information
and Commercial Interests decisions that the SIC had made regarding what constituted public or private
information and any case-law to hand. However, decisions over public and private could only be made
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(and it was well-known) on a case-by-case basis, such that each should be treated in isolation and might
even set precedent. Compliance in one moment might appear non-compliance in another moment.
Decision-making was in this sense ‘devolved’; it was the responsibility of individual FOI practitioners
alone. There appeared no larger network to which practitioners might turn for an answer. In some cases
an individual might deliberately allow a case to reach the SIC’s desk for him to make an often complex
decision over public and private on their behalf. But such a move also risked their own reputation as well
as that of the authority, which might be considered non-compliant. Thus, allowing a request to go to the
SIC on appeal was a last resort. So while practitioners had to comply with the law and ensure that other
employees did so, the law itself seemed something that was not just applied but potentially realised (by the
SIC) after the event.
The SIC’s Briefings
These provide general guidance on the interpretation and application of the FOISA exemptions that
specify under what circumstances information cannot be disclosed For example, under what
circumstances a requester is ‘vexatious’ and can be refused information.
Confidentiality
Information might be considered confidential when it contains communications with a legal advisor
where advice is either sought or given, and consists of documents created in the contemplation of legal
proceedings. Information might also be considered confidential under other circumstances: for example,





This applies to two kinds of request: when a person has asked for information about themselves, and
when a person has asked for information about someone else. In the case of the former, that person
might be asked to reapply for the information under the Data Protection Act. In the case of the latter,
information cannot be disclosed unless the subject of the data has had the chance to exercise their right
under the DPA to issue a notice to the data controller to prevent this information being released—a
decision which itself will be subject to the public interest test.
Public Interest Test
Most exemptions in Part Two of FOISA are so-called qualified exemptions, which means that they are
subject to the public interest test. While the public interest is not defined in FOISA, it is described as
information that is of serious concern and benefit to the public, not merely of individual interest. When
applying the test, the public authority is deciding whether it serves the interests of the public better to
withhold or disclose information
Commercial Interests
Information may be withheld under this exemption when, it is considered a trade secret or when
disclosure would prejudice substantially the commercial interests of any person or organization, the
economic interests of the whole or part of the UK, or the financial interests of an administration in the
UK.
The courts made an effort to clarify what constitutes personal information15 in a well-known case,
known as the Durant Case, in which the appellant sought disclosure of information that he claimed to be
personal data relating to him held by the Financial Services Authority. Lord Justice Auld argued that:
‘It follows from what I have said that not all information retrieved from a computer search
against an individual’s name or unique identifier is personal data within the Act. Mere mention
of the data subject in a document held by a data collection does not necessarily amount to his personal data.
Whether it does so in any particular instances depends on where it falls in a continuum of
relevance or proximity to the data subject…
15 DPA Part 1 Schedule 1: ‘personal data’ means data which relate to a living individual who can be identified—
(a) from those data, or
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of,
the data controller, and includes any expression of opinion about the individual and any indication of the intentions
of the data controller or any other person in respect of the individual;
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It seems to me that there are two notions which may be of assistance. The first is whether the
information is biographical in a significant sense, that is, going beyond the recording of the putative
data subject’s involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal connotations, a life
event in respect of which his privacy could not be said to be compromised.
The second is one of focus. The information should have the putative data subject as its focus rather
than some other person with whom he may have been involved or some transaction or event
in which he may have figured or have had an interest, for example, as in this case, an
investigation into some other person’s or body’s conduct that he maybe instigated.
In short, it is information that affects his privacy, whether in his personal or family life, business or
professional capacity’
(Auld LJ in Durant vs. Financial Services Authority [2003] EWCA Civ 1746, my italics)
The interaction between the UK FOI and DPA in relation to the Durant case was summarized in
a Standard Note issued by the House of Commons Library in 2006 for the benefit of Members of
Parliament and their staff:
‘As the result of the Durant judgement there has been a narrowing of the definition of
‘personal data’. The judgement identifies two notions to determine whether information
affects an individual’s privacy, firstly whether the information is biographical and secondly
whether the individual is the focus of the information. So simply because an individual’s
name appears on a document does not mean it is ‘personal data’ and they are entitled to
protection under the Data Protection Act 1998. It is more likely that when an individual’s name
is accompanied by other information relating to the individual, then this would be ‘personal
data’’16
The Durant decision had a significant impact on how the line between public and private was
drawn. And yet it was also a point of reference from which decision-makers had more recently deviated:
the IC, responsible for enforcing FOI in the UK (apart from Scotland) and DPA in the UK as a whole,
more recently returned to the view that ‘any reference to someone’s name is personal data’, as the director
for the Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFoI) revealed in a workshop on the SIC and IC’s
decisions in early 2008. ‘It seems we understand the Data Protection Act… but we don’t really
understand it’, the CFoI director remarked while taking an audience of FOI practitioners through the
16 http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-04018.pdf
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SIC’s and IC’s decisions. So, although there were guidelines advising people as to when information was
personal, these guidelines were by no means specific, and their ambiguity left it to individual practitioners
to decide.
But decisions over public and private were not simply a matter of when individuals themselves
might be disclosed, but when discrepancies between organizations, their accounts, policy, operation and
structure would also be revealed in a way that would illuminate these organizations individually. In other
words, claims to privacy might be made when information disclosed individuals, and people’s motivations
and intentions, but might also be made when information disclosed organizations as differentiated
through the divisions between them by way of information contained in tender agreements, contracts,
policy documents and recorded communication. Claims to privacy, in this case, were made because
individuals sought to conceal their organization’s interests and the particular angle and approach that
made it singularly attractive to others. To disclose the details underpinning this would put at risk such an
organisation’s niche in the market.
Thus, while individuals sought to conceal, were embarrassed even, by the differences between
them, organisations sought to retain the divisions between them and thus others’ interests in them. And
yet competition by public sector bodies for financial reasons was not within the scope of FOISA, and
while government owned organizations such as McBride ferries (that was tendering for the Highland and
Island ferry routes) sought to retain what they saw as commercially sensitive information, to withhold
information so as to enable competition seemed contrary to the ethos of the Act.
Although a good deal of the legal detail lies outside of the sphere of anthropology, in this chapter
I address, as far as possible, the basis on which decisions over public and private are made in the context
of FOI in Scotland, and the SIC’s decisions and claims that people make over information that they
consider private. I present three case-studies. The first concerns particular decisions of the SIC
concerning public and private, his thoughts, and where the line between public and private might be
drawn. The second case is that of the National Services Scotland versus Donald, in which the SIC’s
decision for the NSS to disclose information it holds is taken to the Court of Session and latterly the
House of Lords. The final case concerns claims made by public authority employees, members of the
public, and FOI Officers over public and private, and the basis on which such claims are made. I turn to
Duncan, at Lochhead, who must decide whether information that the council holds and an applicant has
requested constitutes private information; he tackles staff who have ideas of their own. The chapter
might be considered a response to the following: when and in what manner might information disclose
persons? And when and for what reason do individuals fail to appear as in a personal capacity?
The SIC’s decisions (2005-2006)
The SIC generally made his decisions on a case-by-case basis. While this often left civil servants uncertain
in their decision-making, it also suggested that it was the context of the case that more often than not
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determined its outcome; it was not only FOI practitioners but the SIC who on occasions seemed to find it
difficult to decide over public and private.
The Role of the SIC
The Scottish Information Commissioner is responsible for promoting and enforcing FOISA. While
individuals must submit their requests for information to public authorities, the SIC’s role is to ensure that
these authorities comply with the Act. If a requester is dissatisfied with a response an authority has given,
then he or she can go to the SIC and appeal this decision. On conducting an independent investigation
into the allegation, the SIC will issue both parties with a decision notice—and he might either agree with
the public authority, or the requester in any particular case.
While there were provisions within FOISA to protect the disclosure of personal information,
senior decision-makers were often of the opinion that the general public and individuals working for
public authorities had become too accustomed to claiming information as personal. Information,
practitioners argued, was retained on ‘questionable’ grounds and people were ‘over sensitive’ about
information and should perhaps take a ‘less emotive view’. The public/private division was reflected in
the sensitivity of information people handled and produced: there was a balance to be struck, it seemed.
However, people were themselves internally divided—acting in both a public and private capacity. Given
this, their excessive attachment or detachment from information suggested that the balance had been
tipped, making some people appear more (or less) a person in the eyes of the law. FOI seemed about
redressing this balance, which required treating information less personally and adopting a certain
detachment from it.
In his 2006 annual report, the SIC listed some key findings in relation to personal information
and also the commercial interests exemption, expanding on and explaining his decisions case-by-case.
Commercial interests, the SIC interpreted as a public authority’s ability to successfully engage in the
buying and selling of goods and services—such as drugs in the case of the NHS, education in the case of a
University, and ferry crossings in the case of McBride ferry company. On this basis the SIC argued that
public authorities did have commercial interests; it was in the public interest for authorities to engage in
trade. However, commercial interests did not extend to financial gain, and the SIC would not uphold
their commercial interests simply because an authority sought to trade profitably—that is, when an
authority faced competition from another organization that offered the same products and services for
less money. This was hard on particular authorities that were unable to protect their commercial interests
as other companies dug deep into their policies, procedures, accounts and bids with the aim of
undercutting them. In the case of McBride ferries, tendering to run the Highland and Islands ferry
crossings, and facing competition from organizations not covered by FOISA, this was a very real problem.
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The SIC offered two examples of where different parties considered information either public or
private. These decisions had become a matter for wider public debate. The first regarded the expense
claims of key public and political figures. The public, and in particular, journalists and MSP’s research
assistants had been particularly keen for MSPs to routinely disclose their expenses, making the Scottish
Parliament ‘one of the most open’ in the world. The SIC wrote:
‘Expenses claims of employees are by their nature personal data as defined by DPA. While
there may well be cases where I order the release of expenses claims, in one particular case I
decided that release of travel expenses claims forms would cause unjustified stress to the
people who were the subject of that information.’17
While the disclosure of personal data was exempt under FOI, this exemption was not always
absolute: the SIC might decide for himself if the disclosure of personal information was in the public
interest. The second example concerned the disclosure of the names of employees: a decision with which
the SIC had had some difficulty, as had public authority FOI Officers as they decided whether the names
of FOI applicants should be released in response to demands that requests made under FOI including the
names of applicants should routinely be disclosed. The SIC argued:
‘…public authority employees are more likely to expect that information about them will be
released than people in the private sector.
For example, I ordered a local authority to release the name of one of their community
wardens. However, this does not mean that information about the private sector will always
be kept secret. In another case, an applicant wanted to know the names of people working
for a private sector company who had been complained about to a trading standards service.
I ordered the release of the names of the directors of the company who had been
complained about, while agreeing that the names of the employees who had been
complained about should not be released’18
It seemed that what constituted private and public information was under constant negotiation.
A person (and information they held) might appear private in relation to the wider public, as the SIC ruled
with regard to employees (as opposed to directors) of a private company whose names were in public
authority trading standards records. But people might also appear combined and public, as was the case
with the local authority employee, whose role made him a representative of the public authority. In other
words, while differentiated (as a named warden) in relation to other members of the public, an individual
17 SIC’s 2006 Annual Report.
18 Ibid.
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might also be considered as undifferentiated (a warden) amongst members of the same company (of
wardens). People in this sense had the potential to appear private and public in different moments and
when viewed by different people. When it came to persons in a public authority performing a public
service, people’s lack of individuality (eg one warden amongst many) seemed crucial. Here, specific
differentiation might in some ways appear a sign of mishap or malpractice. Meanwhile, those of more
senior rank and who occupied positions of authority over an organisation and others, were less able to
retain the right to privacy. As providers of knowledge, this latter group’s private thoughts were
immediately visible through and shared by others. Knowledge that distinguished them from others, became
knowledge that others held in common.
At a half-day course on the Scottish Information Commissioner’s Decisions -- What do they mean in practice?
in early 2007, the director of the Campaign for Freedom of Information discussed some of the SIC’s more
recent decisions regarding personal information. As the image, projected on the screen to his left, flicked
from ‘how to interpret FOI requests’, to ‘Personal Information’ written in large bold type, he exclaimed,
‘…this is not five minutes worth of stuff… I think most of us need a dose of caffeine before we tackle
this!’ After a brief break, plenty of coffee and a selection of biscuits which had been quietly laid out by
caterers on a rectangular table at the back of the room, delegates got back into work, putting their thinking
caps firmly back on.
Among the decisions that were discussed was the SIC’s decision to disclose the names of staff at
a public Ski and Outdoor Centre. The names, according to the SIC, were ‘fair to disclose as… [they were]
related to professional life… [and] some of the names were on [the] web’. However, staff employment
dates, according to the SIC, were ‘unfair to disclose… [considered] not purely professional, [contained]
elements of private life, [and] staff not senior’. The public authority that held the information had later
appealed to the Court of Session, and the SIC had been requested to review his decision.
A second example concerned a request for the hours worked and overtime claims for two named
SDEA (Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency) officers responsible for the surveillance of those making the
request. The SIC concluded that ‘contractual hours [are] not normally personal [whereas] variable hours
are. A reasonable person would not expect strangers to have access to detailed, systematic knowledge of
their hours of overtime particularly given that this could reveal information about their individual income’.
The surveillance ‘log book [detailing employees’ names and their hours was] produced during trial [in
court]’, the director of CFoI continued. However, the SIC was ‘not persuaded that information revealed
in open court is automatically considered to be in the public domain unless the information has been
published and/or there had been contemporaneous reporting… in the media’.
This was an interesting conclusion to draw, that information revealed in open court could still be
considered that which had not been publicly released. It was clear that the SIC sought to distinguish what
information about employees could and could not be released, which he did so on the basis that while
some information might unify them, such as contractual hours of employment, other information was
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thought of as distinguishing them from each other, such as their overtime. In other words, information
might constitute public or private information depending on the context in which it was considered: in
relation to the wider public, employees, it seemed, sought to argue that their names in association with
their jobs was private information. In relation to one another, however, information about an individual’s
job did not necessarily disclose them as individuals since much of this information (and perhaps even the
job itself) was shared amongst colleagues. However, information that did individuate them was
information concerning start dates and the hours that they worked on which they were able to individually
decide. It was this information that was seen to differentiate them and thus consisted private information.
In this case, employees appeared as both public and private in different moments; they might
think and act in ways that were homogenous, shared amongst them, and also in ways that distinguished
them from each other. In other words, each individual employee was split down the middle—each had
the capacity to appear either public or private, shift in form, such that a division within each was reflective
of a division between employees as they appeared as public or private—as if ‘person’ was itself a form,
sharing the aesthetics we are becoming familiar with.
It was clear from the SIC’s decisions that what constituted private and public information was
slowly being untangled. Although sometimes unhelpfully, delegates were told that the SIC would
continue to work on a case-by-case basis. If an applicant or public authority was not satisfied with the
SIC’s decision, however, an applicant having appealed to him because they were dissatisfied with the way
a public authority had handled their request, either or both might decide to take the case to the Court of
Session, and as a last resort, to the House of Lords. The SIC would put forward a case on behalf of the
applicant, and the authority would argue its own case. Two cases where the SIC’s decision was appealed
to the Court of Session are detailed below. It appears it was not only the SIC who sought to decide where
the line between public and private might lie—he needed some help…
National Services Scotland of the Scottish Health Service vs. Donald
The Information Services Division (‘ISD’), an arm of Nation Services Scotland (‘NSS’) of the National
Health Service (‘NHS’), formerly the Common Services Agency (‘CSA’), was in the business of processing
and analyzing information, or so-called health data. Stewart worked for ISD and, as he explained, handled
mental health data. I had met Stewart at an FOI workshop that I arranged for FOI practitioners during
2006, the second year in which FOISA was in force. We agreed to meet some weeks later to discuss the
issues he had raised in the workshop, and were of concern to him and to others in ISD. Two requests
made to them and to which he had responded had been appealed to the SIC, of which one had been
appealed to the Court of Session. Stewart commented on the two cases and recalled how practitioners
and the public watched with great interest.
The first case concerned a request by a journalist for the surgical mortality rates of surgeons since
2000. The NSS was concerned that although mortality rates reflected a surgeon’s performance at work,
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disclosure had the potential to affect a surgeon’s private life. When directly compared, without taking into
account surgeons’ different operating conditions, figures might be considered reflective of a surgeon’s
personal approach, motives and intentions. Figures might be interpreted, misinterpreted and speculated
over by the public, a surgeon’s friends and colleagues in a way that would impact a surgeon’s private and
professional life. It was for this reason that ISD argued that the information was personal and should be
withheld. In the refusal notice (supplied to the applicant in response to his request) ISD had argued,
according to the SIC:
‘…some of the third parties involved (the clinicians) object to the release of data of this kind
requested by [the applicant] because the data does not take account of the risk characteristics
of individual surgeons’ patients. The CSA were therefore of the opinion that disclosure of
such information is likely to be misleading rather than informative and would thus be
unfairly detrimental to the clinicians’ (Decision 066/2005)19
There were rumours that as a result of their own potential disclosure, surgeons would begin to
refuse difficult cases that had the potential to raise their mortality figures. The SIC was also unsure
whether disclosure would cause confusion and alarm amongst the general public, and would be of greater
detriment than it was benefit, particularly if the mortality figures were used by journalists to create exciting
news headlines such as Doctor Death, as anticipated by some. ‘This one I did get sleepless nights over’,
the SIC recalled later the following year. The SIC eventually decided in favour of disclosure. He argued
that the information constituted personal information but its disclosure would not breach any of the data
protection principles. However, he took several key journalists to one side around the time that the data
was due for release to ensure that they would each handle the data responsibly. Such responsibility was
made theirs by the SIC’s very personal efforts to contextualize that which was about to be disclosed. The
journalists could, in this regard, not feign ignorance. Responsibility, it seemed, came with knowledge.
Requests also appeared to generate more requests: the surgical mortality rates case led one man, a
lawyer in England, to request, as Stewart explained:
‘…all the e-mails to do with the surgical mortality [case]. He wants to find out how the
organization responded, and what the thinking was and what was the process of debate. I
had to send him around over one hundred e-mails…’.
Surprisingly, however, Stewart made no mention of any issues over the volume of information that he had




The second case concerned a request for information relating to incidences of childhood
leukaemia in a small area in the East of Scotland. The NSS withheld the data on the grounds that it would
reveal the identity of individuals in the area, and argued ‘the years for which data were available involved
very small numbers and…. there were in consequence concerns that their release would give rise to a
significant risk of indirect identification of living individuals’. The NSS was concerned that in conjunction
with additional information, the public would be able to identify those in the area with leukaemia. The
SIC ordered NSS (then the CSA) to release the information, ‘in a perturbed (barnardised) form’20. On
further refusing to issue the data apart from in aggregated form, incorporating figures from the whole of
the region, for the years 1990 to 2001, the NHS appealed to the Court of Session. The Court found that:
‘In the course of his reasoning the [SIC] had concluded that the true data at census ward
level constituted personal data within the meaning of the Data Protection Act 1998, that they
were, by virtue of section 38 of the FOISA (as read with the 1998 Act) exempt data and that
the [NSS] was not obliged to give them to [the applicant]. However, in the course of the
correspondence there had been reference to a process of perturbation known, after its
author, as ‘barnardisation’. That method, as envisaged generally by the CSA, involved the
random modification of small numbers….
…It is, it appears, a standard statistical method, devised with a view to avoiding or
minimising the risk of the identification of individuals in circumstances where the numbers
are small but which can nonetheless provide useful information for planning and other
purposes. The total number of diagnoses of leukaemia in [the region] of children in the age
range 0-14 years in the period from 1990 to 2001 inclusive was 15, over the 47 census wards
of that area…’21
Barndardisation
A technique developed by Professor George Barnard (1915 – 2002), a British statistician, barndardisation
is a method for disclosure control for tables of counts that involves randomly adding or subtracting 1
from some cells in the table.
Barnardising the figures would make any symptoms and statistics harder to match up and persons
themselves less identifiable in light of smaller numbers. The NSS indicated that it was reluctant to release
20 The idea came from the NHS who were developing the technique at the time, Stewart explained. However, the
NHS argued that this was a draft version of a possible technique, which had not been tested. Previous versions
when tested had not prevented the disclosure of identity, and as a result the NHS was hesitant to recommend the
technique.
21 CSA v SIC at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/2006CSIH58.html.
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data where the number of incidence in any one ‘cell’—data set—was less then five. It further stated that
in cases where the population was relatively small and covered a small geographical area, people who
knew a child had cancer could request information on all childhood cancer and could potentially learn that
the child had leukaemia22. Obscuring the detail in the data would mean that the public might identify
trends across the region without identifying specific individuals. As the figures for the total incidences of
leukaemia were gradually divided by region, and then by area, in order to establish the figures for the small
area that had been requested, it seemed there was a critical number at which persons with leukaemia in the
data set would be themselves revealed as persons—by disclosing their individual physical and personal
circumstances. Barnardising the figures would change the potential number of individuals with leukaemia
in each sub-set, such that there was less chance that symptoms and people could be (as easily) linked, and
at the same time, such symptoms would no longer appear singularly theirs. That is, it seemed it was
vagueness in the data itself that ensured individuals could not be differentiated. Obscurity in the data
leads to uncertainty in the information.
This brings us to the question of what, if any, is the difference between data and information?
Stewart explained to me that the NSS had deliberately not released the leukaemia data even before
running an analysis on it: it was clear the ‘data set was far too small’. While still keeping back the raw data,
the NHS gave a second applicant, a woman who had made the same request, an interpretation or analysis
of the data, which revealed the trend across the region that both applicants apparently sought, which ‘she
was quite happy with’, Stewart explained. On the question, posed above, of the difference between data
and information he continued:
‘Some people would say that there is… the way we hold [data] is in an electronic soup on
our server, it’s got a structure but it’s in relational databases held electronically… And that’s
data. Now you can argue that you have to do some analysis on it to turn it into
information… Now we’ve never done a particular analysis, never created information, do we
have to do that in response to a request for data, for information? Now I spoke to [the SIC]
about this… and he said you do…’
Data seemed only to have meaning in relation to other data. The database provided both a
context and stable meaning. It was this meaning that NSS had to supply along with data in order for it to
be meaningful (make the right kind of sense). It was as if data existed in an organizational framework to
which new data had to be carefully inserted in order to have meaning within the same framework. There
was, then, a spectrum of forms in which a response to an FOI request might come: in the form of data, or
meaningful data (information) or meaningful and valuable data (knowledge). Each perhaps specified the
degree and type of relation: data that was related to other data and had had ‘some analysis’ done on it
22 Decision 021/2005.
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elicited information, but information too had to be turned into knowledge and seemed only meaningful if
associated or attached to particular persons. What appeared to differentiate data, information and
knowledge, then, was varying degrees of personalization. Stewart remained confused, however, as to why,
if contextual or analytical information should be supplied with data that was disclosed, contextualized
information or analysis alone (which he was happy to provide) was not enough to satisfy the applicant and
the SIC. After all, he argued, ‘[i]t’s not a Freedom of Data Act… it’s a Freedom of Information Act…’.
Earlier in the year I interviewed Donald who had asked for the leukaemia data. He was a
researcher for the one of the Scottish political parties and worked in the Scottish Parliament. ‘I think
they’re really pushing it to argue that to give us bare statistics would actually risk identification. I just
don’t think that’s credible’. Donald explained what he had asked for and why he had asked for it:
‘Apparently it was the most difficult thing [OSIC had] had to deal with… it took them five
months [to get the decision out]… I sort of formally requested information from the [ISD]
at the beginning of January, and they replied fairly quickly saying no we’re not giving it to
you. But we can do this. … I said no, I don’t want that, I want you to give it to me, so I’m
formally appealing to you.
…the [SIC’s] Office has instructed them to give me the information within forty two days
which is around about now… [but] they said, well we haven’t decided what we’re going to
do yet…
We were trying to determine whether there are or are not leukaemia clusters along the
Sandwell coast. Because if there are, we would try and link those to Sellafield or… So we’re
just trying to find out if there’s anything or not
‘So what kind of information do you think ought not to be released?’, I asked, wondering if there
were any absolute exemptions on disclosure.
‘That’s a good question… I suppose it’s… the one we’ve got in at the moment [the
leukaemia case], I suppose personal data, health things, that’s got to be left out. …but
there’s a difference between statistical data and access to someone’s personal medical files
for instance. I think that’s real, and that’s what we’ve been arguing with them and the [NHS]
don’t agree… it’s just a culture of release of information, I think they’re over cautious’
According to Donald, then, an individual’s medical records were personal information yet
providing the public with perturbed statistics was a way of providing data in a seemingly less personal way.
It seemed personal information might be depersonalized by making numbers ambiguous, symptoms and
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statistics more difficult to match up and individuals one of several in a manner that persons themselves
disappeared.
Apart from considering whether the data disclosed an individual’s identity, whether information
should be seen as public or private often depended on the context in which it was considered.
Information that seemed to differentiate individuals one from another in relation to wider society, such as
an employee’s contracted hours of work, was information that people held in common in relation to work
colleagues, and might be considered less revealing of their personal motives and interests. Perceiving
individuals as combined by their role or their approach to their job, rather than divided, seemed a method
through which persons were disguised. An interest that was otherwise specific to one or two persons
became more general, such that these interests were no longer specifically theirs but were seen to belong to
the group of which they were part. People thus appeared to operate not in their own personal capacity,
but in the capacity of the organization. This shift in perception, it seems, enabled practitioners to decide
over what was private and what was public, decisions they would otherwise have been unable to make.
Duncan at Lochhead Council
Figure 2. Layout of part of Lochhead Council’s main building (ground floor), including Duncan’s office and seating
arrangements
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Duncan was the Information Compliance Officer for Lochhead Council. He worked in a small,
unventilated, rectangular room on the ground floor of a large, old council building located near the centre
of Lochhead, a small town in the south west of Scotland. His colleagues June, Clare and Michael sat
beside and behind him, all four of them sharing the same high desk that ran around the edges of the
cramped room (see figure 2). June was the council’s Records Manager. She often stood in for Duncan
when he was away from his desk or off work, and was young and lively. Clare and Michael were new
graduates who helped Duncan and June in their roles as Information Compliance and Records Manager.
It was their first paid full-time position and they seemed attentive and keen to learn all they could.
In the first two years that FOI was in force, Duncan could receive from between eight and twenty
Freedom of Information requests a week. He would spend much of his time logging requests, chasing up
enquiries and co-ordinating responses to requests for information that he and other colleagues had
received, as well as talking to staff about compliance or technical issues. He was attentive to detail and left
himself sticky yellow post-it notes in neat rows along the edge of his desk. At lunchtime he would buy
soup from the small hatch along the corridor, served by an elderly lady who also cheerfully sold cold cans
of fizzy drink and snacks. Duncan would eat this soup back at his desk, slowly dunking his sandwiches
into the hot liquid before eating them while doing a crossword puzzle.
I assisted Duncan in his office one wintry March morning in 2006 as he made a note of new
requests and checked the council’s FOI log to see what requests were still outstanding. Duncan noticed
that several services had yet to answer requests that he had forwarded to them some time ago. He made a
few phone calls and, leaning back on his chair with the phone in hand, arranged to see those responsible
for handling FOI requests that were still outstanding. As Duncan and I climbed the council’s wide and
heavy, stone staircase to speak to Pat, an FOI Officer on the second floor, Duncan explained, ‘This one’s
to do with job descriptions. Pat’s okay. She’s pretty sound’.
Duncan knocked on the door of the Head of Customer Services to speak to Pat, his secretary and
the FOI Officer for Customer Services. As Duncan entered the darkly furnished room, he began pacing
about while Pat remained firmly seated behind her large, wooden desk. She quickly explained why she
had not yet dealt with the FOI request that was imminently due:
Pat: ‘It’s some guy in payroll that doesn’t want his job description to go out… he thinks it’ll
identify him’
Duncan: ‘I don’t see anything wrong with it… it’s nothing to do with him. It’s his job
description. If he didn’t do [the job], someone else would be. Tell him it’s got to go out,
and if anyone has anything to say about it, tell them to come to me’
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When we were back in Duncan’s office, Duncan elaborated on what he meant:
‘We get requests here about jobs that people do, and my opinion is that information should
be disclosed. Why shouldn’t it be disclosed? My job doesn’t identify me. I don’t own the
job… I’m only doing the job. If I or anyone else leaves the job, someone else would do the
job. Your job description is not personal information’
Brought into this specific relation of deciding between public and private, it seemed that Duncan,
in his role as Information Compliance Officer, has taken on the same role as the SIC. He had both the
position and capacity to decide what constituted personal information.
Duncan, then, seemed to think that a job did not distinguish persons from others despite the fact
that a job could also be said to say something about a person. Rather, someone’s job description did not
identify them since persons taking up the same position, he argued, would inevitably think, do and act in
the same way. To check that he had made the right decision, Duncan consulted the SIC’s website and
read the Craigdale Council decision. The SIC had decided that in this case it was in the public interest to
disclose ‘the job descriptions of people higher up in an organization’. He had issued Craigdale Council
with a Decision Notice, ordering the council to release the information. Triumphant, Duncan telephoned
Pat to advise that she should release the information as soon as possible.
A Decision Notice
A decision notice is defined in the Act as ‘notice in writing’ of any decision made by the SIC on an
applicant’s appeal to him.
The same afternoon presented a second problem. Janice, the Head of Early Years, Play and Out
of School Care, (whom I did not meet but heard much about), had received a request, forwarded to her by
Duncan, which, Duncan explained, she did not answer. The request was for the number of registered sex
offenders, and drug addicts with children, in the care of the council. Janice had argued that the council
‘did not hold’ this information and so had refused the request. She would write to the applicant in the
next few days, she explained. But Duncan was adamant that this was information that the council did
hold and made some enquiries. He consulted Fiona in Social Work who worked in a different service, but
the same department as Janice. Fiona explained to Duncan that the council did in fact hold the
information, but it seemed that Janice had ‘not attempted to look for it’. That afternoon, Duncan and I
walked along the narrow corridor of the council’s main building and across the snow-clad car park to the
more modern annex to have a detailed discussion with Fiona in her office on the top floor. Duncan and I
climbed the many flights of stairs to the top of the annex, pushing through heavy double doors, and
walked along vast corridors. As we did so, Duncan explained that ‘some people do not like releasing
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information because they don’t like getting it wrong’—they might stand out as their own person rather
than the person of the public authority.
We entered Fiona’s office, which she shared with Anne her colleague, and Duncan discreetly
closed the door behind us. He dragged two chairs up to Fiona’s desk and invited me to take a seat. Anne
continued to work as Duncan, Fiona and I sat and spoke about the case. First Duncan had to reassure
Fiona that I was ‘okay’, that she could talk frankly in front of me. In light of Duncan’s own approach to
dissemination and the discussion that we were about to have, such discretion seemed out of place—as if
Fiona’s knowledge here, was personal only in light of my presence as someone from outside the
organization, (the division between what was public and what was private momentarily appearing again to
give us our own division). But this brief division between Fiona and me only appeared to reflect Janet’s
own sense of division from others. Fiona agreed with Duncan, ‘there was no problem in releasing [the
information]’. The information that had been requested could be found, she argued, although with some
difficulty. She apologized: ‘[s]ome of my colleagues are, putting it lightly, narrow in their views’. A more
balanced viewpoint, it seems, might be to consider information as something to disclose, reflective of a
balanced person—someone who might appear in both public and private form, an individual’s narrowness
indicative of their being too private perhaps. As an end to their discussion, Duncan and Fiona agreed it
was possible to bypass Janet and locate the information by going through different channels. The
information would be held elsewhere, in a different form or in parts. Fiona would locate the information,
instead of Janet, and distribute it as soon as possible.
Once we were back in his office, Duncan gave his opinion on why people were reluctant to
comply with FOI. ‘People only object to [FOI] because there’s something wrong with what they’ve done,
or they’ve got something to hide, or they’ve been administratively caught out by the Act’. In Duncan’s
eyes, it was clear that Janice had not wanted to provide the information because she did not want a
decision that she had made to be scrutinized by the public. But I later heard from a different source that
Janice had been ‘concerned for the sex offenders, drug addicts and children’ who were the subject of the
request. She thought that releasing information about them would change the council’s approach to the
way these persons were managed in a manner that would harm the people concerned.
As well as untangling public from private information and dealing with coy decision-makers, this
particular day Duncan had to tackle staff and other individuals who were dragging their heels over the
release of potentially confidential information. Since January 2005 when FOISA came into force, it
seemed authorities had taken to liberally stamping confidential on information they supplied to other
authorities, in the belief that this would inhibit naïve council staff from releasing the information. The
SIC drew a fine line between information that was reasonably confidential, such as communications
between a social worker and a client, communications during legal proceedings, or a contract held
between a private business and a client (that is information the disclosure of which would constitute an
actionable breach of confidence), and information that council staff hesitated to give out because it said
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something about themselves or the council. When on one occasion an FOI Officer tried to withhold
information on the basis of confidentiality, Duncan made sure that the confidentiality exemption had
been correctly applied. He looked at the SIC’s website and the section 36 confidentiality briefing and
applied the public interest test to determine whether, despite the confidential exemption, it was in the
public interest for information to go out.
In the end, the decision as to whether information was public or private lay with the SIC. While
public authority civil servants would do their best to make the right decision, he would be the final
arbitrator concerning any decisions that they made. Civil servants would for this reason not only regularly
check new decisions that the SIC had published on his website, but remain aware that if an applicant was
not a happy with the response that they had issued, their decision would be appealed, on neutral terms, to
the SIC.
Negotiating Relations
It appears in the cases above that whether information and an individual appears as public or private
depends on to whom or what they are in relation. When in relation to others from whom they are
differentiated, people appear as persons and the information that they originate as private. In the
instances above, information about someone’s occupation or health was often considered by those
disclosing it to constitute personal information. Yet as they came into relation with others, knowledge
that seemed to differentiate people was also knowledge that appeared shared. Information about what
someone does for a job could well be information people held in common: because people conducted
themselves in the same way as others in the same job would. Such information, in short, said little about
an individual person. But put back in relation to the wider community, individuals who have knowledge
and interests in common can appear once again individuated; that is, the knowledge that they share is also
knowledge through which they are distinguished from others who do not share it.
So people are at once divided (differentiated) and combined (hold knowledge in common), their
divided and combined form something that appears as they come into relation. This not only provides
the sense that individuals are dependent on others for their own private or public form, but that such a
change in form moment to moment produces a kind of merographic effect, that makes individuals and
any information they produce difficult to capture and define.
Merographic
‘It presupposes that one thing differs from another insofar as it belongs to or is part of something else
[…] The ability to constantly re-describe something from another viewpoint [inducing the form in which
appears…] produces a displacement effect of a particular kind [as if nothing is ever definitively ‘known’]’
(Strathern 73: 1992).
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Yet even information that appears and remains personal is information that might in other cases
be disclosed. Information such as expense claims and performance rates were released in the public
interest. This was because information was thought to disclose a common approach to the spending of
public money, an approach that in light of the fact that it is was more common also seemed justified,
(publicly endorsed). While FOI maintains the distinction between information relating to a person’s
private and professional life, the conversion of personal information into that which is public seems
pointed to the manner in which personal lives might be regarded as combined so as to appear public.
Claims to privacy that a person might make appeared to diminish with hierarchy. While more senior
members of an organization might look on the information that they held or originated as personal, as
they disseminated and shared this same information with others in the organization, knowledge that
distinguished them from others was also knowledge that united more junior members of staff. This
seemed not only knowledge that staff to whom it is disseminated held in common but might be more
than happy to disclose (given it said nothing about them personally). Important to note, then, was that
knowledge that was public, that is, held in common, was also knowledge that for others was personal, and reflective of
their motives, interests and endeavours. Thus what was private appeared to double up as, and permeate,
what was otherwise public depending on the way in which these capacities were activated by relations.
And as decisions over relations were made and, as a consequence, persons and things appeared in a
particular form, the relations themselves fell into the background. What had been constructed would now
seem given, as if discovered, as the method of construction fell away.
Decisions over public and private were amongst the most time-consuming and difficult to make.
As information appeared private in one moment and public in the next, as persons who held or originated
information and information itself came into relation with different entities, persons and things appeared a
product of one relational context and then the next. There seemed, for those with an interest in such
decisions, often no clear pattern to the way in which and reason why decisions over public and private
were made. At a half-day workshop on the SIC’s decisions, the director for the UK Campaign for FOI
remarked that the SIC, for example, had both decided in favour of the disclosure of expense claims (on
the basis that it is in the public interest for such information to scrutinized), but also against the disclosure
of such information (on the basis that its release would cause undue stress to the subjects of the
information). The SIC’s decisions on matters of public and private (as well as other points of law) were
regularly scrutinized by the CFoI and compared with those of the UK Information Commissioner. It was
helpful for FOI practitioners, for example, if they could see some pattern in the decisions the SIC (and
IC) made, which would indicate his thinking on what constitutes public and private information,
providing guidance on how they might make decisions in the future. But the SIC was renowned for
stating that cases were decided on a case-by-case basis, which indicated that there might not be any
pattern at all. So while there appeared to be no pattern to the SIC’s decisions, pattern itself depended on
the way in which cases were scrutinized and themselves divided and combined. As one pattern emerged,
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another might disappear as decisions were made over how the line between cases, like the line between
information and between people, could be drawn.
The UK Information Commissioner (IC)
The IC is responsible for enforcing and promoting the UK FOI Act outwith Scotland and the DPA in
the whole UK.
Indeed, while public and private might pivot on a single viewpoint, a particular approach seeming
public and private in different moments, a single individual might also adopt different, sometimes
contrasting, approaches to the same thing, whether this be an issue, case or information to hand. As
people shifted their viewpoints, there seemed an accompanying shift in scale and increased complexity,
producing the sense that that there was perhaps always more to know, always a new position or
perspective to take up (Strathern 1992). People with different viewpoints on the same thing might at once
appear to have combined and divided interests in their relations with others.
The fact that people appear at once combined and divided, and information is ordered and
reordered, comes from the simple fact of life that something might also be considered from a new or
different angle (Strathern 1992). Writing on English kinship in the twentieth century, Strathern states:
‘Difference… becomes apparent from a simple fact of life: it is a connection from another angle.
That is, what looks as though it is connected to one fact can also be connected to another…
[such that] one thing differs from another insofar as it belongs to or is part of something
else. I call this kind of connection, link or relationship merographic’ (1992: 73, original
emphasis)
By merographic, Strathern is not referring to the study of part-whole relations to which Thornton
(1988) refers, but to the:
‘English view that anything may be a part of something else… In this view, nothing is in fact
ever simply part of a whole because another view, another perspective or domain, may
redescribe it as part of something else. When that something else is perceived as a context
or underlying assumption, the very grounds on which things appear become another
perspective on them.’
Strathern uses perspective here in a very specific sense, to describe the manner in which we might
consider ourselves, through our relations with others, as taking up different positions on things, perhaps
as a consequence of our membership of a particular group or organization. There is a sense, here, that the
world is broken into fragments, giving rise to the contemporary division between individual and society.
But as new capacities elicited by new relations emerge (relations here providing ‘perspective’), these
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provide grounds for a new perspective on something else, which is inevitably part of something else from
which to consider the same thing; it is a cyclical process that guarantees new angles from which to
consider something and is replicated on different scales. There are only seemingly endless permutations in
form, providing the sense that connections are always partial, that there is no whole. Indeed perhaps
instead of fragments and conceiving of the world in terms of parts and wholes, it should perhaps be
considered fractal (a curve or geometric figure, each part of which has the same statistical character as the
whole23) suggests Strathern.
While people might have different viewpoints on the same thing, only one viewpoint seemed
theirs, the other belonging to the wider group or society. The more one knew, the more there seemed to
know about a particular thing, knowledge itself seeming to come from and belong to different levels of
organization and an individual’s membership of different groups. Thus knowledge itself no longer
seemed personal. While such detachment was an effect of purification or separation of networks from the
forms they elicit (see Latour 1992), it was a technique that came in useful when persons sought to disguise
themselves (disappear). In the case of the leukaemia data, the SIC argued that such data should be
released on the grounds that barnardisation would sufficiently obscure the numbers in the data set. In this
way, the identity of individuals would be disguised as connections became more difficult to establish; and
there would be sufficient ambiguity that persons might be considered one of an unknown number.
Information, in this sense, would seem less personal by dint of controlling its form.
The potential for different perspectives on the same thing presents the dilemma that things might
be described and at the same time categorized differently. Certain attempts to analyse and find pattern in
the SIC’s decisions were made on the basis that decisions concerning the division between private and
public might be themselves divided and combined to create some sense of pattern. Since his decisions
might be divided and combined along different and contrasting lines, as soon as two cases appeared the
same and a pattern emerged, pattern was also lost. This only reflected the manner in which individuals
were themselves divided and combined along different lines, considered public and private in their
relations with others. As Wagner (1977) writes with regard to systems of categorization in the life sciences
and social sciences, things both appear to resist and incite the manner in which they are arranged. As
soon as something is one thing, there is always the potential for it to be something else. Wagner states:
‘…the more discretely and specifically we define and bound the units of our study, the more
provocative, necessary, and difficult it becomes to account for the relationships among those
units; conversely, the more effectively we are able to analyze and sum up the relationships
among a set of units, the more provocative, necessary, and difficult it becomes to define the
units’ (Wagner 1977: 386)
23 Compact Oxford Dictionary online
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It seems there are always new possibilities and other links to be made; different ways of
categorizing and organizing species (in the life sciences) and persons (in the social sciences) in a manner
that can only leave scientists in pursuit of order, in a dilemma. But it is a dilemma that too seems resolved
if categories, people and species themselves are seen as belonging either to the province of culture or as
innate. ‘…it is this negotiation, taking one or another of the semiotic modalities as the province of one’s
deliberate action and responsibility, and relegating the other to the realm of the given, that provides the
potentialities and limitations of any particular scientific task’, Wagner continues. It is a division that is
otherwise often referred to as ‘science’s relation’ (Strathern 2005), that is, a division in knowledge and
between persons where knowledge appears at once given (discovered) and constructed (invented). It
seems it is only by subdividing knowledge in this way that science might overcome the paradox that is
categorization. And yet it is a relation that will eventually require unpacking.
The manner in which things are (eventually) categorized and the meaning of or approach to a
particular thing, seems to depend on the relationship that is established between relations themselves.
Knowledge, viewpoints, approaches might be organized along different lines, the relation between them
producing a scale or order. Scale in this light refers to the way in which approaches and perspectives are
organized so as to produce a particular meaning or system of categorization.
It is the relation between relations that appears crucial in establishing the meaning of things,
which perspective or approach to prioritize above others, and how to categorize and re-categorize
decisions. It seems in establishing such a scale, and the relationship between outlooks and approaches, (as
revealed through the information that people hold or produce), that the context of a particular case will
emerge and information and persons appear public or private. FOI practitioners, who on a daily basis had
to make decisions over what constituted public and private information, found themselves making
decisions over the order of knowledge. It seemed it was decisions over what constituted knowledge that
the SIC took into account in concluding whether information was public or private. What appeared to
govern these decisions were the interests and value perceived in a particular relation. It was people’s
divided interests in a particular social relation that invoked their separation and combination, their
particularly different viewpoints, and the particular meaning of information and form of a thing.
Conclusion
I have explored the manner in which persons and information appear both public and private in relation,
and the fact that decisions over the relationship between relations appears to set the context of a particular
case. The relationship between public and private was one that was under constant negotiation. A single
viewpoint appeared both public and private as persons appeared in one moment divided from, and in
another combined with, others. A momentary shift in context or meaning made what otherwise appeared
public, private, and vice-versa. While public and private might pivot on a single viewpoint, a division
between persons along a private public axis seemed only to reflect a division within persons along this
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same axis. Persons might appear both public and private in different moments. While a single viewpoint
– a person’s public and private form -- was in flux, people might also appear simultaneously public and
private due to a division within persons that reflected a division between them. Despite being under
constant negotiation, the relationship between public and private was also one that was often looked on
by practitioners and members of the public as fixed, that is, something to be uncovered. On this analysis,
public knowledge was knowledge to which individuals had a right: and they had that right because public
knowledge depicted what was commonly known, or true. There was a sense of ownership on two fronts:
knowledge that was public was to be commonly held and at the same time belonged to no one, while
knowledge that was private only belonged to the individual and might be individually and discretely
known. Insofar as knowledge was separated from persons, it was also something that could be commonly





The focus of this chapter is the ‘culture change’ that FOISA is designed to achieve in Scotland. Culture
change in Scotland involves a change from a public sector culture of information retention, to one of
openness and transparency. It was a New Labour incentive to bring about change across the public
sector, to make public authorities and various levels of government appear, if not become, transparent and
open in light of declining trust in government, and in particular, in a New Labour government. In
Scotland, campaigners and decision-makers such as the Campaign for Freedom of Information in
Scotland and the Scottish Information Commissioner, considered that public authorities should not need
additional resources—monetary or otherwise—to implement, and comply with, FOISA. Public
authorities should be readily able to provide information to those who want to know, have methods of
organizing this information, and be able to quickly locate and retrieve it without any major organizational
changes. It was perhaps for this reason that FOI in Scotland, enacted two years behind the UK FOI Act,
came into force at the same time as the UK FOI Act, giving non-Scottish UK public authorities five years
to prepare, and Scottish public authorities only three.
This chapter follows on from the previous one, and explores what culture change entailed in
theory and in practice for practitioners handling and responding to FOI requests, for end-users devising
and submitting requests, and for policy and decision-makers implementing FOI.
FOI Officers approached the enactment of FOISA with some anticipation. Many had been
involved in establishing a framework for its implementation and enforcement within their authorities since
well before the Act came into force in 2005. For this reason, they looked forward, with some anxiety, to
the hour that FOISA came in—to see whether their hard work had paid off, whether the systems they
devised to track and process requests would hold up, and how employees would respond to the new
legislation—would they recognize an FOI request when they saw one and readily provide information?
Social relations in which practitioners’ were enmeshed and on which their knowledge depended,
were continually made visible at FOISA meetings and conferences and as practitioners conversed and
liaised with colleagues. Yet, as this knowledge was shared between groups, between a practitioner and an
end-user, for example, in the form of an e-mail or a letter, these relational connections appeared truncated
and lost. ‘Hot’ knowledge was received as ‘cold’ information (Strathern 2004).
This chapter therefore focuses on the way in which the relations that were the focus of chapter
two, that inform what people come to know, elicit the form of persons and things as public or private or
otherwise, and turn data into information, and information into knowledge, are moment-to-moment,
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made present, or absent by those originating, handling and exchanging knowledge. As practitioners,
policy-makers or end-users present themselves as ‘anyone’, no different from anyone else, one of many
rather than alone, undifferentiated from others in what they think and how they act, so the differences
between them drop away and information passes freely—detached from the networks from which it was
originated. In the examples that follow, knowledge alternates between appearing in two forms: something
that travels between people in a relationship (knowledge), or something that travels independently of
those who transfer and create it, in neat units (information).
In light of this, culture change had three key forms in the cases below: the first concerns
practitioners’ replication of each others’ form through common or shared knowledge; the second
concerns the replication of a form of a relationship, the division between citizens and government
becomes replicated within the authority; and the third concerns the manner in which FOI officers within
each part of the authority made social links absent from the knowledge they disclosed.
Looking at the first of these, public authority employees, both practitioners and their colleagues
were often aware of the manner in which their own particular interests, personality, and relationships
might be disclosed with the information that they provided. As a result, they often avoided—or were
certainly reluctant to—disclose information. This meant that FOI practitioners had a hard job in
persuading colleagues (and sometimes themselves) to release information as well as handle FOI requests
more generally. As gaps emerged within the authority, between public authority employees, ‘culture
change’ (from secrecy to openness) invoked the migration and replication of a division (between the
culture of secrecy and that of openness) rather that its resolution. What was previously a division between
the public and the public authority became one between different persons within the authority.
As to the second, decision-makers and protagonists of FOISA preferred FOI to be a ‘devolved’
activity. They saw the responsibility of dealing with FOI requests not as that of one department or one
person but as that of every member of staff together with dedicated members of staff positioned throughout
the organization. Practitioners were encouraged to take on new ways of working and, in accordance with
advice from the SIC that was available at FOISA events and disseminated through colleagues, to perceive
themselves and what they did differently. It was necessary for practitioners to replicate each others’ and,
more particularly, the SIC’s approach, in order to comply with the new legislation. Culture change, here,
concerned the propagation of a particular form through shared knowledge.
Turning to the third, moment-to-moment, practitioners either made absent or present the social
relations that informed what they knew and how they acted. While the concealment of the social relations
on which knowledge depends made knowledge appear in the form of information and persons in the form of
independent, discrete things, their revelation made knowledge appear in the form of social knowledge and
people in the form of persons. The neat switch between these two modes—persons or things, knowledge
or information—and the way in which people in their relations with others put this change to use, is the
focus of this chapter. In this case, culture change lay in the manner in which, in highlighting their own
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lack of differentiation, people made themselves appear as undifferentiated things and turned knowledge
into ‘information’.
I draw on official rhetoric, including Ministers’ speeches, the consultation document that set FOI
legislation in motion in Scotland (An Open Scotland), and the words of the Scottish Information
Commissioner and his staff to describe the change that is expected to take place, and what culture change
is expected to achieve. In conjunction with this, I examine people’s responses to this change: in
particular, those of practitioners handling and responding to requests for information under FOISA. I
draw on four case-studies: three concerning practitioners as they handle and respond to requests for
information and deal with colleagues, who are often reluctant to disclose information, and the other
concerning the conferences and meetings practitioners attend about FOISA and culture change, at which
they share and receive knowledge on the Act and the change it will initiate.
Culture Change: The Official Story
Culture change is at the heart of Freedom of Information legislation in Scotland as well as, it seems, in
other jurisdictions with access to information laws. Culture change concerns a change of public sector
attitude towards information dissemination, a shift from a culture of secrecy to one of increased openness.
It was a strong message carried by both Ministers and decision-makers north and south of the border, in
light of the enactment of the UK and Scotland FOI Acts that the public sector must operate more openly.
The policy was introduced after years of campaigning by groups such as the UK Campaign for Freedom
of Information against what was perceived as unnecessary secrecy. A Freedom of Information Bill was
finally offered in 1997 in New Labour’s election manifesto, and after their election, took the form of the
UK white paper Your Right to Know, and in Scotland the 1999 consultation paper An Open Scotland. A
Freedom of Information Bill for Scotland was a promise that Jim Wallace MSP, later Scotland’s Deputy
First Minister, had made on his election as MSP for Orkney and Shetland and it was one that he appeared
keen to keep: ‘When I first stood for the Westminster Parliament in Orkney & Shetland in 1983, and was
asked what private member’s bill I’d like to bring in, if successful in the backbench ballot, I committed
myself to an FOI Bill’, he said in his speech at a FOISA conference in 2006. He continued:
‘The need to overturn a culture of secrecy was a pressing one. Here was a country, or more
specifically, a public service which was still dominated by the 1911 Official Secrets Act – a
piece of legislation introduced to combat a German spy fear in the years before World War I.
But its ethos – everything being secret except that which was expressly allowed not to be –
pervaded government.
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I recall citing as examples, the offence committed by revealing the whereabouts of the Post
Office Tower in London, or by the Head Gardener in the Royal Botanic Gardens disclosing,
without authorization, the order in which the plants were watered.
It wasn’t just a change of legislation, which was needed; it was a change of culture’.24
The default position of information retention, it seemed, was so entrenched that legislation alone was not
going to change culture but legislation must be accompanied by a change of attitude across the public
sector. Culture change appeared both a precondition and an outcome. In A Partnership for Scotland,
which set out the key principles for the so-called Lib-Lab partnership25 (an alliance formed by the Labour
and Liberal Democrat parties in Scotland) published shortly after the 1999 elections to the Scottish
Parliament, Scottish Ministers made clear their commitment ‘to the early introduction of an effective
Freedom of Information regime’ and ‘a culture of openness within the public sector’ considered ‘an
essential foundation for the successful implementation of [FOI]’26. It was argued that culture change
would lead to more efficient and effective governance, as public scrutiny ensured better records
management and that the right decisions were being made at the right cost.
FOI was foregrounded against decades of official secrecy in Britain. The 1911 Official Secrets
Act (introduced in 1889 and amended in 1911, 1920, 1939 and 1989) was a measure enacted in the
interests of national security from the viewpoint of being on a war footing. It placed an emphasis on the
retention of information: and, as the quote above indicates, its scope was extended over time to include, not
just sensitive information, but any information that a civil servant or government contractor might come
across in the course of their work for the government. The OSA continued to be staple legislation
throughout most of the twentieth century on which Ministers, public officials and decision-makers relied.
In light of slow moves in other jurisdictions around the world towards openness, considered by their own
citizens and other nations as a sign of democracy and a transparent and accountable government, Britain’s
lack of access to information legislation in the late twentieth century seemed backward. Or perhaps a
demonstration of an implicit assumption that government and its employees could be trusted to ‘do the
right thing’: an assumption that the public, and many civil servants, felt was being increasingly abused.
Freedom of Information legislation was aimed at reversing this long-standing emphasis on the
retention of information, and provide people with an automatic right of access—unless of course
information was exempt, considered for example, personal, confidential, or something that might




27 Exemptions on disclosure such as these, however, were often subject to the public interest test, and a decision
over disclosure or retention something to be decided on by a practitioner or the SIC himself.
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Scotland famously stated. The increasingly apparent decline in public trust towards government provided
New Labour with an incentive to introduce an FOI Bill, in addition to the clear call for change on the part
of groups such as the UK CFoI and the wider public.
To obtain and share information, then, was a way of participating in politics, devolving politics to
citizens, which in some ways alleviated Members of Parliament from having to make decisions. FOI
embodied a devolved structure of governance, where civil servants’ relation to Government invoked their
decision-making capacities, and in their relations with civil servants, citizens had capacities to challenge
and amend these decisions. Government had, in a sense, been taken out of the equation.
However, advocacy was also coupled with skepticism: there are those who continue to doubt that
organizations will ever start liberally disclosing information that they prefer to retain. Drawing on the
experience of other jurisdictions with FOI regimes, in particular Canada and the United States, Roberts
(2006) states that organizations will always resist disclosure, ‘[e]xperience has shown that the governing
institutions in Westminster systems are particularly resilient, and capable of rejecting alien transplantations
such as FOI laws, or of developing new routines designed to minimize the disruptive effect of these new
laws’ (2006: 108). While there is small chance that there will be a change in culture or increased trust,
Roberts’s outlook is balanced: some information will be released, he argues, and citizens and non-
governmental groups will undoubtedly find FOI a useful tool for extracting information about
government and decision-making.
Prejudice the Conduct of Public Affairs Exemption
Information is likely to be retained if it is considered it would be likely to prejudice substantially the
maintenance of the convention of the collective responsibility of the Scottish Ministers, would or would
be likely to inhibit substantially the free and frank provision of advice, or free and frank exchange of views
for the purposes of deliberation. Or if it was likely to prejudice substantially the effective conduct of
public affairs. The use of the word substantial here, over using prejudice alone distinguishes FOISA from
the UK FOI Act.
Agents of Change
The shift in emphasis from retention to disclosure and the responsibility to see the change through fell on
public authority FOI Officers and practitioners responsible for handing FOI requests on behalf of their
organization. Complaints officers, personal assistants, secretaries, records managers, archivists, and others
who had a good knowledge of their authority juggled their day-jobs with receiving and responding to FOI
requests. It appeared a testing role, and one that required individuals to not only have determination (in
their dealings with resistant colleagues and testing applicants), but to also be friendly, sociable and think
laterally – where else might information be kept or who might hold it? FOISA in effect required public
authority employees to re-learn what and how they knew.
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FOI Officers were individuals often already with a public facing role in the authority, and dealing
with FOI was something for which they also became responsible. Upbeat spirits, sociability, patience,
good knowledge of the organization and working relationships with colleagues appeared part of the job
description. Practitioners had to draw on their relations with others and ask favours to get information
retrieved and supplied on time, and also remain in regular contact with colleagues as well as applicants by
telephone and e-mail. Discussing requests over coffee with a colleague was incorporated into an Officer’s
daily routine: FOI, it seemed, was a sociable business. While often the ones in the firing line when a
deadline was not met or a request mislaid, it was FOI Officers—agents of culture change—who rarely
received praise for relentlessly encouraging colleagues to disclose information and rigorously promoting
FOI within their authority. Promoting as well as enacting FOI seemed part of their job: there was the
expectation (amongst decision-makers) that much information an authority held was and should be free.
Thus culture change was in the hands of individual FOI Officers, such as Colin and Samantha,
principle FOI Officers for NHS Glendale, a large public authority in the East of Scotland. And Duncan,
whom we have met before, at Lochhead. Many of these people, already in a public facing role and thus
seeing the benefits (for the authority and the public) of sharing information with members of the public
with whom they already liaised, were advocates of FOISA; they saw its practical uses—the fact that
citizens would be more aware of how their organization operated and the demands they often placed on it
and its capacity to deliver on these (or not). Openness also served to extend a network of relations:
between the authority and the outside world and within the authority—between citizens and civil servants,
and high-ranking officials or public authority directors in whom new relations invoked new capacities.
But practitioners were also aware of the problems and issues that FOISA raised. They sometimes
considered themselves caught up in a media cycle, and as receiving requests for information from the
media that would only generate new requests (from journalists) off the back of a new media story.
FOI Officers acted as a kind of pivot, a fulcrum that elicited new social knowledge as they liaised
between applicants, decision-makers and civil servants. They drew on their network of relations to locate
and disclose information such that recipients of it were at times wholly reliant on an FOI Officer’s ability
to persuade colleagues to share what they held. Subjects of the legislation—civil servants themselves—
became enthusiastic advocates of it, as if the division between the law and public authorities was realized
as ‘the law and public authorities’ versus public authority colleagues: the ‘law’ took the form of a ‘subject’
to persuade a ‘culture’—civil servant colleagues—to change.
Rachel and Spin
Indeed, FOI Officers often had to manage the needs of their colleagues many of whom were more
reluctant to give information out. Rachel, NHS Glendale Press and Communications Officer, and one of
Colin and Samantha’s colleagues mentioned below, was concerned with managing spin. It was important
to Rachel that she was one step ahead of journalists who might reinterpret information for their own
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purposes and in the process potentially damage the reputation of NHS Glendale, leading to loss of public
trust. Of course, too much spin risked the same effect. Rachel carefully advised Samantha and Colin
what to give out and when. She might, for example, request that they disclose only paragraphs relevant to
a particular enquiry rather than a whole document, or issue contextualising paragraphs along with
information so that those receiving it might not misconstrue its meaning.
Journalistic spin and information spun by others who attempted to keep ahead of the game,
appeared only to reflect if not replicate the spin-doctoring for which the New Labour government had
became notorious during the late 1990s and early 2000s. New Labour spin constituted the careful
presentation of ideas in a manner that, some argued, substituted for solid Labour policy. Once a story had
been spun, carefully bolstered and seamlessly replicated, it appeared it had to run its course. Cracks and
inconsistency had the potential to point to conspiracy and deceit not only due to apparent contradiction,
but as new knowledge arose people might also presume what was known had always been known and had
simply been concealed. At the same time, government spin-doctoring appeared counteracted by media
spin, from which public authorities such as NHS Glendale sought reprieve in the form of spin
management, that is, the reduction of spin through the use of (for example) press releases, itself spin of a
kind.
Spin was counteracted by spin: considering something from a new or different angle engendered
in others the capacity to do the same. Given this was the case, it seemed in the end difficult to tell who
revealed or concealed the truth. Spin lead to correction and amendment of spin, in the form of spin,
meaning that while information was replaced with information, people were also trying to read into this
information the relations and persons that underpinned it. The distinction between information and
knowledge, here, was blurred.
It seemed, then that an existing culture of releasing information pre-dated FOI, one of ‘spin’, and
‘spin management’, which took a very different approach. FOI implementation created a clash between
these cultures, suggesting that the culture change FOI brought about also lay in this change.
It was FOI Officers with whom I spent much of my time during fieldwork. In the following case studies,
I highlight people’s responses to the legislation. I came to know Colin through his colleague Samantha, to
whom I was introduced by an FOI Officer at Glendale council. That is, located in one field context, I
came to know about (and later to meet) informants in another. Colin, as with other FOI Officers,
appeared overworked and overstretched—but despite this, made time to communicate with applicants
and respond to their requests as well as talk with me. I worked alongside Colin for just over three
months, helping him collate and make available responses to requests on topical issues such as MRSA,
NHS waiting lists and car parking fines. I shall also discuss the formal and informal FOI meetings, larger
conferences and sector and cross-sector events that were a method through which the message of culture
change was disseminated. It seemed the message of information dissemination was itself disseminated
69
throughout the FOI community in a way that made it both a message and a model. I also revisit Duncan,
at Lochhead, and Morag, records manager for the University of Glendale who deftly encouraged people
within their authorities to disclose information. Duncan and Morag attended and spoke at larger FOI
conferences and sector meetings. It is Colin and NHS Glendale to which I first turn.
Persons in the Form of Persons
Colin, principle FOI Officer for NHS Glendale
Colin, the principle FOI Officer for NHS Glendale, and his boss Samantha worked for NHS Glendale
Health Board, which was within walking distance from the busy town centre. Colin had worked for the
Health Board for some time, but Samantha had only recently been recruited to assist him with FOI.
While Colin had changed jobs, he continued to sit with his former colleagues with whom he got on well in
the Facilities Department (see figure 3).
Figure 3. Layout of the ground floor of NHS Glendale Health Board, including Samantha’s office, the
Facilities Department and seating arrangements
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Colin was young and enthusiastic, and was on familiar terms with many of his work colleagues as
well as many applicants. He was a keen snowboarder, and when I initially began working for Samantha
and Colin, he was away snowboarding with his girlfriend of ten years. Colin was originally from the
North of Scotland and had moved to Glendale to be with his girlfriend when she moved to Glendale to
study medicine.
In the first year that FOISA was in force, Colin received up to eight FOI requests a week which,
although not an unusually high number, meant that Colin had plenty of work to do locating and providing
the information that had been requested. He dealt with these according to FOISA, the FOISA Codes of
Practice and guidance from the SIC and the Scottish Government FOI Unit. As the person responsible
for handling FOI requests on behalf of his authority, Colin had twenty days in which to collect and put, as
another FOI Officer explained, different ‘bits of information’ together and compile a response to an FOI
request. He also had a duty to advise and assist an applicant with their request so that they find the
information they require. However, Colin did not always find his own colleagues co-operative when it
came to assisting him with FOI requests. They often did not respond to his requests for information, and
he was acutely aware of the danger that they might never respond. He explained:
‘There are times when you have to ask people again and again [for information], and we’re
still not sure we’ve got [it] all. [If it’s not all there] no one else is going to get it…’
Although dependent on colleagues—as one civil servant on a chain of others—it was still Colin’s
responsibility alone under the Act to locate and retrieve information that had been requested. Even,
Derek, NHS Glendale’s Chief Executive, Colin explained, was occasionally reluctant to disclose
information. It seemed this was because Derek was aware of how NHS Glendale’s response might be
considered incomplete or inadequate by those receiving it. In one case, to comply with a request and to
ease his own concerns, Derek had asked Colin if there was more information that he could send out. All
responses went out in Derek’s name, and if a response was neither considered adequate nor provided
enough information, Derek would be considered personally to be in the wrong, or at least reveal his own
difference from others. Colin continued, offering an explanation for Derek’s anxiety:
‘We always like to give [the applicant] something, even if we don’t hold the information… I
know we don’t have to, but it’s much better for us if we look as if we’re being helpful.
Otherwise, the next thing you know, [the request] hits the Commissioner’s desk’.
For Colin and his colleagues, it was important not to be seen as providing no information at all:
this might imply an authority was withholding information. It was as if the authority must at least hold
some relevant information. Something was better than nothing, even if irrelevant since the act of disclosure
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was seen as being as important as the content of the information provided. Openness was something that
practitioners considered the need to continually perform. It became a marker of the fact that persons and
their authorities were readily disclosing information, with the alternative problem that if individuals were
to stop performing disclosure in front of others that this implied that they were not actively doing it. This
left individuals and authorities concerned that they might at any one point be considered by others as not
being open; a turned back was enough for suspicions to form and eyebrows to raise.
But in providing information, an authority and those working on its behalf risked disclosing
themselves as differentiated and as standing out, much to their embarrassment (after all, an applicant was
not required to say why they wanted the information). This differentiation might not only suggest that
they were in the wrong, but meant that they themselves were exposed as individually different, making
their own personal interests, concerns, capacity, and social relations visible to others.
Despite Derek’s concerns, Colin was acutely aware of the need to respond to an applicant within
twenty days (as stated in the legislation). They might otherwise consider his lack of response ‘a mute and
deemed refusal’ and ask the authority to review its decision. But sending a prompt response was more
than simply an attempt by Colin to comply with the Act. It was important to Colin that it appeared to the
applicant as if ‘anybody’ within the authority would be in a position to provide it. A delayed response
seemed to suggest that Colin had made some kind of personal effort to locate, retrieve and provide
information, which of course he had. His own very personal efforts to secure and retrieve information
from colleagues, and his reliance on his particular network of relationships meant that information was
not simply information, but took the form of social knowledge informed by these very particular
relationships. If provided on this basis, the information requested would also carry person-ality, that is,
some part of Colin himself. It seemed necessary to make these relations absent, which Colin did through
the speed of his response.
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A Mute and Deemed Refusal
This is a term used by the SIC to describe when an authority (deliberately or otherwise) does not respond
to a request for information within the twenty day deadline. Their silence (muteness) is taken to indicate
they refuse the request.
It was Colin’s job and his responsibility to provide information in a manner that would not expose
either his authority or colleagues. Yet the full, adequate and, hence, slower response that people such as
Colin’s boss Derek preferred, in order for him personally not to stand out, seemed to be in conflict with
the rapid response that Colin preferred, which itself was also intended to make absent the social relations
(and hard work) that informed it.
It seemed those working for public authorities, concerned about appearing individually different,
considered only what was at stake for them in disclosure. Given this, culture change was neither straight-
forward, nor easy. While in principle it addressed the division between citizens and government, resolving
this division only led to a division emerging elsewhere—between public authority employees themselves.
As the ‘devolved’ practices of the legislation placed Colin in a position analogous with the SIC, Colin
found himself taking sides with the Act. The form of the relationship between the public and public
authorities was thus reiterated within the authority itself.
It soon became apparent that a division between citizens and civil servants might rapidly become
one that emerged between Colin and his colleagues as he fulfilled his obligations under the Act. The Act,
here, seemed being put to work beyond its own realm, between civil servants themselves rather than between
civil servants and citizens. As Colin went about persuading colleagues to release information, culture
change lay in the migration of the secrecy divide from being between public organizations and the public
they served to being within the organizations themselves.
Implementing and enforcing FOISA, here, entailed Colin managing his relations with others, and
controlling whether or not those relations were apparent. It was through making social relations that were
crucial to the information that was gathered and disclosed, invisible to those receiving this information,
that knowledge took the form of information and Colin the form of an independent entity, or thing,
whose actions were not informed by his relations with other people. This seemed crucial to the effective
operation of FOISA and ‘compliance’ that required persons not to act in their own capacity, but in the
capacity of the organization—or ‘decision-maker’. Yet social relations, as the passage below shows, were
integral to FOI.
Among the colleagues with whom Colin regularly liaised to gather information and provide an
applicant with a response was Margaret, an FOI Officer working for one of the hospitals in the West
Glendale Hospitals Division, some thirty minutes away from the Health Board by train. Colin and
Margaret often spoke on the telephone and corresponded by e-mail. As part of my work with the Health
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Board, and offering a spare pair of hands, I was asked if I would visit Margaret and help her prepare for
an internal FOI Audit that would take place in the following weeks. It was nearing the end of the first
year that FOI was in force, and the authority was reviewing how FOISA had been implemented and the
manner in which FOI requests were managed and recorded.
Margaret was a well-dressed, middle aged woman with two sons in their twenties who, she said,
she continued working to support. Her husband was a successful builder, and Margaret drove a black
BMW to and from work. Margaret had worked for the authority for over ten years, in the same office
with many of the same people. She had been a Personal Assistant to one of the Senior Managers before
he relocated to a larger hospital and she now worked as a Complaints Officer, and had recently been given
responsibility for FOI. She regularly met with friends and colleagues in her own building to talk over her
weekends, personal dilemmas and upcoming events such as her father-in-law’s recent visit to the hospital.
She also discussed complaints and FOI requests with colleagues. She might discuss how to interpret a
request, what information the hospital held, and who held information and might even bring a request up
in conversation with colleagues over lunch or morning coffee, people with whom she was good friends
and would spend a weekend away once a year.
On one occasion, Margaret received a forwarded FOI request from Colin as an e-mail that had
been sent to NHS Glendale by an MSP’s assistant on behalf of a well-known MSP. The applicant had
requested copies of all e-mails that the authority held to and from a particular group of ‘.gov.uk’ e-mail
addresses. It seemed that the applicant, working for the opposing party, wanted background information
on the government’s decision to change the way in which the NHS in Scotland was organized, one that
had been controversial. Margaret and her colleagues speculated that the MSP was going to use the
information to present a counterargument to the changes. On collecting, to her knowledge and that of
her colleagues, all the information that the applicant had requested, Margaret passed it as an e-mail to
Colin for him to provide the applicant with the information along with a written explanation.
Although Margaret forwarded the information that she had collected to Colin in the cold form of
an e-mail attachment, the information that Colin and the applicant received was as if far from cold. It was
the consequence of hot and detailed social exchanges over coffee and lunch and by telephone. Attached
to information was knowledge born out of regular exchanges between colleagues, something considered
neither by Colin nor the applicant as they received information as cold fact. No relations between
information and persons were apparent.
Knowledge and persons, in the above case-study of NHS Glendale, appeared in two forms: in
one moment as knowledge and as persons dependent on the network of relations integral to FOI, and
another as entities that operated independently of these relations. The form of knowledge and people
here depended on the manner in which practitioners made visible, or invisible, the social relations on
which they and knowledge depended. Colin found that making knowledge appear as information, and
himself as an independent entity, was often crucial to its transfer, and also his own compliance.
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Applicants sought to receive information, not social knowledge (the perceived outcome of very particular
relationships). Colin considered that providing an application with a speedy response would make these
relationships invisible. Yet relations once again became visible in light of divisions disclosed by that
information; differences between colleagues, different authorities, and an authority and the public. It
seemed through these differences, people’s particular motives, interests and above all the social ties they
sought to conceal, were made visible. In an effort to make the social relations that were integral to FOI
disappear, the trick for practitioners seemed to be to actively appear the same—replicate the social form
that the SIC, other practitioners and authorities took.
This method of replication—constituting a particular kind of ‘culture change’—was most
apparent in the FOISA conferences and meetings described in the following section. Indeed, the practice
of information dissemination, between practitioners and applicants seemed replicated amongst
practitioners as they passed advice about dissemination, openness, and culture change in conversations
between them at conferences. FOISA appeared both a model for dissemination between civil servants and
citizens and a model of dissemination since FOI practitioners’ own practices replicated the very information
sharing practices that the FOI Act endorsed.
Coffee, meetings and conferences
Like all new legislation, FOI attracted much attention from private legal consultancy groups, web based
organizations such as www.freedomofinformation.org that advised on FOI (and sometimes Data
Protection), and publicly funded legal information services. Much of the advice that public authority
employees dealing with the FOI Act received from these organizations constituted informal advice. FOI
practitioners could only look to the SIC for formal guidance on how to apply the legislation, against which
their decision-making would be assessed. Nevertheless, private exams on FOI and DPA, that
practitioners such as Duncan took for his own peace of mind (to ensure that he had done all he could to
comply with FOISA), attendance of private events and conferences run by private consultancy groups and
listening to free advice supplied by such groups were all attractive to public authority FOI practitioners.
Indeed, those with formal (although not officially recognized) qualifications would also receive kudos
from fellow colleagues, who would look on those with qualification as a source of guidance and advice.
In addition to giving rise to a burgeoning field of rights, and advisors, and information providers,
a whole host of formal and informal FOI meetings and conferences were put on by private events
organizers in the first two years that FOI was in force, when I carried out my fieldwork. These events
were on occasions organized in collaboration with the SIC: his Office would assist with the conference
agenda, suggest speakers and the SIC would also present to an audience of public authority FOI
practitioners on matters of interest or concern. But most were run independently of the SIC’s Office, and
were a way of facilitating information gathering and sharing amongst FOI practitioners with new
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responsibilities to handle FOI requests in a particular sector (for example, Health or Higher Education),
or across sectors.
Universities Scotland, for example, the representative group for all Scottish Higher and Further
Education Institutions (SHEI), held a conference for FOI practitioners in SHEIs at the beginning of 2005
to which representatives from other sectors such as the Scottish Government FOI Unit, Scottish
Enterprise, and Northern Police Constabulary were invited to speak and offer their perspective on the
impact of FOI in Scotland. The conference was for practitioners to share points of concern pertinent to
the HEI sector such as what to do with a request for information for cutting edge research when an
applicant sought to ‘cherry pick’ other academics’ findings. Such issues were raised and discussed, and on
occasions informally agreed on, delegates themselves ensuring they established guidelines for a common
approach that would not be perceived by the SIC or other institutional practitioners as collusion. If
practitioners were seen as colluding, that is, deliberately attempting to withhold information by getting
more than one person to deny its existence or conceal it, this would raise suspicion and they would be
seen to be in deliberate breach of the Act.
Larger FOI events provided practitioners with the opportunity to replicate others. Replication
became a method through which people might get things right and make a non-controversial decision
under FOISA that was likely to be accepted by the SIC rather than rejected by him. In fact, it had become
imperative that individual decision-makers such as FOI Officers making important decisions over what
information to retain and what information to disclose, listened carefully to others such as the SIC,
colleagues, and members of the Scottish Government FOI Unit as well as the wider FOI community.
Decision-making had become a devolved practice; practitioners must make important decisions over what
constituted information that was in the public interest. And so in following others, and taking the lead
from Government decision-makers and policy-makers, people found themselves replicating the work of
Government, its decision-making, and becoming fractals (or an extended arm) of the larger Government
body.
The HEI sector also disseminated information to its members via group e-mail and regularly held
its own informal group meetings, which meant topics of interest, core concerns, and information requests
were regularly shared amongst FOI practitioners across the HEI sector. Meetings and conferences
appeared themselves replicated: smaller and more informal meetings replicated larger more formal ones in
form and function. It was as if individual practitioners’ very attendance of formal and informal, smaller
and larger meetings and their replication of others at these meetings meant that the form of meetings
themselves was replicated and transferred. Host practitioners at smaller meetings put on spreads of food,
provided plenty of coffee, and breaks were an opportunity for people to exchange thoughts on requests
they had received and debate compliance issues. While informal, there were aspects to informal meetings
that replicated the formality and sociability of larger ones: not unlike larger meetings, delegates wore dark
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suits and ties often in contrast to their usual causal work attire, invited guest speakers, and scrutinized
other institutions’ figures.
FOI practitioners such as those participating in informal HEI meetings also attended large
cross-sector conferences held throughout the year. Perhaps the most well-known and most attended was
the annual FOI conference run by Holyrood Events in conjunction with the SIC’s Office. It was at these
larger conferences that the SIC would speak as well as an international delegate such as the Information
Commissioner from the Ireland FOI Office, or New Zealand FOI Ombudsman. Other panel guests
might include well-known journalists speaking on their experiences of using the Act, lawyers from private
law firms providing legal advice on points of law, a director from the Campaign for Freedom of
Information in Scotland and representatives from the voluntary, private or public sector talking about
their experience of and the potential impact of FOI on their sector. Such conferences provided the SIC
and other speakers with a platform from which to deliver a message and thus publicize their cause. The
SIC might draw on examples where a public authority had failed to comply with the Act and areas where
authorities could be more proficient.
Delegates such as Colin, from NHS Glendale, would visibly fidget in their seats as they listened to
panelists speak, since they did not always agree with what invited speakers had to say about the Act and
the way it was implemented. Over a generous lunch put on by conference organizers, delegates grumbled
about the SIC and his decisions, and the complications surrounding the location, retrieval and
dissemination of information that the SIC did not seem to appreciate. FOI Officers talked of spending
hours transferring electronic documents from their authority’s intranet to the internet and creating links in
and between documents (for example, its publication scheme in which links to documents could be
provided), so that others could find information without submitting a request, only for these links no
longer to work when the authority’s intranet was updated. Or debate how to avoid trapping information
in outmoded and potentially inaccessible electronic records management systems, and yet despite its
inaccessibility did the SIC consider this information that the authority held? In some ways practitioners
such as Colin and his colleagues were moving faster than the SIC, implementing, expanding and realizing
the implications of FOISA.
Despite their grumblings, and on re-gathering after lunch, delegates would sit in silence as the
conference chair asked for views from the floor. Delegates, who had seemed annoyed when discussing
the SIC’s latest decisions were reluctant to speak when given the opportunity to do so in front of
colleagues, international panelists and the SIC. Indeed, at a conference at the end of 2006, the SIC had
remarked on individuals’ ‘embarrassment’ to disclose information—or to comment at the conference. He
did not consider embarrassment to be an excuse. Despite this, practitioners seemed reluctant to provide
panelists with information in the same way that, in the case-study above, they had been reluctant to
respond to FOI requests because they were embarrassed.
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When I later asked Colin, with whom I had become well acquainted, about his and others’ silence,
Colin shrugged his shoulders. He was, again, silent. Culture change was not easy. People were cautious
about revealing what they knew given what information might, or might not say about them in the eyes of
others, their approach, what they did, and how they thought. In the opinion of the SIC, it seemed, some
practitioners and often their colleagues, were silent because they did not like to ‘get it wrong’. Although
possibly true, the reason for people’s silence was subtler than this. Rather than principally being
concerned about making a mistake, practitioners appeared concerned about being personally revealed.
Information, here, appeared to communicate a practitioner’s own concerns and interests. Indeed,
information in fact constituted social knowledge in the eyes of those who disclosed it. There were,
however, ways and means that people avoided disclosing their own intentions, perspective or interests
along with the information that they provided, as detailed in the passage below.
Persons in the Form of Things
Avoiding Embarrassment
In addition to larger conferences, practitioners regularly met in the first two years that FOI was in force
(2005 – 2006) at Scottish Government led implementation meetings. These were an opportunity for
sector representatives to voice their sector’s concerns, report on the progress their sector had made with
implementing an FOI regime, and update other sectors on the types and volume of requests that they had
received. These meetings, called Scottish Freedom of Information Implementation Group (SFOIIG)28
meetings were held every three months in different locations across Scotland (often in the south in large
cities such as Glendale, Lochhead or Strathmore) and attended by between twelve and fifteen
practitioners, for example, representatives from the Scottish Consumer Council (‘SCC’), Audit Scotland,
Universities Scotland and government agencies such as the National Archives of Scotland (‘NAS’) and
Historic Scotland. Each sector representative was asked to provide the group with a quarterly written
(sometimes oral) report several pages in length, consisting of a breakdown and analysis of the number of
applicants, types of requests, and FOI reviews conducted over the past months, often neatly displayed in
tables and charts.
Representatives would compile these figures by collecting information from most of the
authorities across their sector, and each individual authority would have compiled the information to be
forwarded to their sector representative by collecting information forwarded to them by each service and
department. The method of organizing information at the level of the authority replicated the method of
collating and organizing information for each meeting. In addition to the sector updates, items on the
agenda might include a discussion of amendments to particular sections of the Act, its scope and statutory
28 Scottish Public Information Forum (SPIF) meetings post March 2007
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bars on disclosure29. Discussions also covered SFOIIG group membership and how to publicize public
SFOIIG meetings more widely.
As well as bringing and receiving collated information, sector representatives were each expected
to articulate their sector’s viewpoint, each of which were negotiated and combined to produce SFOIIG
action points, or a decision as to what the next step with regard to a particular issue should be. Yet unlike
the public authority employees described above who seemed reluctant to articulate their view in front of
others for fear of standing out, and disclosing their own personal views in light of their anticipated
difference, representatives at these meetings seemed less intimidated. Rather, a representative’s viewpoint
did not appear to be his or her own, but the result of a long and drawn out process, a particular
arrangement of persons and information, and many meetings, the order of which was crucial for decision-
making to be inclusive. This organizational arrangement seemed to leave behind the individual who no
longer appeared to be acting in their own capacity, but the capacity of the group they were representing.
As the representative for Universities Scotland once commented, ‘We’re the representative body.
I represent the representative body… The [SHEIP] practitioners group is an informal group, and feeds
into the secretaries’ group of [Universities Scotland], which is a formal group made up of managers’. It
was important that information was combined and passed on in the right manner to produce an action
point that might simply be to arrange a separate meeting, the results of which would be presented to the
group at the next SFOIIG meeting. Decision-making was a rolling process whereby the pooling and
combining of information would produce the impetus for more pooling and combining—which seemed
for those involved, to indicate progress.
Above all, information and action points generated at SFOIIG meetings seemed the consequence
of an internal logic that came from the order of meetings, rather than an assessment of the meaning of
information; the outcome of meetings at one level seemed to frame decisions made at subsequent
meetings such that the outcome of a SFOIIG meeting was laid out in the arrangements and patterns that
preceded it. What was important to those present at meetings was not from whom or what suggestions
came but the information that was under consideration. Individuals, here, did not act as individuals or in
a personal capacity. Information that was negotiated seemed no longer to originate from its sector
representative as an individual in is or her own right, rather the negotiations were conducted based solely
on what they as representatives brought to the table. In their acting on behalf of the group from which
they were themselves indistinguishable, representatives were not acting as one single individual, but as one
among many. Negotiating with others who saw themselves similarly, the action points noted or
29 That is, the potential for the actions of the Freedom of Information (Removal and Relaxation of Statutory
Prohibition on Disclosure of Information) Order 2004 to be replicated for Scotland. In some cases, other legislation
prohibited the disclosure of information. These prohibitions had to be addressed in light of FOI. The 2004 Order
removed and relaxed prohibitions on disclosure at the UK level, but did not apply to Scotland where prohibitions
still remained in place. The Scottish Government therefore asked to be made aware of any unnoted prohibitions and
considered that the 2004 Order might be replicated in Scotland.
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conclusions reached in any one meeting were not personal. Persons, personalities, individual intensions
and motivations were made absent from the negotiations. The outlook of these representatives was in
direct contrast to those of civil servants sitting at their desks, who worried that their own thoughts and
interests would be disclosed by the information they provided.
The forms that persons and knowledge took here is not dissimilar from those Annelise Riles
describes in her analysis of meetings in which UN delegates generated documents as part of the United
Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (2000). Riles draws a neat comparison between
the documents generated at different levels of meeting, and Fijian mats, ‘[c]reating a mat’, she explains, ‘is
a work of repetition – of the careful repetition of simple shapes to form the patterns and of the even
repetition of hand gestures in platting’ (75). Documents generated at each level of meeting provided a
starting point for documents generated at the next:
‘[and] at each level of negotiation mirrored the others in form and function. Conferences at
global, national, regional and subregional levels all generated their own ‘platforms for action’,
which were then taken to higher levels of conferences and incorporated into the new
documents negotiated there… At each level, successive drafts were incorporated into
preceding ones.’ (2000: 79)
She continues:
‘[T]he skill of the exercise lay in the detail… It entailed the wearisome and often highly
frustrating detailed work of cutting and pasting, of organizing and collating… The objective
was not so much to achieve transparent meaning as to satisfy the aesthetics of logic and
language.’ (2000: 79)
The language of the documents had ‘a shape, a rhythm, a feel, not simply a meaning’, she explains
(80). The people Riles writes of are lawyers (UN delegates) and professional negotiators who manage,
combine, and organize information in a particular manner. While I write about a different group of
people, civil servants and FOI practitioners, there are similarities in the manner in which people’s own
particular or personal form is no longer seen, made absent through interests shared in common.
Tony Crook (in Harris 2007), writing on Riles’ UN delegates and the document writing process
described above, offers a re-description of her account. He similarly emphasizes the unindividuated status
of delegates. ‘In an earlier version of her analysis, Riles presented the image of the brackets with words
inside, and the negotiating room with delegates inside as equivalents’, Crook explains.
‘Upon entering the negotiating room… the very real differences of economic and political
influence were exchanged for sententious guises that placed each country delegate on an
equal footing as though they merely replicated and repeated each other’s status.’ (2007: 10)
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Delegates, he writes:
‘[r]ather than speaking out of their own interests… spoke of these interests through
resolving state differences they perceived in the room… Collective differences are
recognized in the suggested offering of the delegate [which] serves to reiterate the replicated
status of the delegate such that when suggestions are made they appear in the voice of an
undifferentiated [whole]’ (2007: 11)
UN delegates had the capacity to unite or differentiate the whole, and acting not as individuals
but in terms of the whole were, not unlike representatives at the SFOIIG meeting, themselves
undifferentiated. Of all the relations they contained, had the capacity to activate, representatives were
careful to only act on the basis or footing that they shared in common. Compliance demanded action
from a role or office not a person—as a thing, not an individual person whose personality, gender, religion,
race, had any bearing on the negotiations in hand.
The form driving the UN delegate meetings that Riles describes was the same form that was
driving the action of the delegates within each SFOIIG meeting. It was through emphasizing the non-
differentiation of meetings, through reference to the participants’ identical form and function that political
and social relations, persons and personality, were entirely removed from the negotiating process.
Moreover, the meetings themselves appeared contained units, the interaction between which was
predicated on the circulation of information that emerged out of each level of meeting, representing
activities, processes, and negotiations between delegates that were themselves not personal. In this way,
persons—UN delegates or professional negotiators—neither directed the flow nor the composition of the
documents they produced.
The approach both of FOISA representatives and Riles’ UN delegates, their perceptions of
themselves and the basis of their actions, was not unlike that of Duncan at Lochhead Council, a keen
advocate of FOISA, and whom I discuss in the following paragraphs.
More from Duncan at Lochhead council
Lochhead council is a small public authority situated to the west of Glendale. As Information
Compliance Officer, Duncan was on familiar terms with members of the wider FOISA community and
practitioners often mentioned his name, recommending him as a ‘good person to know’ and source of
advice on FOI matters. It was undoubtedly due to Duncan’s popularity and his colleagues’ high regard
for him that, in a small network of FOI practitioners, FOI policy-makers and FOI end-users in Scotland,
Duncan became one of my main informants. His colleagues at Lochhead also regarded him as a bit of an
FOI expert, and he was particularly well known among staff for his kindness and willingness to help. But
in response to these compliments, Duncan would shrug and say, ‘I’m only telling you what anyone else
would tell you’.
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Duncan (perhaps due to his helpfulness and knowledge of FOISA) would attend and sometimes
speak at larger FOISA conferences with the SIC, applicants and practitioners. Conferences were an
opportunity for Duncan to consult the SIC and Scottish Government FOI Unit on a particular matter or
how to handle a particularly difficult request. He would otherwise ‘give the [Scottish Executive] FOI Unit
a call’ or contact one the SIC’s staff, with whom he was familiar. More recently he had been invited to
become an FOI examiner by one of the private consultancy firms specializing in FOI.
In the first two years that FOI was in force, Lochhead council received between eight and twenty
FOI requests a week. Duncan was often busy logging requests, following up enquiries, responding to e-
mails from applicants expressing their thanks or concern at having a request refused, and chasing up late
responses. Duncan liaised with FOI Officers across the authority, each responsible for responding to
FOI requests on behalf of their section. He might arrange to meet an FOI Officer at their desk and
council staff would also regularly drop by to speak with him in his office. On these occasions, Duncan
would deftly close his office door so that those ‘across the corridor’ would not overhear conversations
that would seem politically inappropriate; the council operated politically neutrally, but this did not
prevent individual council staff from having and indeed expressing their own political views, Duncan
explained. Duncan, then, was a point of contact for FOI Officers, council staff and the public, and
managed this interface between the internal private politics and external public face.
It was Duncan’s role within the authority to receive and log FOI requests, and pass these onto
people in his authority who could deal with them. Lochhead council took a ‘devolved’ approach to FOI,
which meant that Duncan gave the responsibility for dealing with FOI requests to designated FOI
Officers in departments across the council. Duncan, however, remained on hand to co-ordinate a
particularly tricky response. Receiving and handling FOI requests was only one part of Duncan’s role as
Information Compliance Officer. He also dealt with Data Protection issues, liaised with council archivists
and assisted with the management of council records. He liked to think of himself as an honest, straight-
talking man, who encouraged others to talk frankly. Unlike those who seemed reluctant to readily disclose
information in answer to a request, Duncan appeared an advocate of FOI: ‘The Act has a dual purpose’,
he explained, ‘…if people get better information they have better information on how well the service is
performing’ and the council is then able to provide better services. He continued:
‘….you’ve got to get people into the mindset of disclosure. Disclosure is the way to
approach it. Don’t take the alternative posture, which I would consider “let’s go and look
for an exemption”. What we’ve always preached [here] is disclosure is the way forward’.
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Devolved and Centralized Approaches
Taking a devolved approach was the method decision-makers and stakeholders preferred since
information requests were received and responded to by employees throughout the organization. The
opposite approach was to deal with all FOI requests centrally. In this case, a central department took
responsibility for coordinating and providing responses. For example, the UK Department of
Constitutional Affairs has a ‘clearing house’ to ensure ‘consistency across central government in relation to
the application of [FOI]’30.
While some practitioners appeared concerned about the disclosure of information, considering
themselves personally revealed on providing access to information they held or, indeed, what was in their
heads (comments, concerns, views), Duncan did not appear to be so. Part of Duncan’s enviable skill
came in not considering himself differentiated in what he knew or how he acted. In fact, Duncan saw
himself as ‘the same as anyone else’. The views he held were not exclusively his, rather views he
considered he shared in common with others. In fact, Duncan always made sure, given all the relations he
had the capacity to activate, that he only ever acted on a basis that he shared with others. He would
explicitly and loudly ask himself whether it was his own personal opinion, or a view held by others he was
acting on. As a result of the fact that Duncan did not consider himself as individually differentiated,
rather one of many thinking and acting on the same basis, Duncan was able to disclose information
freely—knowledge, here, and Duncan himself, appearing in the form of a independent entity that could be
shared.
Duncan’s skill was enviable, since not considering oneself as acting in one’s own capacity was
exactly the culture change that FOISA required, considered necessary in order for people to more liberally
share what they knew. Practitioners and colleagues who were less willing to share information—in this
case perceived in the form of knowledge with relations internally implied—and would not disclose
information either at FOISA conferences or in response to an FOI request for information, could usefully
take Duncan’s advice. Although whether Duncan was able to explain why he was able to share what he
knew in the manner that he did—that it was because he considered himself undifferentiated from others,
which had the effect of making social relationships that informed what he knew absent—was perhaps
unlikely. It seemed, for people to more freely give information out, this kind of outlook was what was
required.
So culture change lay in people’s ability to consider what they did as well as the information they
handled in a new light. Information itself became something to disclose unless exempt rather than to




Morag at Glendale University
Morag was not unlike Duncan in how she approached information and its disclosure. She regularly
attended larger FOISA conferences and meetings. Morag seemed well-known amongst decision and
policy-makers such as the SIC, the Head of the Scottish Government FOI Unit, and other FOI
practitioners in her own and other sectors. Like Duncan, Morag seemed an advocate of the legislation
and was keen to provide information under FOISA unless it was exempt. She was chairperson of the
SHEIP group, and chaired and organized SHEIP group meetings. As one of its founding members, she
seemed to find it useful and was keen to encourage SHEIP group members to ‘share their experience’ and
circulate any issues or conclusions regarding HEI FOI policy, which she would then draw to the attention
of the Universities Scotland FOI representative. As she explained:
‘[SHEIP] has a link with the Universities Scotland secretaries group, so if there are significant
strategic issues, we can raise them through that channel, which again gives us support and it’s
a very useful mechanism because it’s a means of getting FOI onto the University Secretaries
agenda’
Like Lochhead council, Glendale University took a devolved approach to FOISA, which meant
that Morag was responsible for ‘planning, advising, training and supporting’ other members of staff to
comply with FOISA but did not ‘necessarily do the work [herself], partly because’, as she explained, ‘to
implement records management across an organization of 7,000 people […] is not a job for one section
unless it’s an extremely large section’. As Morag explained:
‘The [appointed] practitioners [in each organizational area] are supposed to take the lead on
setting up records management systems in their areas. They also are responsible for
maintaining their areas’ contribution to the publication scheme because again, we don’t
know what’s changed out there or what’s out there at all, so they all contribute. And they’re
also responsible for handling FOI requests that relate exclusively to their area… a lot of
requests are coming into us centrally, business areas are getting them and forwarding them to
us because one of our roles is to act as a kind of post office… to get requests in the right
direction. And yes, although a lot of people talk about the information map as being crucial
to help deal with FOI requests, I’ve found that actually what you need to know is who is
responsible for what’.
As a devolved activity within the organization, the relationship between FOI Officers, such as
Morag and her colleagues, and public authority employees appeared analogous to that of the SIC and the
public authority. Again, as with the case of Colin and colleagues at NHS Glendale, the particular form of
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the relations was reiterated, and in establishing the same form, Morag and her colleagues also came into—
shared—the same relations. Once again, culture change was the propagation of a form and of relations,
which in this sense made social relations, not absent and irrelevant, but entirely relevant.
I wouldn’t say we had databases, it’s much more people based with a people structure. I
suppose people isn’t always entirely correct because it’s roles… it’s role based… so it doesn’t
matter if it’s Fred or Jane, but it is very much reliant on who’s responsibility [it is]. Which
area of the University would it be, so if Fred is away Jane can answer it too. But it is based
on functions rather than records and pieces of information and… because we’ve got
practitioners, a very good spread of practitioners, usually we can figure out which part of the
University has responsibilities in this area. And contact the relevant practitioners.’
Morag it seemed was reliant on a network of people who might locate, retrieve and disclose
information and who would inform her and others of what information the University held. While a map
of all the information held by the authority was of little use since this might change over time and thus an
information map would be in need of constant updating, a good knowledge of the people in that
organization and their position in it was more useful. People appeared interchangeable, here, for the
reason that their attributes were not considered theirs, but of the group that they each represented. The
emphasis was not on the individuals themselves, it did not matter whether it was ‘Fred or Jane’ who
retrieved the information, but the fact that each individual acted on a shared basis.
Morag’s comments only served to reiterate Duncan’s own understanding of his role and himself
as ‘anyone’, and also that of the UN delegates that Riles describes who never acted in their own capacity,
rather in the capacity of the group they represented. Only ever acting on a basis he shared in common
with others, Duncan only ever saw himself as having knowledge that derived from elsewhere, and was not
his, and that made him one among many, considering that he interacted with others who were one among
many also.
The network of practitioners of which people were a part, and the system in which they operated,
seemed to make people themselves equivalent to a parallel information map. As information providers
themselves, people were a route to information in a system that otherwise sought to take the individuality of persons out of the
information-sharing process.
Persons and Things
It is difficult to hold in a single view knowledge of a person as a subject, informed by their relations, and
knowledge of a person in the form of an object, or thing. But exactly this alternation has been the focus
of this chapter.
Social relations are integral to FOI, as they are integral to knowing. Social knowledge, into which
people come while having coffee or lunch with colleagues, at meetings, or in locating and retrieving
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information as part of an FOI request, depends on social relations—or rather someone’s interests in a
particular social relation. It is this interest that invokes their division and combination with others.
Margaret, at NHS Glendale, regularly met her colleagues—her friends for many years—for
morning coffee at which she would discuss what she did the previous weekend, her father-in-law’s
ailments and on occasions, an FOI request to which she was having difficulties responding. The
information that Margaret gathered and forwarded to Colin was socially governed. Thus the information
that another practitioner or an applicant received, was social knowledge.
The social networks intrinsic to the emergence and transfer of knowledge between practitioners,
and practitioners and applicants, seemed no different to those visible at FOISA meetings and conferences.
While FOI was a model for knowledge sharing between public authorities and citizens, it was also modelled on
these very practices as practitioners and decision-makers themselves shared knowledge, about FOISA and
culture change, at conferences and meetings.
As evident in these meetings, culture change entailed establishing a common basis of thinking and
acting, the replication of certain forms, and the propagation of particular relations. Unlike other forms of
culture change, social relations were crucial to the change, as it was necessary for practitioners to both
make and un-make social ties as they took on a new ways of working.
While social relations, as was well-known by FOI practitioners themselves, were integral to FOI
and to the location and retrieval of information in response to a request, practitioners also made absent
the social ties that otherwise governed what they knew and any information an applicant received. On
considering themselves as acting on a common or shared basis every time they thought and acted, persons
concealed their own personal form (despite the fact that the particular basis on which they thought and
acted was informed by their particular interests in a social relation) and made social knowledge appear as
objectively gathered information.
Conclusion
I this chapter, I have principally focused on the role of practitioners as agents of change who are key to
implementing culture change in government agencies in Scotland. I have drawn on the official culture
change rhetoric in order to relay something of what culture entails for practitioners responsible for
handling information requests, and the expectations of policy-makers and decision-makers such as the
SIC. I have drawn on four case-studies, three concerning practitioners and the way in which they go
about implementing culture change, and the fourth concerning the meetings and conferences at which the
message of culture change is disseminated amongst practitioners keen to learn.
I have touched on three forms of culture change: the move from secrecy to openness as between
the public and the public authority and the consequent change in relations between public authority
employees themselves; the devolution of decision making to individual FOI officers within each part of
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the authority, their replicated form and the associated relational changes, and the absence of social links
from the information given by the public authority to the public.
The first two overlap, and concern the social relations, or social form that practitioners, in order
to comply with the legislation, also come to share. Unlike the third form of culture change, this change
requires practitioners to be particularly aware of with whom they have social relations in common and the
basis on which they operate. Practitioners, taking on new roles as promoters and enforcers of FOI, also
find themselves in a role, in relation to their own authority, analogous to that of the SIC. In order to
comply with the Act, practitioners have to act out a role, and in so doing, they come into new knowledge
and act on a shared basis, this being a basis they hold in common both with each other and with the SIC.
As a result, divisions open up within the authority as others are resolved. Sharing a common basis with
the SIC, new divisions emerge between practitioners and some of their colleagues, that replicates that
formally between the SIC and the public authority as a whole. As divisions emerge within the public
authority, ‘culture change’ entails firstly the propagation of a particular form, and secondly, the emergence
of this new division.
But culture change also requires that social and political relations play no part in the dissemination
of information; and that neither have a hand in what is provided nor direct the flow of information. In
order to comply with the Act, practitioners must thus make absent the social ties that are integral to FOI:
that daily inform the way in which practitioners locate and retrieve information, and respond to requests.
Making these relations is a brilliant manoeuvre that takes extreme skill and effort. In particular, I draw on
the thoughts and practices of Duncan, at Lochhead council, and Riles’ description of the work of UN
delegates at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. Both Duncan and delegates (and others
also mentioned here) make social relations absent by making absent their own particularity. By always
holding knowledge in common with others, Duncan ensures that he is never acting in his own capacity
but in the capacity of the group with whom he shares knowledge in common. In so doing, Duncan never
acts in his own right, and always as one of many—or ‘anyone’ as he states. Similarly, UN delegates are
differentiated only in light of the shared basis they hold in common with others. The differences between
them, then, only serve to indicate their replicated and repeated status that places them on an equal footing.
In chapter two I sought to touch on how it is our interests in a particular social relationship that
invokes our division and combination, govern our thoughts and actions, and the form that these actions
take as public or private. In this chapter I have sought to show the way in which these relations are also
made absent, and in so doing, persons appear in the form of independent, and unrelated entities, and
knowledge in the form of information. The particular manner in which this is done is of interest here, as
well as how culture change appears to demand both making social relationships present and absent.
In the following chapter I seek to explore how these pairs of alternating forms, persons and




‘Secrecy is the bonding material which holds the rambling structure of central government
together. Secrecy is built into the calcium of a British policy-maker’s bones’ (Hennessy 1989:
346)
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the secrecy that protagonists of FOISA, at all levels, see in the actions of people
who appear as still reluctant to disclose information under FOISA. FOISA is designed to change a public
sector culture of secrecy, to one of openness and transparency. This entails policy-makers persuading
organizations and civil servants to be less secretive about what they think and do, and share information
they hold with one other—to reveal the truth. But it is lack of secrets in instances in which secrecy is
suspected in which I am interested in this chapter.
Several scholars have more recently taken secrecy as a subject of study within and beyond
anthropology. I touch on the work of anthropologists concerned with secrecy in different field contexts.
In particular, I turn to the work of Crook (2006, 2007) who responds to Frederick Barth’s (1987, 2002)
examination of secrecy in the context of the Min area of Papua New Guinea, and also writes of ‘secrecy’
there. Crook argues perceptions of Min secrecy are the outcome of an anthropologist’s own knowledge-
making practices. Others, such as the non-anthropologist and the founder of the UK Campaign for
Freedom of Information (that drafted the UK FOI legislation), Des Wilson (1984) MP, argue that at the
root of secrecy is power.
Of particular re-known for his research on Government secrecy and transparency is Alasdair
Roberts (2006). His recent book, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in an Information Age, centres on the tactics
that politicians and bureaucrats around the world have used to preserve government secrecy. Roberts
(2006) notes in relation to the American public that the rhetoric of secrecy can in fact exacerbate public
suspicion and mistrust. Considering secrecy rhetoric sometimes as just ‘rhetoric’, Roberts urges us to act
on information: the revelation of injustice is not a remedy for injustice, it requires us to act on the
injustices that concealed information newly discloses.
However, it is not only decades of official secrecy that are the cause of suspicion and mistrust in
the cases below. As two different accounts, that of the discloser and recipient of information are put
together, two different approaches to knowledge also appear. It is the misfit between these two different
approaches, what knowledge is and how it works—knowing relationally and knowing in the absence of
relations—that also seems to be at the root of secrecy.
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In Chapter Three, I described how FOI Officers such as Colin and Duncan made every effort to
ensure that their own personality was not evident in and did not shape the information they disclosed to
applicants. Designed to make absent social relations that could otherwise determine where information
flowed, this concealment was what appeared required of them in their role as FOI Officers. Considering
themselves as always acting on a basis they held in common with other people, Colin and Duncan went to
great lengths to conceal the relations that information might reveal, (carried in the very information
selected, type, or amount to disclose). But concealment of social relations, here, is a doubled-edged
sword; as we shall discover, it is this concealment of relations that also leads to accusations of ‘secrecy’.
Perceived as always acting on a basis they share in common with others, and thus as non-
differentiated or ‘anyone’, differences between different non-differentiated practitioners, in the case-
studies below, applicants explain in terms of ‘secrecy’. Given practitioners are perceived as sharing a
common basis, and as undifferentiated, the knowledge that they handle in the eyes of applicants (and
often in their own eyes) takes the form of information—or an independent entity that travels free of social
ties. In light of this, knowledge (in the form of an independent unit or entity) is conceived of as
something that people either have, or have not. Knowledge is not conceived of as something into which
people come in their relations with others and as not known prior to this relation; consequently, silence in
cases where it is presumed that people have knowledge is also explained in terms of ‘secrecy’.
At the same time, this chapter illuminates the manner in which there is not a crisp distinction
between ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’. Knowledge that appears in the form of information is also turned
back into knowledge as result of with whom it is associated. At the same time, social relations are
embodied in disclosed information. As in the examples inspected in chapter two, the action of form shows
individual entities, or things, as being implicated in other relations, such that to see an individual entity
alone (for example, a piece of information) is also to acknowledge that it exists in relations—and makes
the not-seen, in some ways, perceptible.
While applicants such as George a regular FOISA user, read the relations implied in the
information released and considered that with whom information was associated determines its usefulness
(and the truth), there are also instances in the case-studies below where the relations information
contained or implied have a detrimental affect on its value and applicants’ relationships with FOI
practitioners. Contrary to FOISA rhetoric, and despite practitioners’ efforts to conceal their own
personality from information, the quality of information here does lie with the quality of the person
providing the information. Considering those who work for the same organization to share the same
knowledge and same form, and tracing these social ties in information that is disclosed, applicants
consider practitioners ‘secretive’ when they also seem to contradict each other.
‘Truth’ has received particular attention within and beyond anthropology. I explore the work of
the French philosopher Michel Foucualt who is well-known for his exploration of the intersection
between truth (or knowledge) and power (in a selection of collected works in Gordon 1980). Truth is
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something in which social anthropologists largely take interest by way of their subjects of study. There is
a sense in which people ‘battle’ over the truth yet also that truth emerges out of and exists in a network of
relations. While those with whom we liaise during fieldwork, interview, or become friends with, might
search for the truth, a social anthropologist might ask what constitutes the truth for particular people in
particular moments? In other words, a search for the truth turns into an examination of knowledge, what
it is and how it works. It is only on putting two versions of the same story together, comparing two
different approaches to the same issue, person or thing, that the grounds on which people think and act,
that is, people’s different interests in a particular thing (relation), become apparent.
Before turning to instances of secrecy between practitioners and applicants, and moments in
which applicants establish the truth, I turn to official rhetoric relating to FOISA and secrecy, and offer
some thoughts on truth in relation to individualism and secrecy in relation to power.
The Rhetoric of Secrecy
First mooted in the U.K. in the 1980s and finally enacted in the form of Freedom of Information
legislation in 2005, the right to know was a long awaited response to an extended epoch of official secrecy
in Britain. The culture of secrecy was formally crystallized in Britain in the form of the 1889 and 1911
Official Secrets Act (OSA). Section 231 of the 1911 OSA made it an offence for persons, members of the
security or intelligence services, Crown servants and government contractors to disclose unauthorized
official information, documents and articles relating to security, intelligence or defence32. While the aim of
the 1889 OSA was to curb leaks by government civil servants that had the potential to make Britain
vulnerable to invasion, the 1911 OSA was an updated version more suited to a time when Britain was on
the brink of war with Germany. The OSA in some ways formalized an informal culture of secrecy that
had been slowly mounting in the second half of the late 19th century. From around 1844, there were
reports of personal written correspondence being intercepted by Government, to which Government
seemingly did not own up (Vincent 1998) and reliability and discretion was secured through appeals to
moral probity (Rogers 1992).
Through World War Two, the Cold War, and into Margaret Thatcher’s 1980s Conservative
government, Britain remained in a state of official secrecy, although there was some resistance and reform
in the latter half of the twentieth century. While in some ways tolerated during times of war, it was under
Thatcher that the media, citizens, and campaigners began to resist secrecy and increasingly apparent civil
repression; the rate of prosecution under the OSA increased sharply under the Thatcher government
(Vincent 1998: 11) and organizations such as Liberty and Charter 88 were founded, as well as the 1984
UK Campaign for Freedom of Information. Thatcher’s refusal to justify secrecy through legal-rational
31 The OSA of 1889, was in two parts: Section 1 dealt with spying and Section 2 with breaches of official trust
(Hennessy 1989: 352).
32 1989 Official Secrets Act, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1989/Ukpga_19890006_en_1.htm
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means, and her efforts to control and change the way in which the British State worked in a manner that
left even Ministers in the dark, seemed to stir up dissent within Whitehall, among the media, and security
and intelligence services. The press had been seemingly tolerant of Government secrecy, often sharing
the interests of government, yet under Thatcher was increasingly used as a medium through which to
reveal and challenge government policy. Most well-known is perhaps the case of Clive Ponting who used
the media to mount his campaign against government. He released two classified Ministry of Defence
(MoD) documents to Tam Dalyell MP that revealed that there had been a two-year systematic cover-up by
the government of events surrounding the 1982 sinking of the Argentinean cruiser General Belgrano33.
Ponting’s case revealed that the OSA was an inadequate tool for silencing civil servants, and the OSA was
amended in 198934, in some ways making it more draconian. The secret side of British politics has of
course been notoriously played out in popular culture, reflected in a spate of television serials,
documentaries and films throughout the 1980s, and embodied in the well-known character, James Bond
secret agent 007.
The Campaign for Freedom of Information
A London based group that has been campaigning for FOI legislation since 1984. It maintains a website
that is full of information on the history and origins of FOI in the UK, and provides the latest updates on
FOI developments in Britain – minor amendments, debates on FOI at Whitehall and Holyrood, and FOI
in the press,.
A link marked ‘Secrecy Examples’ provides access to a page of links to publications that contain
examples of official secrecy. Every year, the CFoI has an annual Freedom of Information Awards
ceremony through which it recognized individuals who have campaigned for greater openness, and
authorities and companies that have developed initiatives to disclose more information.
Maurice Frankel, directs the CFoI and is a full time campaigner for FOI. The CFoI was founded
by Des Wilson (Wilson 1984) and works closely with the CFoI in Scotland.
The United States at the same time also existed in a state of official secrecy, although an OSA was
never enacted and calls for access to information and the right to know came much earlier. Throughout
33 Ponting pleaded not guilty to charges of unlawful disclosure under the 1911 OSA, arguing that releasing the
documents was in the public interest. He was eventually acquitted: while the judge ruled that he was incorrect to
interpret the ‘interests of the State’ in section 2 of the OSA as ‘the public interest’, Ponting managed to persuade the
jury of the morality of his actions.
34 In the 1989 OSA the public interest (‘interests of the State’) clause was removed. In addition to its amendment in
1889, the OSA was also amended in 1920 and 1939. The former affected Section 2 of the OSA and was in response
to demands from MI5 to preserve as much of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) as possible, (by amending the
Aliens Order (?)). The 1939 amendment did not affect Section 2 since the 1920 amendment was sufficiently all
embracing to satisfy MI5, but was confined to Section 1 and affected the practice of journalism in permitting the
prosecution of persons who failed to give information about unlawful disclosures. Journalists, in other words, had
to name their source! (Hennessy 1989: 356)
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both World Wars, it seemed, the American government was also cautious with information and it was
largely due to this that there were demands for the American government to be more open post World
War Two, in some ways granted in the form of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (Roberts
2006) (see introduction). But it was in light of the weakness of the 1946 APA that the 1966 American
Freedom of Information Act was conceived, which created and enforced the presumption that all citizens
have a right to government records. The route to openness in the US was in many ways much swifter
than in Britain, largely due to the absence of an OSA, which in Britain pointed to a more entrenched
culture of secrecy making the shift to a culture of openness seem more difficult to accomplish.
However, FOI was not simply about opening the floodgates and letting information out.
Decisions over what information should and should not be released had to be carefully considered. As
part of a series of Cambridge conferences in late 2006 and early 2007 entitled, Debating the Evidence, The
Rt. Hon. Tony Benn, former cabinet secretary Lord Wilson of Dinton, BBC Diplomatic Correspondent
Bridget Kendall, and Chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission Dr. Hans Blix were
invited to talk on Freedom of Information. Delegates and speakers addressed the issues entailed in FOI
legislation, balancing perceived benefits against disbenefits. The debate turned out to be a debate about
the Iraq war: although rather than discussing whether it should have taken place, the debate was over what
kind of information that should have been made available to the public prior, during and after the war,
and on what occasion should information be justifiably withheld? How might those responsible for
information balance the risks and responsibilities entailed in its disclosure, and strike a balance between
secrecy and truth—as if secrecy or truth, knowing or not knowing, were a black and white matter of
revelation and concealment?
FOI in Scotland and the UK seemed particularly about unlocking the door of public institutions
and letting trapped information out, as well as allowing the public in to scrutinize them. As one FOI
Officer for a Scottish local authority remarked as he explained to an audience of civil servant practitioners
about what FOI meant, ‘information is trapped within the organisation, and FOI is there to let it out, to
make it free’. The image of information trapped within the organization was one that was drawn on by
public authorities as well as by those implementing and enforcing the Act to depict its meaning and the
use to which it could be put. The U.K. Information Commissioner uses the image of a half-open door as
a logo, perhaps to suggest that locked doors are being opened as a result of FOI legislation. The picture,
here, is one of information as a trapped person, or prisoner, awaiting release: as if like people, information
too is meant to be free.
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Truth and Individualism
Michel Foucault’s examination of truth in selected interviews and writings on power/knowledge between
1972 and 1977, collected and edited by Gordon (1980), forms part of a body of work, spanning from the
early 1960s to his death in 1984. In this collection of works, Foucault examines knowledge—or Truth—
in relation to power; the two, he argues, are inextricably linked. In an essay on Truth and Power,
transcribed and translated in this volume by Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino, Foucault asks
what governs statements and how statements govern each other so as to ‘constitute a set of propositions
which are [scientifically] acceptable, and hence capable of being verified or falsified…’ (1980: 112). While
Foucault writes about science, his argument here seems applicable to the way he considers knowledge to
operate more generally. Truth is an outcome of a regime or network of interrelating statements that point
to and uphold one another and thus indicate what is True. People are the vehicles of power not its point
of application, he argues. This means that those seemingly with power over others and in a position to
govern what is True, are themselves governed, by these interconnecting statements and relations: power
circulates, flows via persons and knowledge, and is in this sense transcendental.
At certain moments, the regime of truth—a matrix of interrelating statements— undergoes a
global modification. There will be what might be called a paradigm shift. Foucault points to moments in
science, or biology, as exemplary of such shifts at the turn of the nineteenth century (1980: 112). There is
a battle around truth, not on behalf of truth, he argues. To resist truth and hegemonic power, it seems, is
only to act according to another truth; to become subject to a different regime. It is not possible to
subvert the power of truth by changing ‘what’s in [people’s] heads’, since this would only entail more of
the same power/knowledge; people would simply come under a different regime of power. Rather it is
necessary to ‘[detach] the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural,
within which it operates…’ (133). In other words, it is to take the power out of truth.
His exploration of the will-to-knowledge, or truth and power, forms part of his critique of
Enlightenment thought, although there are many who also consider Foucault as employing the methods
he seeks to challenge (Habermas 1986). However, it is not Foucault’s power analytics—a term used to
describe Foucault’s theory of power (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1982)—that I take up here. These I challenge
in chapter six in light of my examination of power in moments where practitioners seem to have power
over applicants. However, rather I turn to Foucault’s description of truth—what it is and how it seems to
operate—as the outcome of a network of interconnected persons and things that appears, at first blush,
not unlike my own. In this chapter, and in relation to the case studies below, I argue that the truth
depends on the connections that people—applicants, practitioners, policy-makers—can read between
information and those who hold or dispense it. For George, who seeks out the truth, knowledge
embodied in a high-ranking public authority official determines what is true.
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As citizens were keen to root out and resolve discrepancies between different sources of
information—or different versions of the truth—FOI Officers quickly discovered it was important to
communicate to an applicant at the earliest possible stage how and in what way their request was being
dealt with, sometimes as important as responding to the request itself. Information brought with it
information, and requests generated requests, and even requests about requests in a manner that suggested
FOI might elicit information in an endless stream. In the cases below, applicants, often unfamiliar with
large, and complex organizations seem suspicious and confused if they received a seemingly contradictory
response. It was for this reason that Colin and Samantha, FOI Officers for NHS Glendale, were
extremely careful to explain the contradictions between information emerging from different sources—
different people or different organizations. On one occasion (not included here), Colin’s colleague, Dave,
recalled Colin’s mistake of not telling the applicants who had applied for personal data under FOI instead
of the Data Protection Act that they had made an application under the wrong Act. Colin instead passed
their request onto NHS Glendale’s Data Protection Officer. Discrepancies between the two Acts, in
addition to Colin’s lack of explanation, pointed to Colin’s secrecy (and also that concealed within the FOI
Act) in the eyes of the applicants.
Through ordering and arranging information, the public sector might be seen as organized into a
cohesive and joined up whole, from which the truth would emerge. However, the truth was not always
easily agreed on. Since by definition the truth is itself definitive, as one person spoke the truth, another
would take this to be an assertion of opinion or individualism. The conflict lay in the fact that while
knowledge was the outcome of a network of relations, these relations could appear hidden, such that
knowledge seemed given, with people themselves as having no hand in its production. As far as any
individual was concerned, they saw themselves as altruistically providing the facts or truth into which they
had also come (or, in Colin’s case, passing on a request to where the truth could be found). As new
disclosures revealed incomplete knowledge, the truth seemed something that was perennially under
construction. Meanwhile, individuals seemed individualistic and acting for different ends in light of
interests that appeared divided through new disclosures.
Secrecy and Power
Secrecy has been more recently explored within social anthropology (Barth 1987, 2002, Crook 2007,
Herdt 1990, 2003, Lattas 1998, Tefft 1980). Herdt (2003), beginning with his own historical society and
moving outward to Papua New Guinea, deconstructs the exoticism inherent in secrecy and, he argues, the
tendency to transform members of social out-groups into marginalized Others typical of the way in which
secrecy is treated within academia. Writing on ‘secret societies and secret collectives’ in relation to
Victorian men’s societies, Herdt (1990) argues secrecy is an intentional process of differentiating included
persons and entities from those excluded, while building solidarity among holders of secret. Herdt’s
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analysis reflects the division perceived by FOISA protagonists between citizens and government,
government appearing a kind of ‘secret society’.
Stanton Tefft (1980), editing a volume on secrecy from cross-cultural perspectives states:
‘Secrecy… proves to be dysfunctional for the political community and its member
organizations and institutions when it prevents community members from making a realistic
assessment of policies….’ (17)
Tefft advocates openness, suggesting that in evaluating ideas for political reform as presented in
his edited volume, the potential harm that secrecy can cause should be borne in mind. Des Wilson (MP
and CFoI founder), advocates openness, considering power the root cause of secrecy. He not only
elaborates on how power operates, but also argues it is lack of information that that leads people to
suspect others of secrecy:
‘Control of information – secrecy… enables the powerful to maintain a monopoly of power. The
more secretive the centre of power, the more it develops a distance from the people. Lack
of information excludes others from participation. In fact, it reduces the desire for
participation, because the assumption that those in power have inside knowledge, are in
possession of secrets, and are presumably deemed to be the most trustworthy, makes the
majority of people feel inadequate and thus admire and respect the powerful.’ (1984: 17,
original emphasis)
Knowledge is assumed to be something that others have but do not share, their silence indicating
retention of knowledge. The axiomatic relationship between knowledge and power suggests that equal
access to information also equals equal power. At the same time, scarcity of information makes people
and the knowledge they hold more desirable because it is less available.
If knowledge is conceived as an absolute, that is known or unknown, then people’s lack of
articulation becomes a sign of their secrecy rather than the absence of knowledge. As Crook explains:
‘[o]ne of secrecy’s traps is to lull one into thinking that secrecy is a black and white matter of something in
a state of either being known or being unknown’ (Crook 2006:2). Under this analysis, knowledge is
something that one either has or does not have. Thus the revelation of new knowledge points to that
which was previously concealed. Unlike kinship, as a universal category of analysis, that ‘operates as a
general description through particular varieties’, secrecy ‘seems to collapse both into one – making it open
to comparison with other examples and open to theorizing on a grander scale’ (Crook). In other words,
while kinship operates as a general description but cannot itself be generalized, secrecy it appears can be.
A discussion of its variety would, for example, lead to a discussion about the relative amount of secrecy,
secrecy itself, and what it entails, remaining unaltered.
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Lattas (1998) notes that when knowledge is disclosed, it is generally thought of as something that
is revealed gradually, as if shrouded and brought out into the light. It is this kind of thinking that truths
are secret and emergent rather than constitute a response, that makes knowledge appear as if something
that is known, held, stored, and revealed.
In the case-studies that follow, I offer different instances of secrecy. Often, not unlike the interchange
between Barth and the Min that Crook (2007) describes, one way of knowing—that of the recipient of
information—illuminates the other—that of those disclosing it. It is often the result of the conflict
between these two ways of knowing that people appear ‘secretive’. Following on from chapter two (in
which I described the way in which practitioners, policy-makers and end-users know as a result of their
interests in a particular relation), and chapter three (in which I showed that when people consider
themselves as acting on a common or shared basis these social relations are made absent), chapter four
addresses the two ways of knowing that emerge as social relations are made absent or present, and the
difficulties to which the intersection of these two different ways of knowing gives rise.
At the crux of the chapter, is the manner in which knowledge can take the form of knowledge or
information. Yet there is not a crisp divide between the two forms, information and knowledge, cross-
over. The argument of this chapter lies in the detail: while knowledge appears in the form of
‘information’, this information can also appear in the form of knowledge as practitioners and applicants
read the relations that are implied in its very form. For this reason the two words—‘knowledge’ and
‘information’—have been carefully used, to point to the careful negotiation by practitioners of when
relations are made present or absent, as perceived or not by applicants.
The following case-study concerns Colin and Samantha, FOI Officers for NHS Glendale, who
had difficulties persuading applicants that they did not hide information. Relations between information
requesters and disclosers, here, did not go smoothly.
Secrecy Examples
NHS Glendale
Colin, and Difficulties with Applicants
Colin was bright and funny. He had a friendly manner that made him popular with other NHS Glendale
staff and applicants. He was in his early thirties, tall, and slim and had fine, blond, but receding hair. His
long curved nose propped up a small pair of frameless, rectangular glasses that concealed his grey eyes.
He had worked for NHS Glendale Health Board for over ten years since he moved to the city from the
North of Scotland. And although he had recently started helping Samantha with FOI, he continued to sit
in the Facilities Department with his old colleagues Kate and Jo.
The Facilities Department was on the ground floor of the Health Board, a tall, glass-fronted
building that was squeezed in between yellow-brick houses that glowed warmly in the sun. It was nearing
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the end of 2005 and I had worked for the Board for three months. Kate, Jo, Colin and I sat in the large,
rectangular room that was the facilities department, reading and organising documents, while it continued
to rain outside. The authority had decided to collect together all the FOI requests that it had received and
responses that it had provided over the past twelve months, and organize them by topic in a table. I had
been given this task, suggesting that as well as a ‘researcher’, people saw me as a useful pair of hands. The
table would be put on the website so that people knew what information had already been made available
by NHS Glendale and could access this information without making a request. Colin liked to talk, and as
we sat and worked, he told the others and me about his weekend, his holiday and his girlfriend Maeve. I
had taken Colin’s desk so he worked from the room next door, in hollering distance from the others and
me. He generally left the door wide open so that he could hear our conversations and join in if he pleased
(see figure 3).
But Colin was rarely at his desk, often off in search of information an applicant sought or the
persons who might hold it, discussing a request with another FOI Officer or with Samantha in her office
nearby. Colin and Samantha worked closely together, combining their expertise (knowledge of the
organization and colleagues) to fulfil their new responsibilities under FOI. The Board received between
eight and ten FOI requests a week. As the person who carried most of the responsibility for handling
requests, Colin often had difficulty locating and persuading colleagues to send information to him in time.
Yet his friendliness with colleagues and applicants put him in good stead, and he was on occasions able to
persuade someone to release information they seemed unwilling to provide and also to manage the
expectations of applicants. At times, however, he and his colleagues seemed to mishandle an applicant or
misjudge a situation, perhaps not recognizing that the social relationships within the organization that
were for them, clear, for others were hidden behind the concrete walls of the organization. This left them
and the applicant confused and problems to be resolved.
Establishing the Review Process
Colin was passing my desk one afternoon when he mentioned a case that concerned him: an applicant
sought information from NHS Glendale and had been unhappy with Colin and Samantha’s response.
They considered that Samantha and Colin were withholding information and had requested a review.
Requesting a Review
If the applicant is unsatisfied with the public authority response to their FOI request, they can ask the
authority for a review. The applicant has twenty days in which to request a review. After receiving such a
request, the authority appoints an independent internal reviewer to appraise the efforts that have been
made to locate, retrieve and respond to the request.
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The applicant sought statistical information about post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among
Falklands War veterans in Scotland. He wanted to obtain an overview of the situation and whether
incidences of PTSD had increased or declined in the years since 1982. He had made a number of similar
requests for information to different public authorities on the same subject since the Act had come into
force. In this case, he had contacted a large hospital on the outskirts of Glendale. It was this request with
which Colin and Samantha were dealing. However, as Samantha and Colin wrote in their original
response, this was information that their authority did not hold (see figure 4).
Figure 4. Response from NHS Glendale’s Chief Executive (on behalf of Samantha and Colin) given to the
applicant who sought information on post-traumatic stress disorder
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In line with their FOI review process, Samantha had passed the applicant’s request onto NHS
Glendale’s internal FOI reviewer, Hector, and explained to the applicant what she had done. Hector was
a man of few words. He was one of the Board’s non-Executive directors and had worked in the Health
service for the last thirty years. His FOI role was to review, when requested by them, the efforts
Samantha and Colin had made to locate and retrieve the requested information. Samantha had, as she
usually did under these circumstances, spoken to Hector directly about what was involved in the
applicant’s request for review. However, the applicant wanted to speak with Hector himself, and did not
want to communicate with Hector via Samantha or Colin.
To confuse matters, however, Samantha, Colin and Hector had already communicated about the
review. This was clear to the applicant from correspondence he had with Colin, in which Colin had
explained that Hector was ‘looking into the case’. In particular, Colin stated that Hector had already
begun to look into the ‘recording mechanisms’ in place for recording information passed from NHS
Glendale to the NHS Information Services Division. This suggested that the change in the applicant’s
perception of Hector that would arise from Samantha, Colin and Hector discussing the case, had already
taken place. Samantha, Colin and Hector’s shared knowledge, it seemed to the applicant, suggested a basis
they shared in common, and put them in a position to collude against the applicant.
To begin the review process, Hector wrote to the applicant (having already discussed the review
with Samantha and Colin, about which the applicant knew). Hector wrote:
Dear Mr. Jones,
I am writing in my capacity as FOI Reviewer for NHS Glendale.
I understand that there are matters pertaining to requests for information which you wish to
be reviewed. Please confirm that you do indeed wish me to review these matters.
I am ready to carry out such reviews and should be grateful if you would advise me of the
following:
1. Your address for correspondence (this can be your address email)
2. Details of your original requests for information




Hector got the following response:
Dear Mr. Davis,
You know the answers to all of these questions, and you are well aware of what is going on,
and so please, do not come across as being ignorant.
Sincerely,
Mr. Jones
The fact that Samantha, Colin and Hector had discussed the applicant’s case suggested to the
applicant that all three shared knowledge and a common basis, and would inevitably only come to the
same conclusion about his request. He need not go through the review process: in his eyes, the outcome
was a foregone conclusion. He asked for another reviewer, someone from outside the authority who was
‘impartial’. It seemed, not only had Samantha, Colin and Hector shared what they knew, but working for
the same organization suggested that they were unable to be separate, and impartial, and indeed would act
as ‘one’ body.
Hector did not know whether to proceed with the review or not. Colin explained:
‘[the applicant’s] complained to [the Chief Executive] about me, Samantha and Hector saying
that we haven’t done things properly. He wants another reviewer. …people are under the
impression that the reviewer shouldn’t be a member of this organization. But we are all
members of this organization… Samantha is, I am, Hector is, there’s no one who isn’t a
member of this organization! Anyway, I don’t think Hector wants to do it [anymore]’
Hector, in the end, refused to conduct the review. He was unwilling to proceed for the very
reason that his professionalism had been called into question. It seemed that the division within Hector
and between him and others, that allowed him to in one moment, to offer his private thoughts, and in the
other, a professional view, had been collapsed. His relations with his colleagues in the eyes of the
applicant seemed to forfeit his own divisibility, and gave relational form to his professionalism.
Although no different from that in any other authority, it was the review process that activated, in
the applicant, a new relationship with Hector as a result of his perceived relations with Samantha and
Colin. As applicants read the relations that practitioners shared in what they did and said, and the
information that they disclosed, the crisp distinction between information and knowledge seemed to blur.
Relations were considered implied in the information practitioners disclosed in a way that left practitioners
and applicants estranged. In fact, Hector, Samantha and Colin’s unity might even negate the applicant’s
case. The basis they shared in common, their conformity, would serve to make their position (of there
being no information to give out) once again relation-free and, hence, more credible in comparison with
the applicant’s case, which seemed based on his own opinion.
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In the end, the applicant did not receive the information that he had requested from NHS
Glendale. The authority continued to insist that this was information they did not hold. At the same
time, a decision notice issued by the SIC, concerning a request that the applicant had made of the NHS
Information Services Division (ISD) for statistics relating to Falklands War veterans with PTSD
concluded that this too was information that ISD did not hold. It seemed the way in which hospital
discharge data was classified precluded identification of PTSD.
Samantha, and Breast Screening Results
As the Boards Complaints Officer, and already in a public facing role, Samantha was responsible for
handling FOI requests. She had a friendly manner that seemed appropriate for her role and would often
happily talk to me for hours about the requests and complaints that the Board had received, issues they
had raised, and some difficulties she had with applicants.
Samantha’s office had a tendency to overheat. It was small and about one hundred yards from
the room in which Colin and I worked. She generally left her office door open, which provided some
cool air and a view of colleagues as they walked by and made cups of tea and coffee in the large coffee
room opposite. On walking along the long corridor that stretched from beyond her office to the facilities
department, I would be invited in for a chat at the small, round, wooden table that sat to one side of her
desk. We would talk of how she could predict what requests would come in by the stories in the
newspapers and how as she released information, one request would generate the next, and information
would appear as a news story the next day only to generate new requests on the same topic. Samantha
could see enchainment in information, the manner in which information elicited new information, and the
way in which relations between different pieces of information informed the creation of information.
Sitting at her small office one morning, Samantha told me about a case that concerned her. She
had received another letter from an applicant with whom she was now familiar. In this letter the applicant
sought to explain what information she wanted and why she wanted it. But the letter was not only a
request for information. In it the applicant relayed in detail her experiences in the hands of the NHS,
described her ordeal, the treatment she had, and the actions she had subsequently taken against NHS
Glendale, suggesting she required someone within the authority to understand her case and obtain some
support. Receiving the letter, Samantha considered it should really have been sent to the Scottish Public
Services Ombudsman (SPSO) with whom the applicant was already in communication. It was the SPSO
who had informed the woman that NHS Glendale might provide minutes to a meeting that it turned out
they did not hold.
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Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (‘SPSO’)
A person can approach the SPSO after the formal complaints process of the organization concerned. The
complaint will then be independently investigated by the SPSO, who deals with complaints against
councils, the NHS, housing associations, the Scottish Government and its agencies and departments,
colleges and Universities and most Scottish public authorities.
While a patient of NHS Glendale, the applicant was far from happy with the treatment that she
had received. The breast-screening clinic where she had her breast scanned had given her the all clear, but
she was subsequently diagnosed with cancer. On complaining to the authority about her initial
misdiagnosis NHS Glendale’s Complaints Panel decided not to uphold her complaint. On appealing to
the SPSO, it was suggested to her that she sought out the minutes to the diagnostic panel meeting, which
now proved difficult to find. ‘I don’t think we can help her’, Samantha explained.
‘….complainants can now ask for their files [using FOI] whereas they couldn’t before.
There’s one complainant [the applicant described above] at the moment… She thinks we’re
holding something back from her. And we’re not, she just thinks we are.’
Complainant
A term used to describe people who had submitted a formal complaint to the authority.
Although the applicant had already taken her complaint to the SIC on appeal, she continued to
ask Samantha for the minutes to the meeting, information that NHS Glendale did not hold. In fact, the
minutes did not exist, Samantha explained. ‘We never take minutes of that kind of thing, we never have.
It’s Scottish Executive policy, not us’.
Colin and Samantha’s Cases Compared
Practitioners such as Colin often made sure they acted on a common or shared basis so as to comply with
the Act and ensure that their own particular relations or personality were not seen to govern the decisions
they made. However, complying with FOISA was a double-edged sword: practitioners’ concealment of
relations was both necessary for compliance and brought accusations of secrecy from applicants.
In chapter three I elaborated on the manner in which different persons were undifferentiated
because they considered themselves as acting on a common or shared basis. It was in light of the non-
differentiation of different practitioners that they made their own personality and individual relations
absent. Different practitioners, such as Duncan and Morag, simply appeared ‘anyone’ in a position to
locate and retrieve information; their own personality and position was irrelevant to what was retrieved
and disclosed. Since different persons and organizations were perceived as undifferentiated, others might
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only explain the differences between them in terms of their secrecy or the concealment of information.
Indeed, it soon became clear to practitioners such as Samantha and Colin that perceived differences
between what different people, organizations and even different Acts said, would indeed be interpreted by
applicants in terms of ‘secrecy’.
While practitioners’ concealment of the relations on which disclosures depended was at the root
of secrecy in the above instances, there were also instances in which relations between people were highly
visible in the information that was disclosed—both evident in the communication between Samantha,
Colin, Hector and the applicant, and potentially evident in the information they disclosed that was the
outcome of a relation, made absent. The action of form shows individual entities, or things, as being
implicated in other relations, such that to see a piece of information alone was also to acknowledge that it
exists in relations.
The relation that Samantha, Colin and Hector shared in common made Hector’s knowledge less
valuable to the applicant, who was consequently concerned Hector would be partial as an FOI reviewer.
Relations between practitioners diminished relations between Hector and the applicant. At the same time,
discrepancies between Samantha, Colin and Hector, what they said and did, was also read by the applicant
in terms of secrecy, since this could be the only explanation for their differences (given they were perceived
as holding a relation in common thus as propagating the same form).
Necessary Feedback
Despite her continued communication with NHS Glendale, the applicant had already gone to the Scottish
Information Commissioner, Samantha stated. On investigating the allegation that the authority withheld
information, the SIC concluded, in a surprising twist, that NHS Glendale had failed to comply with the
Act. He argued that each letter the applicant had sent had contained additional questions to which
Samantha and Colin had not responded. One concerned a request for information about other (besides
her own) complaints against the Scottish Breast Screening Service. Samantha, perceiving the letter as
something that was the concern of the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman, and appearing to assume
that the letter only reiterated the request with which they were currently dealing, overlooked the additional
questions that lay embedded in the text. In the decision notice that the SIC issued to Samantha and her
colleagues, they received a ticking off. While they had subsequently provided the information for which
the applicant had asked, they had not done so within the twenty day timescale as laid out in the Act.
It seemed that the Act required (although not in statute) that requests for information that the
authority held were not only recognized as and when they were made, and responded to in full and within
the timescale, but that requests for unrecorded information—opinion, advice, suggestions, feedback,
contextualization from those disclosing the information—also be provided.
It soon became clear to Samantha and her colleagues that providing an applicant with additional
feedback, contextualising a request or clarifying certain organizational procedures was as crucial as
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responding to a request itself. Only then would an applicant not be confused and suspicious. In other
words, applicants required feedback twice, once in the form of the information requested, and secondly in
the form of information about information, what it meant, why it was withheld, and why it was different.
As such information was not recorded, an FOI request entailed both recorded information and access to
persons and unrecorded information. This second kind of information, Samantha generally willing gave,
as shown by the way in which she would happily talk with me, about FOISA, providing me with all the
details, feedback, and context I needed for my research. In this case, providing and making visible to
applicants the non-recorded information and relations entailed within it, took time and effort.
It was clear to me, if not to the applicants who received it, that this latter kind of information was
different. Information, here, had relations internally implied—those of Samantha and her colleagues—as
a result of which such ‘information’ was elicited or created. Information, here, appeared more like
‘knowledge’.
But sometimes no amount of information was enough. On the one hand, feedback generated
more questions and more answers as if the applicant and practitioners were both disclosers and recipients
of information. On the other, it seemed to applicants as if there was always information that practitioners
were not disclosing, and for this reason, always more to know.
In the case above, applicants read into knowledge relations between public authority employees, which
created new divisions between them and the applicants concerned, and to accusations of secrecy in light
of their differences. In the case below, George, an applicant and regular users of FOISA established
friendly and often informal relations with FOI practitioners. The relations that George could read
between public authority employees and information enhanced its value or importance—turned it into




Requester and Discloser: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue
There were times when George, a resident of the small town of Edenside and frequent user of the FOI
Act appeared to assume I had knowledge that I might articulate so that he could respond to my research
questions more fully. There was a sense in which he thought I was having difficulty articulating what I
already knew, the division between us a consequence of the different knowledge that we had acquired and
might either share or withhold. George was a grey haired gentleman, tall and slim, with a soft manner,
and a slow walk. He was extremely careful with his words, a precision, he explained, that he had acquired
from many years in business. He was a retired business systems analyst. He used to run his own small
business with his wife, Helen, which entailed going into large companies and looking at the way they used
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their IT systems, aspects of their business ‘usually connected with databases’, and recommending
software. George was also developing his own philosophical theory of how the world worked, one that
he had been contemplating for many years and to which he could now devote more time. Like all
thinkers, he was finding it difficult to find the words to express his ideas. So George and I not only talked
about the FOI Act, which he frequently used but mulled over some of his more theoretical ideas and how
they might be developed.
I was introduced to George by Mike, the FOI Officer for the University of Edenside, with whom
I had become familiar from attending a short introductory session on FOI that he had held at the
University earlier in the year. Mike was in his early forties. He had been working for the University for
some months, had a background in intellectual property rights and private business. George had known
Mike since the end of 2004 when ‘as a trial run’ George had put an FOI request into the University, the
year before FOI was enacted. Mike had treated this as a test case and George had subsequently put
several requests into the University, which Mike generally forwarded to someone within the University
who could respond, although George was not always happy with their efforts.
George was an active member of his local community and at the time of our meetings was
principally involved in two projects. He was working on a response to a public consultation with other
residents on the local council’s regional development plan that he would submit in a few weeks. In
addition to this, he was making a case, with others, against the closure of his daughter’s primary school,
part of a larger council run project to amalgamate and reorganize four existing schools in the area. On
both projects he was someone who knew how to use FOISA, compose and submit requests on behalf of
the group and ‘dig out the facts’. In fact, George had developed quite a technique for composing
questions that could not ‘be easily misinterpreted’ by those who dealt with them and left no ‘wriggle
room’. George had, for example, made requests for information on school closure procedures, pupil rolls
and projected figures for the coming years, the number of university students with cars, and dog walking
restrictions on university owned land.
Over the course of the year that FOISA came into force, George and I regularly met for morning
coffee in a sunlit, glass-panelled conference centre on the outskirts of Edenside. Here, George could
discuss the requests that he had made, out of earshot of other residents, and staff to whom he might have
submitted a request. He did not want a discussion of how he went about getting information, thoughts
on fellow residents and council and University employees to be overheard. In our meetings we discussed
the requests that he had made and some of the e-mails that he had forwarded to me, containing
correspondence between residents, information released as a result of a request, or an FOI request to
which he was awaiting a response. He was also interested in learning more about social anthropology, and
how its approach might fit in which his own research.
While I did what I could to assist George with his requests about social anthropology, as a
requester or applicant myself asking for information from a ‘practitioner’, George did his utmost to
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provide me with information that he considered I might find useful for my research. George did not want
to provide me with ‘useless’ information and above all was concerned with neither ‘wasting my time nor
his’. In fact, he wanted to know how best to fulfil the promise that he had made at our first meeting, as
he explained in some detail:
‘I want to be quite clear in my mind… how [am] I best to carry out my promise to you
without causing me a lot of extra work or you a lot of useless information… My simplest
thing, if I was being pragmatic, [is to say] I’ll just feed her the e-mails, that’s what I’ll do, job
done’.
As if a public authority FOI practitioner responding to a request for information, George could
provide me with the ‘bare minimum’, e-mail correspondence, that was easy for him to forward and might
be of some value to me but he was uncertain in what way. He might then consider his promise fulfilled.
Our relationship seemed somewhat contained: in return for my assistance with his own research, he would
provide me with relevant examples and cases from the material he had to hand. In order for an obligation
to appear fulfilled, however, George had to provide me with what I considered useful information, which
meant I had to be absolutely clear about what I wanted. It was as if George considered himself a resource
from whom I might extract supporting evidence to argue, extend, or supplement what I already knew.
Yet I found I could not always be either precise about what I wanted or provide him with an answer.
George seemed to expect me to at least know what research questions I had in mind, and the
findings I would obtain from the material he gave me. But I tried to explain to George that I did not
know what I wanted. On hearing or reading any material he could provide, such as e-mail
correspondence, between him and a fellow resident, or a letter from a council official, I might then know.
But prior to knowing, so to speak, I did not know and therefore could not share with him what I knew.
Knowing, in George’s eyes, seemed a black and white matter of knowing or not knowing, something
already in existence and slowly revealed rather than something that emerged in response. That I did not
know what I knew before I ‘knew’ it, seemed to bewilder him. Unable to share with George what he only
assumed I knew, George seemed increasingly frustrated and to think my silence disclosed an inability to
express what I knew.
In George’s eyes (and as a researcher himself), being a good researcher entailed knowing what I
wanted to know before I embarked on my research. Familiar with a model of knowing in which persons
and knowledge travel independently of the person and relations through which they are created (discussed
in chapter three), knowledge seemed conceived by George in the form of an independent unit—
something that was either known or not known and travelled independently of the relations through
which it was formed; in the form of an object that can be collected, and applied, revealed or concealed.
But as George also realised, knowledge travelled in social relations…
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While over the course of these meetings our interdisciplinary dialogue was put to one side in
preference for discussing George’s recent activities in relation to FOISA, I did occasionally enquire how
his research was going, as he frequently asked about my own research.
Access to Officials
In order to respond to the council’s public consultation, George requested information from his local
council as well as Edenside University. He received mixed responses to his enquiries. The ‘middle
ranking’ officials seemed more often than not keen to provide him with information. However, the ‘top
officials’ George had reservations about. They were ‘occasionally a bit obstructive in the way they went
about things, and weren’t prepared to release too much information’. It was the ‘top’ or high-ranking
officials with whom George really wanted to make contact, however. George suspected that the ‘middle
ranking officials’ were just doing their job, disclosing information as and when requested, whereas those
of higher rank had had ‘some sort of guidance from the top’, from those at Executive level. At meetings
that George had attended he found that high ranking officials were evasive, ‘…people asked them direct
questions and they didn’t get direct answers, which always makes you suspicious…’. It appeared these
were individuals to whom George considered knowledge was attached, and to whom he sought access.
The very relations that made high-ranking officials of value to George also made them appear inclined to
hang onto information, seemingly at the request of those at the top. Relations between high-ranking
officials and people at the top, then, only diminished relations between officials and members of the
public. However, George soon found there were ways of using the Act that provided him with access to
officials of high rank in a way he had not foreseen.
Scrutinizing his own use of the Act, George was beginning to see that his use of FOI was
changing. This was something that he found quite interesting and was a result of his and other residents’
changing needs. The campaign against the school closure was moving fast and George often needed
information quickly. Rather than obtaining information without the use of the Act, George began to use
FOI as a ‘lever’: he would submit a formal written FOI request as a means of initiating an informal
conversation with a council employee, preferably a high-ranking official, that both would consider a
substitute for a formal written response. In other words, in submitting a request that would be passed to
a council official, George would encourage this request to develop into a more informal conversation, one
through which George would obtain information he considered more valuable than that obtained from a
more formal written response.
Rather than an end in itself, FOI became a means to an end. In the early days of using FOISA,
George had become acquainted with council staff to whom he now regularly sent FOI requests. Having
made contact with these few members of staff, enough to know them by name and by sight, after making
a request, George would follow these requests up with a telephone call to the council employee to whom
he had made the request. After speaking with this employee on the telephone, a meeting might be
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arranged, informally, or more formally attended by other council staff. A request became something to be
talked about with those to whom he had sent the request, demanding a response of a different kind.
Submitting an FOI request in more regular fashion, and awaiting a response, would mean that
George was put in touch with an FOI Officer, ‘an employee of middle rank’, who acted as a conduit for
higher ranking staff. Meanwhile, those to whom George considered useful knowledge was attached
remained out of reach. FOI used instrumentally, appeared to give George access to people and
information he deemed important. Using FOI in this way meant that he could enter into relationships
with council officials. George would regularly hang back after a council meeting to which he had been
invited to have a word with a participant. While a middle-ranking employee might provide him with
‘information’, information turned into valuable knowledge as a consequence of with whom or what it was
associated. High-ranking staff, George considered, had experience and learning that made them
persuasive, turning information into truth and eliciting yet more truth. So while FOISA provided access
to information, it was a way of obtaining access to people, without which information lacked meaning. At
the same time, information was itself the action of form in relation and the outcome of (valuable) relations
made absent or not seen.
Taking Care
But access to people was also something, it seemed, of which one had to take due care. George was aware
that using FOISA as a lever, a means of entering into an informal conversation with council official, he
could not relentlessly ask questions. The knowledge into which he came, was no longer dependent on the
Act, but on this particular relationship. In stepping outside of the scope of the Act, George was working
within different parameters. People would simply stop responding to the questions he asked, run out of
patience, if George asked too many questions. Those disclosing information might reasonably assume
after a certain number of times of responding that information was of suitable interest or value to the
recipient, a request beyond this point suggesting that an applicant was demanding more of a relationship
than was due.
In some ways, it appeared that requesters under these circumstances required a response in return
for paying their taxes in a manner that echoed the reciprocity entailed in my and George’s relationship. It
also appeared the discloser as much as the recipient might decide what constituted valuable information
and when their obligation to provide it had been met. On the other hand, there were times during his
correspondence with the council when George, considered a debt fulfilled well before the council
employees providing the information. As George remarked, on one or two occasions, individuals were
‘exceedingly helpful… the middle ranking officials are very very helpful, and some of them way beyond
the call of duty’. In this case as the recipient of information, it was George who was content with what he
had been provided well before those providing information considered their obligation met. The
information provided seemed of value to George, perhaps in a way that these council staff did not
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anticipate. That is, information was itself the outcome of a relation, which remained latent or unseen in
light of one piece of information alone. Information in this sense appeared more like knowledge that
emerged out of and existed in a network of relations; yet appeared as ‘information’ in light of the absence
of these relations, which nevertheless were read back into information disclosed. Information was both a
product of relations that George sought to read and embodied these relations—they were implied in its
very form.
In these case-studies, knowledge in the form of ‘information’ can be seen working in different forms, and
to different alternative effects.
On the one hand, familiar with a model of knowing in which persons and knowledge travel
independently of the person and relations through which they are created knowledge was conceived by
George in the form of an object into which persons might come by belonging to a particular group, not a
subject activated in relation. (This was a result of the manner in which people make the social relations
that inform what they know and do absent by always considering themselves as holding knowledge in
common and operating on a common or shared footing.) While I explained to him why I could not share
with him what he needed me to share, and that I would come into knowledge (that he already presumed I
‘knew’) in relation to any material, e-mail correspondence, repeated conversations that he could share with
me, knowledge was something that George presumed I had in advance of knowing it.
On the other hand, in contrast to Colin’s case in chapter three where concealing his personal
relations was a way of enhancing the value of the information he disclosed, the personal relations
information carried or through which it was shaped was of importance to George. Knowledge in the
form of information was turned back into knowledge as a result of the relations George could read
between high-ranking officials and information. At the same time, individual entities, or things, were
implicated in other relations, such that to see an individual entity alone was also to acknowledge that it
was the outcome of relations—that is, knowledge in the form of ‘information’ and thus emerged and
existed in a social network. Quality information came from quality people within the organization, in this
case, high-ranking officials: its seemed a practitioner’s position (and personality) both was seen to affect
and not affect what was disclosed. Despite practitioners’ best efforts to conceal their personality and
personal relations so as not to shape or influence what was disclosed, the position of a practitioner did
also determine the use and importance of the information disclosed.
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Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted three key instances of ‘secrecy’ perceived in the actions and statements of
practitioners. Each key instance, or type of concealment, is the outcome of carefully managed subject-
object aesthetics on the part of practitioners, which have both a positive and negative on their relations
with applicants.
To comply with FOISA, practitioners made the social relations that informed their response to a
request deliberately absent. It was a result of this, the fact that different practitioners seemed
undifferentiated, that knowledge appeared in the form of an independent entity that could be freely
disclosed, an entity that is either known or not known, concealed and revealed. It was this method of
concealment was also at the root of secrecy, on two counts.
It was a result of this concealment that knowledge seemed considered that which travelled
independently of persons, as a detached object. Perceiving knowledge as an object meant people also read
‘secrecy’ into people’s silence or lack of articulation of what they are perceived to know. In my relations
with George, I could not share with him what he needed me to share. In George’s eyes, I lacked the
ability to articulate what I knew and seemed ‘secretive’.
At the same time, differences between different people and different organizations, otherwise
perceived to be undifferentiated, applicants explained in terms of their ‘secrecy’. It was these
discrepancies that practitioners sought to quickly explain. Otherwise, as FOI practitioners such as Colin,
Samantha, Dave and Amanda discovered, such differences citizens took on for themselves to sort out.
There seemed no justification for differences in policy and approach that would lead to a discrepancy in
the services and facilities that people across Scotland received. Difference pointed only to lack of
knowledge or, more likely, misconduct and concealment on the part of the authority.
To minimize confusion, it was necessary for FOISA practitioners to spend time providing
applicants with additional feedback. It was important that practitioners such as Colin explained the reason
why the applicants requesting their personal medical files needed to make a new request under DPA.
Otherwise, the discrepancies between the two Acts might be perceived in terms of secrecy.
Such communication and the information they disclosed had the capacity to appear as originating
from particular persons, and as emerging out of particular relationships, which, in turn, had both a
positive and negative effect on applicants. While Colin’s rapport with applicants put him in good stead,
relations between colleagues could create divisions between them and applicants. This was what Hector
soon discovered in light of his communications with Samantha and Colin. The unity that applicants
perceived between practitioners such as Hector, Samantha and Colin, not only gave rise to new divisions
between practitioners and applicants, but led applicants to presume that Samantha, Colin and Hector were
being secretive when they were differentiated, or divided.
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George also read the connections between high-ranking council officials and disclosed
information. George sought information that came from persons in the council whom he considered
knowledgeable and important. Where the information disclosed was seen in the eyes of an applicant (such
as George) to be the product of a practitioner’s particular position, this was what made it valuable or
important—turning information into ‘knowledge’. So a practitioner’s position within the organization
appeared both irrelevant and highly relevant to the quality of the information disclosed; personal relations
and personality were both present and absent in information.
At the root of secrecy, stakeholders and applicants generally considered was ‘power’. In the





While power was not used in formal FOISA rhetoric to explain why people, government, practitioners,
withheld information from citizens, advocates of the legislation regularly used ‘power’ to explain why
people and organizations were ‘secretive’. The axiomatic relationship between power and knowledge was
at the root of such accusations: in the eyes of FOISA decision-makers, equal information also guaranteed
equal power. Power and agency went hand in hand; or rather knowledge would provide citizens with
power and agency. While practitioners with knowledge had power, this denied citizens agency. ‘Agency’
here appeared predicated on knowledge of the truth, suggesting FOISA decision-makers and practitioners
conceived of agency in black and white terms, as something people had or were denied.
Power has been explored in depth within and beyond anthropology. Most well-known for his
examination of power, and how it works, is the philosopher Michel Foucault. In particular, his writing on
power and knowledge (in a selection of collected works in Gordon 1980) focuses on the way in which
power flows through interconnecting statements, persons and things. These are the vehicles of power,
not its point of application. That is, while persons are subjugated by others, these others are also
subjugated by other people and subjugate themselves. In other words, power has no location—and is
seemingly transcendental. However, although I make reference to them, it is neither Foucault’s power
analytics nor other notions of power that I take up in this chapter.
Rather, drawing on two case studies, that of Colin and Samantha at NHS Glendale, and Robert
and Iain who are FOI practitioners at Bankside council, I explore instances of power and agency between
practitioners and applicants working and submitting requests under FOISA. These moments of ‘power’
illuminate the assumptions underpinning a theory of power based on the axiomatic relationship between
power and knowledge, and at the same time throw into question Foucault’s power analytics. That is,
might people’s own practices challenge a theory of social relations that challenges Foucault’s theory of
power?
The Intrigue of Power
Power carries a certain fascination. Social anthropologists are urged to unravel relations of power; make
explicit power that is most, as well as that which is least, obvious. What complicates their efforts is that
there are multiple ways of thinking about power: power as coming from the structures in which people are
embedded (Douglas 1987), value as coming from the retention of knowledge (Simmel 1990), and power as
flowing through people and structures, itself transcendent (Foucault in Gordon 1980).
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Power and agency were terms that decision-makers, practitioners and users of FOI legislation
used in their own way to explain the reasons for and impact of promoting and restricting access to
information. Power was seen as being at the root of secrecy and was also seen as the cause of lack of
agency. Worth reiterating here is the claim of Des Wilson (1984), founder of the UK Campaign for
Freedom of Information, that:
‘Power and information are inextricably linked… it is the desire of most of those who
achieve power to retain that power. To do that they feel a need to create an image of
competence, reliability, sound judgement, even of invincibility. As these are extremely
difficult standards to meet in our world, they rely on a combination of cover-up, public
ignorance, manipulation of – sometimes even misrepresentation of – information, and
selectivity of disclosure... it is almost beyond the power of men and women to resist the
corruptive influences of power itself. The only antidotes to the disease are decentralisation
and deconcentration of power, and democratic structures of the highest quality. Essential to
all of this is freedom of information’ (16-17)
Popularly, knowledge is power: the less knowledge is available, the more power its bearers seem
to have. Power, then, is something gained through making knowledge a scarce resource in some theories
(Barth 1975, Harrison 1995, Herdt 1990). Without knowledge, people seem without power and agency.
Agency, here, comes with knowing and appears to hinge on a division between people that reflects that
between individuals and society. In other words, it is society to which, without knowledge, people do not
have access—from which they are excluded while still existing in (or as part of) it. People’s lack of
knowledge thus points to their lack of capacity to think and act on the same terms and appear in the same
form as others—that is, in the form of society itself. Thus implicit in the term agency is a division
between individuals and society that both puts people in their place and separates them one from another.
Elsewhere, the term has a discourse of its own: Gell (1998) argues that agency is relational, ‘…for any
agent [motivator], there is a patient [recipient], and conversely, for any patient, there is an agent’ (22). Nor
is agency reserved exclusively for people. An object might be looked on as a subject or agent with agency,
with the power to motivate other subjects (Reed 2005). Above all, social anthropologists consider agency
as not only pointing to the capacity of subjects to motivate and others to be motivated but agency serves
to highlight who or what motivates. Agency, then, does not depend on the type of knowledge into which
people come, rather is itself indicative of peoples’ particular interests in a social relation.
In the eyes of Foucault, the dissemination of information that Wilson (1984) advocates allows for
the continuation of power, rather than its dissipation. In other words, power is at work in information
sharing itself, since the very power that dissemination dissipates flows, instead, through the relations that
dissemination sets up. It is here that Wright and Shore (1997), following Foucault, and writing on power
in relation to policy and governance, might step in to argue that what allows power to flow is the fact that
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to participate in society it is necessary for individuals to seek out a certain kind of information, largely
denied to them by others, and provided under FOISA. That is, to have ‘agency’, individuals must obtain
knowledge that is itself considered public, common, and appears separated from the social networks of
which it is a product. Thus power flows in places where it is thought most unlikely and is also least
recognized.
Foucault’s career spans some thirty years, from the early 1960s (Madness and Civilization, 1961) to
his death in 1984 (The History of Sexuality, 1984) at the age of fifty-seven. The work that he produced
during this time is often described as discontinuous since, for many, the links between his works are not
clear. Each might be considered to stand alone, yet it seems that in the very discontinuity between his
works lies a certain continuity. ‘This business about discontinuity’, Foucault once argued, ‘has always
rather bewildered me… It is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each
other so as to constitute a set of propositions that are scientifically acceptable… it’s not so much a matter
of knowing what external power imposes itself on science, as of what effects of power circulate among
scientific statements…’ (in selected transcribed conversations and writings edited by Gordon 1980: 112).
The sudden take-offs, sudden breaks, common to both his own work as well as evident in scientific
practice, are the outcome of changing regimes of truth, that is, shifts in knowledge (Power/Knowledge, 1972-
1977 in Gordon 1980). Identifying when and why these occur was for Foucault of greatest importance.
Over the years, Foucault switched from a narrative on discourse (The Order of Things, 1970 and The
Archaeology of Knowledge, 1969), to one concerning power/knowledge (Gordon 1980), and later to
experience (Discipline and Punish, 1977 and History of Sexuality, 1984), although he also said, looking back at
his work, that what else was he dealing with other than relations of power? As Dreyfus and Rabinow (in
their Foucault Reader, 1982) argue, the power analytics that Foucault puts forward do not so much
constitute theory as depict the full fluidity and contingency of power relations, of which Foucault
describes himself to be part and product.
Foucault’s power analytics are outlined in Power/Knowledge (Gordon 1980) in which Foucault
argues that truth is the outcome of an interconnecting matrix of statements each of which point to other
statements and to what is ‘true’. It is through these statements that power flows. Power thought of in
these terms is implicated in every thought and action, turning people both into subjects and objects of
power. However, while taking an interest in Foucault’s power analytics as well as other notions of power,
it is not these that I take up. Rather it is the very dissipation of power in moments when power might be
thought of as playing a crucial role, that highlights the very basis on which claims to power are made, how
power operates and the assumptions that underlie its operation. Might Foucault and those who employ
his ideas share assumptions about the nature of social relations, that both give rise to and support his
power analytics?
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Amongst his followers are Robertson (1999), for example, who argues that a shift from a culture
of secrecy to one of openness marks not liberation from power but a shift in power relations:
‘[the] …realist sees secrecy as a reflection of power, not values, and believes that there are
almost as many reasons for secrecy as for disclosure. The realist argues that it is underlying
changes to the structure of state power and not shifts in values which give rise to changes in
official secrecy…. The realist takes the view that secrecy is not a matter of conviction but of
the balance of power between different forces within the political system. Changes in the
degree of secrecy will only follow changes in the balance of power’ (9-10)
Meanwhile Susan Wright and Cris Shore (1997) writing on governance, policy and power turn to
Foucault’s power analytics for a description of policy in practice. ‘How do policies construct their
subjects as objects of power…’?, they ask. Policies ‘codify social norms’, conceal power, and produce
self-regulating persons. And while governments consult people with expert knowledge—sociologists,
criminologists, psychologists, religious ministers, behaviour therapists, medics and anthropologists—these
persons only help others to ‘act upon and reform themselves’. People both turn themselves into subjects
of power and suffer external subjection. In fact Governments have come to rely on the capacity of
subjects to self-regulate according to categories that have been normalized through the powers of
expertise: liberalism requires that individuals govern themselves while persons at the same time seem to be
acting as if free agents (9). Among his critics are Jurgen Habermas who argues that while critical of
modernity—the Age of Enlightenment and will-to-knowledge with which it is associated—Foucault later
takes modernity up as ‘the critical impulse worthy of preservation and in need of renewal’. His approach,
Habermas concludes, is inconsistent and lacks rigour (Hoy 1986: 107). Some historians argue Foucault’s
use of historical information is far from accurate. He frequently misrepresents an event, or simply makes
something up entirely. Others, such as sociologist Andrew Scull, argue that years of scholarly research
revealed nothing of importance for Foucault in relation to his project, rather his work is predominantly
based on the detailed analysis of selectively mined nineteenth century sources that are themselves of
dubious reliability. Such criticisms of Foucault’s work cannot but undermine its utility.
Nigel Rapport (2003) puts forward an alternative theory of power. In contrast to Foucault,
Rapport does not consider people as governed or governable and subjects of implicit power that flows
through everything, everywhere, but in control of themselves and their own actions, which includes being
in control of who is in control of them. Rapport develops this alternative theory of power based on his
experience and understanding of key individuals who have had an impact on his own life. He describes
these individuals as in control of themselves and their own life-projects. People, he argues, are
‘responsible for determining the interpretations they make and the actions they take. These might include
succeeding in feeling out of control, or in putting oneself in a position of helplessness…’ (5). Rapport
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uses the vivid image of a ‘self-propelled projectile careering through space’ to describe individuals ‘in
momentum’. He writes:
‘Its energy and momentum carry it along a certain trajectory, and it is deflected from this
path only to the extent that it comes under the gravitational sway of another body, or is
actually hit by another body. Even if this were to happen, the displacement caused to its
original trajectory would depend upon its own force relative to that of the other body: its
mass and its speed in a certain direction. If it is forceful enough it carries on its way’ (7)
It is people’s apparent will here that is most striking. But central to Rapport’s analysis is the
notion that individuals are themselves discrete, separate and contained—transcendental even. In the same
way that Foucault’s power analytics is predicated on the understanding that individuals are separate and
discrete and the persuasive relationship between them is one of power, so Rapport appears to replace the
relationship between individuals with that of the individual him or herself. In other words, people are more
generally conceived of as at the centre of a relationship that has the potential to unite discrete entities. It
is in replacing strangers with the person him or herself that Rapport seems only to replicate Foucault’s
own understanding of the relation. It is perhaps the nature of the relation itself that requires closer
examination, on which both theories of power (Foucualt and Rapport’s) rely.
Power and agency are above all relational; people appear to have or lack power in their relations
with others. This is because a contemporary notion of power appears to rest on a division between
individual and society and the fact that there are certain things to know in order to appear in both forms.
It is the separation of knowledge from the networks from which it originates that invokes people’s own
separation; that is, the fact that there is something to share and to know—a consequence of the magico-
purificatory divide between knowledge and social networks that Latour (1993) describes:
‘…the word modern describes two sets of entirely different practices which must remain
distinct if they are to remain effective, but have recently begun to get confused. The first set
of practices, by ‘translation’, creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids
of nature and culture. The second, by ‘purification’, creates two entirely distinct ontological
zones: that of human beings on the one hand; that of nonhumans on the other’ (1993: 11)
Yet because knowledge is dependent on persons and things in relation, what is ‘real’ is neither
fixed nor locatable. Power, then, is also something neither fixed nor locatable but is, rather, entirely
relationally dependent. In this sense, there could be said to be no concrete power at all.
In the paragraphs that follow I turn to two cases, or rather a collection of moments where power
is clearly harnessed and wielded, causes upset and concern, and is foregrounded and dissipates as people
make and deal with requests for information under FOISA. In the first, Iain and his friend and colleague
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Robert discuss how FOISA was implemented in their authority, and the difficulties and promises which
they faced in being responsible for its implementation. Power comes into view and disappears as Iain and
Robert themselves appear part of bigger networks, with responsibility and sometimes without power. In
the second, I once again turn to Colin and Samantha of NHS Glendale and their difficulties with
applicants who would simply not believe Samantha and Colin were not concealing information: power
here was something that Colin and Samantha seemed to have but was not something that they realised
they had.
Iain and Robert at Bankside Council
Iain was Council Secretary for Bankside Council, one of the largest councils in Scotland. He had taken on
responsibility for the implementation of FOI in the authority with the help of his colleagues Robert, a
trainer in employee services, Steven who worked in e-governance, and Fergus, described by Iain as
Steven’s side-kick. Since FOI had only been in force for six weeks, Iain and his colleagues were still
getting to grips with it. Iain and Robert had been friends for over fifteen years, and appeared to regularly
socialise outside of work as well as support one another on projects such as this. I had first written to Iain
to enquire about the way in which FOI was being implemented and enforced in the council, and was as a
result invited to meet Robert who I was informed would assist me with my research. From then on I was
known as IAIN’S PHD STUDENT often written in bold type as the subject of e-mails passed between
Iain and Robert.
The fact that I was awarded the title IAIN’S PHD STUDENT perhaps said more about the
hierarchical nature of council then it did about me as a researcher. It was clear that both Robert and I
were associated with Iain, and I as a result had access to persons and knowledge to which I would
otherwise not. And it seemed that, in providing me with access to their knowledge, council staff were
securing their own access to Iain’s knowledge, in a way. But what the introductory statement also seemed
to suggest was that what I required and what I would get from people was information. Indeed, in my
discussions with Robert, he would (very helpfully) hand me files of information on the council and
council process. In addition he would ask me what I wanted to find out, which is not something that I
knew until I knew it. Knowledge here seemed thought of as something that might be easily and quickly
retrieved, a latent entity rather than relational. In providing Robert a response he could then think of
someone who would tell me what I needed to know. It seemed my research with Robert and others at the
council was in some way modelled on FOI itself: it was about collecting and obtaining information, and
relying on others to disclose it. While on the one hand knowledge travelled in a social relationship, its
very association with Iain allowing it as well as Robert and myself to travel, on the other, knowledge
became more like an object that anyone in the right position might obtain or provide.
Robert acted as a kind of envoy for Iain: he arranged for me to attend an FOI briefing for council
employees, so that I could meet him and Steven, who had also been involved in the implementation of
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FOI, as well as Elaine and Mark who worked at the Contact Centre where all FOI requests and general
enquiries were received and forwarded to council staff to be dealt with. Robert was a friendly, cheerful
man who was always there to offer help. He would happily point people in the right direction and tell
them what they should know or should be doing. At presentations such as the one he was giving to
council staff at the FOI briefing, he would break complex legislation down and re-explain it in way that
staff could better understand. He approached new legislation as a problem solving exercise. It was a
technique he more generally liked to employ: Robert and I would often find ourselves in a situation where
I unknowingly presented a ‘problem’ for him to solve, breakdown and rebuild. As part of his promise to
Iain to assist me with my research, Robert and I spent time together in his office on the outskirts of town,
discussing what I wanted to find out and with whom I might like to speak. After several meetings with
Robert, I eventually managed to meet Iain, although Robert suggested that I put together a list of
questions that I would like to ask him, rather than, we joked, taking my usual anthropological approach.
Iain and I sat down over a cup of tea and some biscuits to discuss how FOI had been
implemented. FOI had only been in force for six weeks, and we sat in Iain’s large square office situated at
the back of the City Chambers, which we had reached after walking up red-carpeted stairs and through a
warren of corridors. Iain was a tall man in his late fifties, who appeared to take working for the council as
a way of life; he was fully familiar, and entrenched, in the council’s ways and planned to celebrate his
sixtieth birthday in one of the larger meeting rooms at the Council Chambers. Iain had completed a
diploma in Social anthropology at Oxford before leaving academia to work in local government and was
therefore ‘desperate’ to find out what an anthropologist might see in FOI, and also the council. ‘The
focus of our diploma was very much, well, the Oxford tradition of E. Evans-Pritchard, kinship and
marriage among the Nuer…’, Iain explained. ‘Most of it was based around primitive societies or
underdeveloped societies, and the discipline seemed to be one more of methodology, you know you had
to do fieldwork to get any credibility and, you know, mix with some of the less developed parts of the
world’. In return for explaining to Iain what interest an anthropologist might have in FOI, Iain explained
why he had been given responsibility for implementing it, situating himself within the council and in
relation to others. He inherited responsibility for FOI because of his job as Council Secretary, which
‘derives from the fact that I am secretary clerk to the council’, Iain explained, but also because ‘no body
else really wanted to do it’, and also because it was a niche for him and Robert to capture.
Robert was ‘looking out for something where he could make his mark as well’, Iain explained. So
the year before FOI came into force, Iain and Robert started trying to raise the profile of FOI in the
council: Iain made a presentation that Robert had prepared to a group of senior managers at ‘one of these
sort of group lunches’ and persuaded ‘the bosses’ that they needed some resources put into FOI. ‘We got
a project manager and we got some support for him, and we got a project board that our project manager
was reporting to, and I was sort of tacked onto this, in that I have my day job… but acted as a source of
expertise and offered a general understanding of what we were trying to achieve… And the project kind
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of took off from there’. The project team comprised of Iain, Robert, Steven and Fergus. They initiated a
computerised system for logging all requests, which was ‘a first’ Iain explained, ‘…the council has never
managed to achieve corporate logging of anything’. They also established an FOI Officers network,
requesting that people in each of the eight departments took on responsibility for receiving and handling
FOI requests. Finally, Robert ran a training awareness programme, that ‘was excellent’ Iain explained.
‘August to December [2005], that was all the time we had really to prepare [for FOI], but I think we’ve
done pretty well in that time’, Iain concluded.
It appeared that one of the reasons for becoming the council’s experts on FOI was that it was a
means through which to be of particular value to council employees. Iain and Robert saw themselves as
associated and with access to valuable knowledge in a way that made them essential to the way the council
did business. This would heighten their profile within the council. At the same time, what constituted
valuable knowledge had a tendency to shift and appeared relational. Robert might both have and lose
power (value) depending on to whom or what his and other knowledge was associated. Robert’s
association with Iain was of great benefit to him. However, new knowledge, disclosed, for example, by
the SIC had the capacity to differentiate Iain from others and the council from other authorities making
Iain and the council appear without valuable knowledge. Such a change would undoubtedly affect the
power Robert had in relation to others, as Iain’s envoy and chief companion. There was in this sense
power in disclosure itself, that is, in making otherwise powerful persons appear as lacking power.
It was perhaps in anticipation of the fickleness of power and possible change that Robert
sometimes held onto knowledge for as long as he could: he was aware of the ‘little bit of power’ that he
had in being able to provide others with information. He on one occasion took me through a request to
which he was reluctantly responding: the Herald newspaper had requested information on the council’s
employment policy, as the Disqualified Adults list was due to be published and the Herald wanted to
know how many persons were or had been employed by the council who were on the Disqualified Adults
list. ‘Maybe I should give more information’, he explained. ‘[But] before I give them more information I
need to sort out what the council’s position is… When [the list] comes out, lots of questions are going to
be asked’. He continued, ‘…am I being awkward, using my little bit of power… denying them something
that [they] want?’
It soon appeared that the team’s success, and Iain’s and Robert’s own success, largely depended
on whether they stayed on the right side of the SIC and council management. After the council had been
dealing with FOI for eight months, it received a Decision Notice from the SIC that was taken as bad news
for the council. It appeared that the council, or rather staff at Contact Centre, had not recognised and
responded to an FOI request and the applicant had taken the request straight to the SIC on appeal. The
SIC had concluded that the council’s lack of response was due to a Technical Breach and that it should
rethink its request handling system. Iain, Robert and other team members had wanted to keep a low
profile with the SIC and maintain both the reputation of the council and their own and were keen to drop
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off the SIC’s radar a quickly as possible. Iain called a meeting at the Contact Centre, attended by Contact
Centre staff, Iain, Robert, and a handful of FOI Officers so that they might address and resolve the
problem. Iain had to explain the situation to council management also, who were currently ‘going crazy
over council performance’ of which FOI formed a large part. Fingers of blame pointed in different
directions. While the SIC had pointed the blame at the council, and indirectly at Iain since he was
responsible for the implementation of FOI, Iain had suggested to council management that the Contact
Centre were to blame for the error, for which he apologized in the meeting. So it seemed divisions in
knowledge and between people rapidly appeared where they were thought not to exist. While access to
information was about resolving these divisions through shared knowledge, in this particular case people
sought to make the divisions between them evident. It was a kind of backwards move, people
differentiating themselves one by one in order to show that they had not acted out of turn.
Decision Notice
A Decision Notice is defined in the Act as ‘notice in writing’ of any decision made by the SIC on an
appeal before the expiry of four months of receiving the application.
Technical Breach
A Technical Breach is a term used by the SIC to mark that a request had not been responded to due to
technical failure or inadequate request handling systems.
In the Contact Centre’s defence, one staff member with overall responsibility for the management
of FOI requests explained, ‘…the way we manage services at the front end is best practice. We’re juggling
a number of tasks, not just FOI… the standards with regard to FOI are set, and these are checked
constantly’, she explained. ‘Okay, so what are we going to do?’, Iain continued. Robert was to write a
report on the failing, which was to be circulated to council staff, and potentially presented to the SIC if he
required a copy, that would recommend action. Robert recommended in his report that the Contact
Centre took on the responsibility of managing the council’s FOI network, instead of Iain, Robert, Steven
and Fergus, which included establishing a user group attended by council FOI practitioners and a member
of the council legal division. It also suggested that the Contact Centre conducted regular customer
satisfaction surveys, produced and circulated an FOI newsletter amongst staff to increase awareness and
raise the Contact Centre’s profile, and provide targeted awareness training sessions where appropriate. It
is possible that this would mean that Contact Centre staff became more involved in and thus more aware
of FOI in the council. Amongst other consequences, perhaps in writing this, a researcher like myself
might even draw the SIC’s attention to their efforts.
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Samantha and Colin at NHS Glendale
Samantha and Colin, NHS Glendale’s principle FOI Officers, had also had on more than one occasion to
deal with the SIC. In comparison with some of her colleagues, Samantha had a positive approach to FOI.
She argued that people had a right to information and to ask for and obtain it from a public authority.
People should get not just some, but all of the information they had asked for, she explained, bar the
necessary exemptions. However, it seemed that Samantha’s boss Rachel, NHS Glendale’s Press and
Communications Officer, did not agree. She was, Samantha explained, reluctant to provide people with
information willy-nilly under the new FOI Act. Rather, she was concerned about the way in which those
requesting it would use or even misuse information, and how information would inevitably be
misinterpreted. She was particularly aware of journalists’ use of the Act, that is, the manner in which the
media spun information as they generated a good news story. It was for this reason that Rachel often
issued Samantha and Colin with instructions on exactly what information to give out, when, and in what
form, in light of requests for information from the media as well as members of the public.
As NHS Glendale’s principle FOI Officers, Samantha and Colin were both based at NHS
Glendale’s Health Board, which was located in the centre of Glendale, and regularly liaised with other
FOI Officers who worked in different divisions of the authority in different parts of the town. Samantha
was bubbly and sociable, and would often happily spend time telling me about how NHS Glendale was
structured, how FOI had been implemented in such a large and diffuse authority and issues or concerns
that had arisen since its implementation. She was small, with short dark hair and wore large, heavy framed
glasses that caught the light and flashed when she enthusiastically moved her head. She had been NHS
Glendale’s Complaints Officer for many years, and had been given responsibility for handling FOI
requests when FOISA had come into force at the start of the year. It was a heavy burden for one person
to manage, and so Samantha had soon recruited Colin to help her with FOI. Colin had also worked for
NHS Glendale for many years, in the facilities department, which was only one hundred yards away from
Samantha’s office.
Although I have talked about Colin, his colleagues and their work before, it is worth repeating
some of the material here. Colin too was sociable, and looked on by his colleagues as ‘a bit of bright
spark’, someone who was clever and efficient. His spelling was not always accurate, but he had a good
knowledge of the authority, its structure and who was likely to hold what information. His friendly
manner put him in good stead when dealing with individuals who applied for information under the Act.
He might, for example, correspond by e-mail or speak to regular requesters on the telephone about their
request, to seek clarification or explain that a response might be delayed, which on occasions it was due to
the reluctance of some of his colleagues both to respond to his enquires or disclose what they held.
Despite Samantha’s and Colin’s efforts, however, there were occasions when they did not appear to
manage an applicant particularly well and get a response right, and were sometimes considered by
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applicants to conceal what they knew. It was in these cases, two of which follow, that Samantha, Colin as
well as Hector, NHS Glendale’s FOI reviewer, appeared to have power over others, often of which they
were quite unaware.
On occasions, Colin and Samantha found themselves providing applicants with information twice
over, once in the form of the requested information itself, and once in the form of an explanation as to
what had or had not been provided. It seemed even information (itself providing context of sorts)
required some kind of context. In this sense they were particularly careful to explain the contradictions
that emerged in light of information requests. In one particular case, Colin, Samantha and Hector refused
to provide information an applicant sought on the basis that it was a request for personal information that
was covered by the Data Protection Act. It seemed that the applicant (the father of the family which was
the subject of information) considered Colin and his colleagues were attempting to conceal information
from him and were using DPA as an excuse to withhold it. This was exacerbated by the fact that rather
than insist that he reapply for information under DPA, to be helpful, Colin had forwarded the applicant’s
request to NHS Glendale’s Data Protection Officer. This had only caused the applicant further
confusion. He considered he was being fobbed off, and persisted with his request for information, as
another FOI Officer explained:
‘[The applicants] have been around for weeks. They want information we can’t give them.
You see what happened is Colin kindly told them that he couldn’t give them want they
wanted because of data protection issues, and kindly passed their request onto data
protection….’
From the perspective of the applicant, it seemed as if Colin, Samantha and Hector conspired
against him. The authority appeared to deliberately attempt to deny him the agency and power he sought.
Power here was in the hands of very few. In fact, from outwith the authority it might even seem to the
applicant as if the whole authority conspired against him and that Samantha, Colin and Hector and their
work colleagues shared the same knowledge and approach. While the applicant was urged to correspond
with the Data Protection Officer, from his point of view, it seemed as if the Data Protection Officer too
was in on the conspiracy, the division between him and the applicants sustained by Colin and his apparent
unity. There was a sense, then, in which a division in knowledge was also one between people, which
brought with it hierarchy, inclusion and exclusion. So those with knowledge had power through their
ability to close down others without knowledge.
A second case concerned an applicant who had been in frequent correspondence with Samantha
and Colin over the course of the year. The applicant sought minutes to a meeting at which her complaint
against NHS Glendale for misdiagnosis had been discussed but not upheld. The applicant had submitted
a request after her formal complaint of being cleared of having breast cancer despite later being informed
that she did in fact have breast cancer was, she considered, unsatisfactorily dealt with. According to
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Samantha, the applicant had initially approached the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman (the SPSO)
who suggested that she ask NHS Glendale for the minutes of the meeting at which her complaint against
the authority had been discussed. On receiving the applicant’s request for the minutes of this particular
meeting, Samantha responded to explain that minutes of such meetings were not taken. However,
convinced that NHS Glendale did hold the minutes to the meeting, as the SPSO suggested it might, the
applicant continued to request the information despite the fact that Samantha and Colin could not, they
explained, assist her further. In fact, the applicant had even written to Samantha to explain why she
wanted the information, which was information Samantha did not require under the Act and did not need
in order to deal with the applicant’s request. Samantha could only presume that the applicant assumed
that she and Colin deliberately withheld the information she requested, Samantha explained to me over a
cup of tea one morning. In fact, Samantha seemed deeply sorry for the applicant and was distressed that
the information that the applicant sought was not information that she was able to provide:
‘I don’t think we can help her …I think it’s the Public Services Ombudsman she should be
speaking to… She thinks we’re holding something back from her. And we’re not, she just
thinks we are. She’s not very happy with the way she was treated and the care that she
received… but there was nothing wrong. Yes, some things could have been done better, but
there was nothing seriously wrong with the way she was treated. But she’s convinced that
we’re hiding something from her, and she’s approached a few other complainants to ask
them about their treatment. She’s gone to the Commissioner and they’ve got everything.
She’s obviously really angry…’
It seemed that the applicant’s lack of access to information in this case was not only of deep
concern to her but concerned Samantha also. Since Samantha and Colin appeared to withhold
information from the applicant, they also appeared to have power that they did not have. Power, if only
in appearance, it seemed, was not something that they sought or desired since it pointed to the deliberate
attempt to create disparity and to deny others agency—access to knowledge. In fact, it was Samantha’s
and Colin’s lack of knowledge, power and agency in light of this case that appeared to frustrate them.
There was nothing they could do to help the applicant; they did not have access to the minutes she sought,
despite—it appeared from the applicant’s letter—the fact that the applicant assumed Samantha might
have the minutes to the meeting in one hand and her letter in the other.
In attempts to further assist her, Samantha provided the applicant with an explanation of why the
information she sought could not be provided and also attempted to respond to her letters and enquires.
The applicant had made a point of disclosing why she sought information, which was not required under
the legislation, and made explicit her motives. The response with which Samantha provided her seemed a
response to the many letters that Samantha had received from the applicant, which would (Samantha it
seemed hoped) provide the applicant’s request with new context. More than just information, the
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knowledge that was exchanged here came from particular persons who were enmeshed in particular
networks of relations, which each party seemingly made clear. It appeared that Samantha’s efforts were an
attempt to clarify the situation, and in this sense provide the applicant with the agency she sought and
Samantha was unable to provide through other means. At the same time, Samantha’s response might be
considered a kind of reflection or realisation on the part of the applicant. On coming into new knowledge
and being combined (rather than divided from Samantha and Colin) the applicant would be able to think
and act in new ways. So knowledge was not so much something that was externally imposed on the
applicant through which she was subjugated, as enabling.
In March the following year, the SIC published his decision concerning the applicant and the
information she sought from NHS Glendale. While the SIC agreed that NHS Glendale did not hold most
of the information that the applicant had sought, he found that the authority had failed to comply fully
with the provisions of FOISA. Embedded within the numerous letters the applicant had written and sent
to Samantha and Colin were questions that had remained unanswered. While considering that they had
done all that they could to aid the applicant and yet remaining powerless to help, it seemed Samantha and
Colin’s had lacked awareness that, not only had further questions been asked, but that the applicant’s
correspondence concerning the original request might contain, even constitute an FOI request in itself. In
this, they had failed to comply with the Act. It seemed Samantha and Colin had knowledge of which they
were seemingly unaware, and the requests the applicant continued to seek met with silence. Their
apparent lack of communication about these requests appeared to constitute neglect and the knowledge
(that they did not know they had), with the potential to establish relations, appeared an unshared resource.
Instead, Colin and Samantha (themselves unindividuated it seems) appeared to have power and agency
that the applicant was deliberately denied, which only increased the sense that their efforts to retain
knowledge were also deliberate. Samantha and Colin seemed to be holding onto power of which they
were seemingly quite unaware.
In addition to requesting the minutes to the meeting at which her complaint against the authority
was discussed, the applicant had asked for the number of similar complaints the authority had received
about the Breast Screening Service, what they concerned and how they had been dealt with. Some of this
information, the authority later explained to the SIC, although not to the applicant, they could not provide
because it was covered by the Data Protection Act and constituted personal information. While upheld
by the SIC, he chastised the authority in his decision for not disclosing this fact to the applicant. Instead
they simply appeared to ignore her request. Rather than explaining to the applicant what information she
could not have, the authority merely provided the information she could and, is so doing, denied, albeit
unwittingly, the agency that the applicant sought.
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Claims to Power
Power emerges as something that is relational: while people such as Robert at Bankside Council might
make claims to power they, at the same time, remained aware of the way in which power itself was
ephemeral. That is, something that they had but might also lose. Power, then, had a tendency to appear
or disappear between people. People came into or lost power as new knowledge appeared or existing
knowledge became associated with new people, themselves persuasive, and of (social) importance. Robert,
Iain, Colin and Samantha, responsible for disseminating information (and with knowledge and power),
turned out to be embedded in subtler networks than they perhaps realised. In relation to members of the
public, they were perceived as having both knowledge and power. In Samantha’s case, it seems, she did
not appreciate the extent of this perception, which served to exacerbate the appearance of a divide
between her and the applicant. Yet in relation to others in the organization, there seemed the potential
for people to lack what others assumed they had. Samantha was assumed to be aware of the perception
of the applicant in terms of her position of power. With Iain and Robert, power was seen by some as
attaching to their dealings with others in the organisation where they, perhaps, did not feel this to be the
case.
People seemed to slip in and out of power relations in different moments, and in their relations
with different people. The fact that power was relational, that it existed between one person and the next
only for the duration of the power-giving relationship made power itself seem ephemeral, something easily
lost and gained—neither something that people could predict or determine nor something that people
concretely had. It was not something that existed outwith a relationship and might show its face in
particular, and unexpected, moments.
While seemingly something which individuals such as Robert and Samantha momentarily had,
power was also something that was given up as divisions emerged between those who at first seemed
undifferentiated. In this respect, Robert and Iain found themselves held responsible for handling requests
for information that was controlled by others in their organisation. Power might thus appear to flow away
from FOI practitioners, while responsibility remained theirs.
This is perhaps in contrast to Crook’s (2000) analysis of the responsibility entailed in releasing
Genetically Modified Organisms into the world. Here, he argues, because Monsanto plc (an agricultural
company that applies innovation and technology to assist farmers around the world) was always part of a
larger network, ‘…profit devolves to Monsanto alone, [but] responsibility never will’:
‘The striking thing here is how Monsanto is enabled to modify the length of its dependency
in the greater chain by appearing, on one hand as if were possible to appear as an independent
component… and on the other hand as if it were impossible to appear as an independent
component (it could not force farmers to buy, it had to abide by regulations made at various
levels)’ (Crook 2000: 10)
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While practitioners such as Robert and Samantha were members of a larger network, a
department or organization, as a result of which they did not always have power and agency, at times they
seemed solely responsible for the burden of handling FOI requests and the success and disappointment that
a response brought. So, while they did not always have (or did not realise that they had) the knowledge or
relations that others thought they did, responsibility could not be abdicated; while responsibility came with
practitioners’ knowledge of the Act and was a given and remained, power was a will o’ the wisp.
But power was the product of a desire for what others knew rather than something that individuals
intrinsically had. It was because people sought the knowledge that others had that people in possession of
this knowledge had power, it seemed. If such knowledge was not desirable, then the power people had
would soon dissipate, which individuals such as Robert quickly realised. And in his efforts to retain ‘the
little power he had’, he perhaps held on to knowledge for a little longer than he should. It was people’s
desirability to know what others’ knew that gave people power. In many ways, knowledge was desirable
because shared knowledge was considered at once constructed and given, and in this sense as describing
the really-existing world. Strathern (2005), following Miller in describing the way in which mothers
approach caring for their children, ‘…mothers come to regard the child’s growing up as a series of
defeats… Whether in affirmation or denial of its importance, people… imagine themselves as confronting
reality’ (4-5). There is some similarity between the mothers described by Strathern and FOI practitioners.
In particular, the feeling that mothers had of ‘confronting reality’, is not entirely dissimilar to FOI
practitioners with information to disseminate. The mothers that Strathern describes felt obligated to
communicate what they know so as to protect their children from the harm that might arise if they did
not. All made the more difficult by the perception on the part of others that both FOI practitioners and
mothers might have power of which they themselves are unaware.
So a desire for knowledge seemed a consequence of the fact that the knowledge that others came
into was also considered as depicting the real world. Without such knowledge, of the world and the
things in it, individuals considered themselves as unable to communicate about the world in which they
and others live and act. So in a sense not only did people give power to others whom they perceived as
having knowledge that they did not, but themselves lacked power and agency because of their perceived
lack of such knowledge. A division in knowledge, then, not only marked a division between persons but
also a hierarchy where people had the capacity to complete the knowledge of others; those ‘lacking’
knowledge seemingly incapacitated, unable to move. Power was something that individuals donated as a
result of their own pursuit of power and agency. Meanwhile, power or lack of it was down to the simple
(but extraordinarily powerful) fact that shared knowledge seemed real, as if it depicted the really-existing,
lived in world—knowledge itself detached from the relational network in which it exists and out of which
it emerges.
But while knowledge, under this view, seemed given, a description of the really-existing world
also appeared constructed, as originating from persons enmeshed in a particular network of relations. In
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the opening quote from Wilson (1984), he states that people are aware of the way in which others might
no longer take an interest in their knowledge, and it is for this reason that they restrict access to the
knowledge that they have in an attempt to increase its and their value through scarcity. Samantha, in
receipt of a letter from the applicant in which the applicant explained her reason for seeking information,
provided a response that was an outcome of her own relationships and interests. What divided persons,
here, was not only knowledge but also people’s different interests and motivations and it was this that
each then shared with others through the provision of knowledge. As knowledge appeared as no longer
objective and a description of the really-existing world, but something that depended on a social
relationship and as originating from persons enmeshed in a particular network of relations, people with
knowledge themselves no longer seemed powerful. In this sense, the power that disclosers had dissipated.
So crucial to having and maintaining power was as much the scarcity of knowledge as people’s ability to
maintain (in others) the sense that knowledge constituted an objective description of the world.
It is here that we might once again turn to Foucault. It is perhaps worth re-iterating Foucault’s
theory of knowledge and power, in relation to Truth. Truth, he argued, was the outcome of a regime of
truth, which he described as a network of interlocking statements, each pointing to what counts as true. It
is because of the will-to-knowledge and the search for the truth, a project of the Age of Enlightenment
that Foucault forcefully rejects, that the relationships that inform what is real, he argues, are concealed.
Foucault, here, conceives of power as flowing through these relationships, and in concealing relations that
inform the truth (knowledge), power itself appears concealed. It is because power flows via relationships
that are themselves inescapable, Foucault argues power is also inescapable. Power emerges as imprecise
and above all ubiquitous. It flows through the relations between entities, from statement to statement,
person to person, using them as vehicles. Power in this sense is transcendental, appearing both as a
positive and negative force, which represses and enables. So while people seek to obtain power and
agency by coming into (new) knowledge that they consider themselves without, it is as a result of this that
they become subjects of power, come under a different regime of truth and subscribe to an alternative
network of relations. The important issue here is that in coming in to new knowledge the very operation
of power is concealed.
Anthropology’s Relation
Foucault presents an image of power as something that flows through people, statements, things.
However, his power analytics in relation to power/knowledge (see Gordon 1980) form only a part of his
work. In the course of his career, he sought to highlight the mechanisms through which power is
mobilized, and through which it flows. But while power flows between entities, such a concept of power
is the result of the particular way in which relations themselves are conceived—as that which (solely)
exists between things, linking them together in a kind of chain. It is a particular approach to the relation
that gives rise to and sustains a particular notion of power—power that subjugates, turns people into
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things, and enables people to control and feel in control. In the following paragraphs I re-examine power
by re-examining the relationships through which it operates.
It is worth drawing on Strathern’s (2005) examination of the creation and flow of knowledge in
relation to the production of sixteenth and seventeenth century scientific texts. What counted as
knowledge was what people were willing to attest, and the value of their testimony rested in turn on the
kind of people they were. It was the relations between people and information that produced knowledge
out of information. As Strathern writes:
‘If items of information, the categories in terms of which the world could be described, were
judged against one another, any fit was simultaneously a relation between them.
‘Knowledge’ became understood as accountable information, and it was by virtue of being
relational that it was accountable’ (Strathern 2005: 62)
Interrelating statements and people in positions to sanction knowledge made knowledge
accountable, and governed what was ‘true’; ‘What validates one fact are other facts, always provided the
connections can be made to ‘hold’ (2005: 62). Strathern’s examination of the connections between
people, texts, and information that govern what is true, seems not too dissimilar from Foucault’s analysis
of the way in which people realise what is true. Yet Strathern points not just to the relation that connects,
but to the relation between texts, pieces of information, that turn knowledge into information.
‘‘Knowledge’ became understood as accountable information, and it was by virtue of being relational that
it was accountable’, she argues (2005: 62). It was the relations between texts that made it able stand up to
other texts. In fact, she states the relation through which we come into new knowledge comes in two
parts, or rather is made up of two kinds of relation:
‘Now the relation is divided (into two kinds) in a particularly powerful way that I want to call
‘anthropology’s relation’. The two kinds that principally interest me here comprise the
conceptual (or categorical) and the interpersonal. On the one hand are those relations seen
to make connections through logic or power of articulation that acquires its own conceptual
momentum; on the other hand are those relations that are conducted through interpersonal
terms, connections between persons inflected with a precise and particular history’ (Strathern
2005: 7)
The conceptual relation is one where something sustains a relationship with something else in a
manner that elicits its form; the form or meaning of persons, information, things in relation do not pre-
exist this relation. So information ‘…sustains a relationship to other pieces of information’ (2005: 63). It
is through this that we grasp information as knowledge. Through bringing bits of information into
relation, information is provided with new context or grounds. At the same time, interpersonal relations
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are that which connect the forms and meanings elicited through the conceptual relation together; people
by their shared knowledge, information by its shared meaning.
Different from the concept of the relation on which Foucault draws, the relation that Strathern
refers to as Anthropology’s Relation is not just that which connects people, information, entities together
but also that which invokes new meaning in information and new divisions between people as, in relation,
they offer different perspectives on the same thing.
In the above two case-studies, or string of moments, people appeared as both differentiated from
friends and colleagues, and as holding knowledge in common or combined. Here, as they came into
relation, people offered different perspectives on the same thing. At the root of their differentiation was
their divided interests in a particular thing (relation). In contrast, people’s lack of differentiation pointed
to a connection between them, or shared knowledge, and thus their shared form.
Robert assisted Iain implement and enforce FOI at Bankside Council, although he soon realised
that power and agency derived from his shared interests was momentary: he and others appeared united
due to their shared knowledge, yet there was always the potential for Robert (and Iain) to appear
differentiated from others as members of a larger network and accountable to those in that network. His
shared knowledge pointed to his power and agency, the divisions that emerged between him and others
might point to his lack of power and agency. While divided from some people through his union with
others, Robert was also divided and combined to the same persons. His colleagues were persons with
whom he sought at times to appear in harmony, yet in others to distinguish himself from, in particular,
when he sought to appear without responsibility for a mislaid request or misjudged response. Robert was
in a situation where he might (although not always) decide in which form he might appear—as expressing
private interests and thoughts, or appearing in unison with others. His private or public form was itself
relational, appearing private or public in relation to those around him. As such he was not always able to
govern his own appearance and prevent his own shifting form as information revealed him in a new light
or context.
The applicant who requested information from NHS Glendale (that it did not appear to hold)
similarly seemed to have interests that were both shared and divided. She sought information concerning
the complaints other individuals had made about the clinic at which she had her breast scanned. She
considered that complainants who had had similar experiences to her might also share common concerns
and interests. Yet the information she requested was also thought to highlight the divisions between her
and other complainants, their personal circumstances, divided interests and particular motivations. So this
applicant had the potential to be at once united and divided from other complainants, as they might be
from each other. Knowledge was both that which was held in common, and that which differentiated
people from others. Both Robert’s and the applicant’s separation and unity with others might be revealed
in their shifting in form that would also inevitably shift of its own accord.
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Knowledge emerged from within a conceptual relationship and as a result of an interpersonal
relationship. The two relations—division and combination—operated together in tandem. Knowledge
that emerged as persons, items, information come into relation was knowledge that was shared
interpersonally. In other words, knowledge emerged and was passed on within a single relation and did not originate
from outwith a divided pair. Knowledge took the form of a response that originated from persons in relation
and with particular form that had the potential to be reversed and replicated. In their relation with others,
Robert and the NHS Glendale applicant appeared part of a divided pair, such that they could see
themselves in another form reflected back at them in others. Both knowledge and persons appeared part of
a dual pair, each reflective of the other in a different and complementary form. Knowledge no more
subjugated persons as enabled their own divided form to momentarily appear and be displaced by form
that seemed previously concealed.
Considered in this light, power conceived as that which flows between entities in an ongoing
chain, from person to person, thing to thing, via documents and statements, simply loses its way. Power
no longer flows along a single chain, and seems to dissipate. Knowledge also no longer comes from a
single, insular entity. That is, knowledge does not come from and in the guise of a single individuated
person who through their shared knowledge is combined with and has power, in light of which others
appear as subjects and subjugated.
The division between public and private reiterates the contemporary division between individuals
and society. Individuals are thus part of and within society as they might also impose themselves on it. At
the same time, society shapes or has influence on individuals themselves. Individuals and society also
appear in relation, one that has the potential to appear inverted or reversed. Thus society appears as
individuals and individuals as society, in a manner that confuses quite who or what shapes whom. Society
and individuals are the form that persons take in relation, and the relationship between them indicative of
people’s changing form.
But it is a relationship that also suggests that society might emerge from within individuals
themselves, as these persons in a different form. So in addition to individuals as potentially external and
internal to it, it is possible to think of society as emerging from within persons as revealed through their
changing (and multiple) form. But what exactly constitutes society and individuals as they emerge in
relation is determined by the relation itself. Both and neither form might in the end constitute society, or
even appear as society itself in different forms. As society is enacted in persons as they enter into multiple
conceptual (division) and interpersonal (combination) relations, so persons could also be said to contain
society rather than be contained by it. Society emerges with each new form, and with each new relation,
division and combination. It is in these moves that people perhaps come to realise that which they each
contain, and of which they are already (but unknowingly) constituted. Each move, then, each new
thought, can be considered as either (inter-subjectively) imposed from one person to the next, or as
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emerging and shared as the outcome of a relation. It is in this small difference that power itself appears
(knowledge as externally imposed) and disappears (knowledge as externally realised).
The Power of Division and Combination
Power slips and slides; people no sooner have power than it is lost, and in the hands of others, it seems.
As persons, entities, information come into relation, new knowledge emerges as a consequence of this
relation, and individuals who elicit knowledge in others momentarily appear without knowledge, power
and agency. Divisions in knowledge appear to point to divisions between people, their divided form, and
the hierarchical relationship between them—there are those with knowledge and those who lack it.
Hierarchy appears an intrinsic part of people’s relations with others. From moment to moment, those
who are combined might appear divided in a manner that reveals them as having knowledge that others
do not and as having power over others from whom they divide themselves.
So power seems something that persons might have, but also something that they quickly lose,
belongs to a higher order and appears attached to different people. It is something that slips away and out
of people’s grasp as quickly as they are able to claim it. It was through becoming known within the
council as FOI experts that Robert and Iain seemed to raise their profiles, and became individuals who
other employees might look to for important knowledge. This knowledge was crucial in light of the
power of the SIC to enforce FOI, take an authority to court, and publicly ‘name and shame’ individuals
and authorities. In fact, it was because of the decision notice that SIC had issued to Bankside Council
explaining that it had not dealt with an FOI request in an appropriate manner that Robert, Iain and the
council momentarily appeared to lose power and agency through their apparent ineptitude (or lack of
knowledge). It seemed only by differentiating themselves from work colleagues that Robert and Iain
might reclaim power and agency: to point out that it was not them but others in the council who knew
how to receive, log and disseminate FOI requests that Robert and Iain ensured that the knowledge and
thus responsibility for request handling was not theirs. It was through delegating certain tasks that neither
knowledge nor power was theirs in relation to this task, and neither was the responsibility. This was in
contrast to Samantha and Colin’s experience, at Glendale, it seemed, where knowledge and power was
something that they felt they did not have despite an applicant’s assumptions that they might.
Responsibility here was something that remained theirs. So while power and agency flowed away from
Samantha and Colin, as members of larger networks and in their relations with others with knowledge,
they carried the responsibility for handing FOI requests on behalf of NHS Glendale.
That power slips and slides, is shifting and ephemeral may come as a surprise to those who
associate power with particular establishments, institutions and strong-holds. Power is imagined to be
something fixed and permanent: located in particular bodies. It is not that power shifts here, but
particular bodies who have the power to do the shifting. But their ability to shift persons and things, to
impart change, depends on their own appearance in relation to others. New knowledge might as quickly
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dissolve power that people appear to have as enable people to dissipate the power of others. The SIC’s
own ability to secure power and agency depended not so much on the powers given to him as on his
appearance in relation. It is the relations between persons and things that have the capacity to manipulate
appearances, form, knowledge, power and agency – and in this sense it is the relation itself that is the only
thing that remains stable. So it is as divisions and combinations are drawn between things, persons,
authorities, institutions, the relations into which they come and decisions that are made over these
relations, that power emerges and disperses; power and agency are as much a matter of how lines are
drawn as the words that are written or uttered. Power in this sense has no fixed location, no permanent
address, and in some ways could be said not to exist at all but for people’s capacities in relation.
In his role as enforcer and promoter of FOISA, the SIC has the power to investigate an
authority’s conduct if it appears it has failed to comply with the legislation by not responding to a request
for information, or not responding to the satisfaction of the requester. It is within his powers (and as part
of an investigation) to issue an authority with an Information Notice that requires it to release any
information to the SIC that he and his team requires. If the SIC considers an authority has not complied
fully with FOISA, he might also issue an Enforcement Notice stipulating what an authority must do to
comply with FOISA and how long they have to do this. The SIC also has the power of entry and
inspection if he considers that an authority continues to withhold information from him and his staff. On
obtaining a warrant, he is entitled to ‘enter and search premises, inspect and seize any documents which
may constitute evidence and, inspect, examine, operate and test any equipment in which information may
be recorded’35. It seems an extremely intrusive procedure—to prise out information, as if itself a bodily
substance that others seek to retain and one person’s physical, personal and bodily intrusion of another.
And yet it is those members of the public without information against whom the injury is perceived to be
done.
Most powerful of all, given to him by law, was the SIC’s ability to point the finger of blame.
Authorities, and more particularly the individuals that they employ, seemed to be acutely aware of the
divisions that might be drawn between them and how in being differentiated they also were made to
appear as if they were themselves incapacitated and lacked power and agency. It was in his capacity to
differentiate one authority or person from another where the SIC’s real power lay. Bankside Council was
among the many Scottish Public Authorities to which the SIC served decision notices, and it was in this
very act that an authority suddenly lacked power and agency as did those who acted for or on its behalf.
It seemed for this reason that Robert and Iain sought to quickly point the finger of blame at others and
avoid the SIC’s own gaze. So while a person or authority’s power and agency depended on their relations
with others, it seemed in the SIC’s power to decide how the lines uniting and dividing bodies would be
drawn, which of course depended on his own capacity to do so—his own appearance in relation. It was
35 Enforcing Freedom of Information: The Scottish Information Commissioner’s Powers’ (Booklet produced by
Scottish Information Commissioner’s Office in 2005)
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perhaps for this reason that in his second four year term as Commissioner, the SIC decided to publish
league tables stipulating which authorities were best and which were worst at complying with the Act.
Since his real power lay in his ability to determine the power of others through publicly highlighting their
division and combination, highlighting authorities’ divided and combined form was a way of getting them
to organize themselves.
Conclusion
Two forms of power (and two forms of agency) have been highlighted in this chapter, clearly emergent in
the field of FOI that on the one hand provided practitioners with an explanation for why individuals and
authorities held onto information longer than they should, and on the other, scholars with an explanation
as to why information might be disclosed. I hope to have challenged both a concept of power that relies
on the axiomatic relationship between knowledge and power, and one developed in relation to this by the
philosopher Michel Foucault resting on the notion that power runs through everything via the connections
between them. And to have pointed to and critiqued the notions that underpin them.
Power seemed a consequence of people’s demand for or need of knowledge, without which they
might neither know nor act in the world in which they and others lived (have power or agency). It was
therefore something that they gave to others as much because knowledge that was shared seemed
knowledge that was true as there appeared only one way of knowing. It was consequently as a result of
people’s search for power and agency for themselves (that they lacked) that others also acquired it. While
this is so, others might argue that it is through the dissemination of knowledge that power flows; it is a
consequence of the assumption that people consider themselves as acquiring the truth. Yet
interconnected statements, persons, bodies point to what is true; that power flows but remains
undisclosed. This constitutes one reading of Foucault’s power analytics that nevertheless points to where
implicit power might be thought of as lying.
But power here is also the consequence of particular assumptions about what constitutes a
relation. The relationships through which power flows seem considered as those that link people, bodies,
information together in a chain. Yet there is no account of from where knowledge originates, and to
where or from where it flows. Knowledge just appears out of and goes to nowhere, but in the interim
appears as a subjugating and powerful force. It is through reconceiving of the relation that it is also
possible to challenge this particular perception of power. Rather than solely intersubjective, Strathern
(2005) posits a relation in which conceptual and intersubjective relations work together. It is in appearing
as at once divided and combined, and the way in which persons work these two relations in tandem, that
makes knowledge appear as something that emerges and is exchanged within a single relation. Thus
power that flows linking persons, statements, entities together dissipates: it has nowhere to go, no links to
flow through. Knowledge does not appear to emerge from a single entity, but rather is the product of a
particular relationship. It thus does not come from a single person who might be seen as having power
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over others. Instead, it seems returned to the recipient or consumer as something they helped to produce.
Knowledge is in this sense reflected back at them, individuals seeing versions of themselves in others and
a form they might have concealed within. A division between persons, in this sense, reflects a division
within a particular person, and in taking on new knowledge that emerges out of a relationship, people shift





Transparency and trust were two core notions that underpinned FOISA. Indeed, FOISA was enacted in
2005, after two enquires, the Hutton Inquiry (2003-2004) into the suspected suicide of the government
weapons expert Dr. Kelly, and Butler Inquiry (2004) into the reliability of the intelligence used to justify
the war against Iraq, had involved unprecedented levels of public access to information. They illuminated
the public’s need for information, and perhaps the extent of public mistrust, and pointed to a new era of
government transparency. In light of a feeling of public mistrust in government more generally, in part
engendered by New Labour spin, providing the public with a right of access to information held by public
authorities and different levels of government was a means of ensuring its transparency and
accountability—that is, the public would then know what actions government is taking and could hold it
to account for these actions. This, it was hoped, would mean that the public could begin to trust these
bodies.
In this chapter, I draw on the work of scholars in the field of law, political science, and also
philosophy as well as social anthropology writing on government transparency often in relation to, but not
always, FOI law around the world. In particular, I draw on the work of the recently published book
Transparency: Key to Better Governance? (Hood and Heald 2006), in which key scholars and protagonists in
the field of government transparency write about the perceived benefits, disbenefits and likely outcomes
of transparency and FOI law. I also draw on the work of the philosopher Onora O’Neill (2002) writing
on trust and transparency, and that of Anthony Giddens (1991) on trust and modernity. O’Neill (2002)
argues that while effort towards and theories of transparency tend to focus on the dissemination of
information, more information does not always lead to greater transparency. Rather ‘Reasonably placed
trust requires not only information about the proposals or undertakings that others put forward, but also
information about those who put them forward’ (2002).
Drawing on two case-studies, one concerning the FOISA meetings and conferences that grew up
around the enactment of FOISA and the (transparent or otherwise) relation between the Scottish
Information Commissioner’s Office (OSIC) and McBride Ferries, I approach transparency heuristically
and newly explore what it is and what it does in light of these cases. As practitioners liaise with others at
FOI meetings in meetings, and in their attempts to comply with FOISA, they make the divisions between
them disappear by coming into the same knowledge. In replicating each other’s form, people make
themselves transparent, or disappear. As they do so—appear similar or different in different moments—
their ‘transparency’ throws into question a theory of transparency predicated on the notion that people are
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different because they conceal information. The point is that transparency in one form—that is,
transparent persons—is a means through which to think about another form of transparency—
transparency as revelation. In the following section I touch on some of the literature concerning
transparency.
Making Things Explicit
Public sector transparency largely underpins FOI legislation in Scotland and elsewhere, the aim being to
increase public trust in government and scrutiny of government-related processes. A transparent public
sector appears to place demands on other domains to be transparent also, in particular the private and
voluntary sector, and as FOI legislation matures there is the propensity for it to extend beyond its own
realm – as differences are resolved, new gaps appear to open up elsewhere.
Secrecy and transparency work in antithesis: they are different sides of the same
revealed/concealed axiom. While transparency reveals what secrecy appears to conceal, secrecy conceals
what transparency has the potential to reveal. Each provides work for the other. Both come in a variety
of forms, although might also be theorized on a grander scale: as Tony Crook (2006) notes with regard to
secrecy (worth reiterating here): unlike kinship as a universal category of analysis that ‘operates as a general
description through particular varieties, secrecy seems to collapse both into one’—making it open to
comparison and analysis on a larger scale. Transparency is above all about making things, processes, and
persons explicit. It is also about being able to challenge the modus operandi: two heads are better than one -
government and citizens together might come up with a better, more democratic, solution to issues of
policy, governance and ethics. The term transparency often crops up in UK, European and International
policy documents, can be frequently read in newspapers and on advertising billboards, and was (more
recently) used in relation to New Labour funding. Transparent government first formally appeared in the
United States in the form of the 1946 US Administrative Procedures Act that provided ‘a rough guarantee
of access to information’ (Roberts 2006: 13), and most appropriately in the form of 1976 US Government
in the Sunshine Act that required every portion of every meeting of every government agency headed by a
collegial board to be open to public observation (Hood 2007a: 10). The concept has since been adopted
by governments as well as non-governmental organizations around the world, on occasions the private
and voluntary sector, and is embodied in the not for profit organization ‘Transparency International’. It
was Jeremy Bentham who is considered to have first advocated government-related transparency in the
form of his Panopticon, or Inspection House36 (e.g. Hood and Heald 2006). As Bentham states, ‘My
prison is transparent: my management, no less so’ ([Bentham] Taylor Milne 1981: 229). Some consider
transparency an aspect of devolved government (Florini 1998), where citizens armed with information
might regulate institutions, organizations and persons in place of Government, reflecting the way in which
36 The building allowed light from external windows to render inmates obvious while an internally partitioned watch-
tower kept the warden out of sight.
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audit and decision-making are also increasingly devolved (see chapter two). Audit is often no longer the
responsibility of external auditors but has become an in-house function (Strathen 2000), and the
responsibility of civil servants and, through them, the public at large. Similarly, decision-making
concerning, for example, which matters are of public interest (in terms of FOI), previously the
responsibility of Ministers and high-ranking officials, becomes the responsibility of individual, and more
junior, civil servants, again subject to challenge by the public.
Visibility, scrutiny and challenge were characteristics of the Age of Enlightenment of the
seventeenth and eighteenth century that continues to have significant influence throughout the world
today. It was particularly important in the formation of a united Britain (Manning 2002). Enlightenment
thinkers emphasised vision and visibility, knowledge through seeing, and it was in shedding light on
persons and things that persons could also know and challenge the truth. It is perhaps due to this that
transparency is considered a metaphor for light. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of the word
‘transparent’ is: ‘[h]aving the property of transmitting light, so as to render bodies lying beyond completely
visible; that can be seen through; diaphanous’. In other words, transparency means to be seen as well as
to be seen through and in effect to render something or someone visible by allowing light to fall on things
such that obstacles and obstructions (to light) have the quality of translucency. Transparency did not
entirely emerge out of Enlightenment thought, however. Persons were rendered visible in the Light of
God, their souls open to scrutiny and surveillance by the one true seer, God, prior to the Enlightenment.
Human vision was subordinate to that of God whose gaze was all-seeing. Religion, and here one might
cite a number of examples from numerous religions, was and is in many ways ocularcentric, that is, is
often sight, light and vision orientated (Jay 1994). While we owe much to Enlightenment thought for its
use and proliferation, it seems it was Plato who most probably originated the concept of transparency
(even if he did not attach it to this exact word) (Jay 1994).
There are those, however, who deride visibility and vision altogether: Michel Foucault states,
‘visibility is a trap’ (Foucault 1975: 200), and argues that (modern) vision is hegemonic (Levin 1997; Reed
1999) – that is, it encapsulates and extends modern ways of knowing, in which power is implicit and must
be made explicit. Foucault uses vision to undermine (modern) vision, and turns to the prison which he
states exemplifies a historical shift: the principle of the dungeon, where darkness affords inmates
protection, was later replaced with an architectural form where inmates were illuminated and might be
overseen by a warden in a central watchtower. There was, Foucault argues, a historical break between
what Reed (1999) terms ‘classical’ and modern forms of vision. Classical architecture, Reed argues, threw
light on the Sovereign and directed gazes in a single direction, while new, modern structures, of which
Foucault considers Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, or ‘Inspection House’ an example, aimed to illuminate
everyone (Reed 1999). Modern vision is hegemonic, Foucault argues, although it is not Foucault’s critique
that I adopt in this chapter.
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While the ideal of a transparent world, thought possible through the circulation of knowledge
(Vattimo 1992), is a utopia to which many aspire, others argue that it is perhaps the word transparency
that has seen more recent popularity, rather than the concept itself (Hood 2006b). In other words, the
word ‘transparency’ has been ‘will-o’-the-wisp’ picked up and used, passes in and out of fashion, taken up
by different policy makers in a seemingly empty fashion because it is used elsewhere. However, in as
much as words carry meaning, that is, they are used in a specific sense, in the same way that a concept is
often encapsulated in a particular word, the adoption of the term (however flippant) seems only to flag up
a certain taken-for-granted possibility, that what is invisible might be made visible.
Despite its clear meaning and what it obviously entails in theory – to whom, what and how are
persons and things to be made ‘transparent’? In practice, transparency might have any number of
meanings and comes in a variety of forms. It is perhaps for this reason that in conducting research on
transparency in government, scholars tend to first establish what transparency means according to
legislation, policy documents, and decision-makers, prior to conducting their research (Glover and Holsen
2007). Whether an authority is ‘transparent’ will, then, depend on the way in which transparency is
defined, and persons, government or organizations might find that they are non-transparent in light of
requirements for them to behave in a certain fashion in order to appear ‘transparent’.
However, increased transparency, increased access to information, does not necessarily lead to
increased trust, argues O’Neill (2002), rather to confusion and misinformation. It is O’Neill’s discussion
of trust in relation to transparency to which I particularly turn in this chapter. Trust has been widely
discussed amongst sociologists, philosophers, archivists and historians (see Giddens 1990, O’Neill 2002,).
Of particular note is Giddens (1990) outlook on trust as ‘‘a device for coping with the freedom of others’’
(Giddens 1990: 33). In this case, trust appears a response to others’ freedoms and in some ways a way of
curtailing them. Trust is ‘confidence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person or thing, or
the truth of a statement’, Giddens continues (30), and appears above all governed by the circulation of
information, rather than, for example, power. But does trust between persons operate differently from
trust in government? Is trust different in different social situations and between different people? These
are questions that appear to have been little addressed by scholars, on which the following cases might
shed some light.
In Scotland, in relation to FOISA, transparency appeared to be used interchangeably with
‘openness’, Ministers, decision-makers and commentators appeared not to discriminate between the two.
Others, however, do so, and while openness is thought quite literally to refer to the disclosure of
information, transparency is considered to refer to the way in which its meaning and significance might be
clarified for those who receive it (Birkinshaw 2005).
Much of the above description, the forms of transparency that I describe, might be covered in the
case-studies below. However, I above all seek to highlight transparency of a kind not described above,
one that obviates the very basis on which other forms of transparency appear to operate. In other words,
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I use transparency to foreground transparency, in the same way that I use the above description to
foreground certain aspects of, or frame, the two cases that follow, and Foucault uses vision to foreground
(or undermine) vision (Foucault 1975). I turn first to Malcolm, Records Manager for McBride ferries,
who handled all of McBride’s FOI requests and had some initial difficulties with FOISA. I also once
again turn to the larger FOI meetings and conferences in which practitioners, decision-makers and
stakeholders attempt to make themselves transparent to each other, through speeches, in conversations
over lunch, electronic voting systems, repeating themselves and replicating others.
Malcolm and McBride Ferries
Malcolm had shiny black hair and a weathered, red face. He was in his mid to late thirties, and spoke in
short, abrupt sentences, that slowly unravelled, lingered and lengthened the longer one spent in his
company. His wife had, only a few weeks before, had her first baby, and photos of his new son were
pinned on short, soft partitions that separated his desk from others and fashioned the open plan office
space that he shared with colleagues. I had met his wife some weeks before, while working with archivists
at the University of Strathmore where she worked. She was at that point fully pregnant, and so it was
good to hear the happy news.
Malcolm worked in Gilmore, a small town thirty miles to the west of Strathmore, and there were
frequent trains between the two. The ferry terminal in which he worked looked out onto the heavy
McBride ships that sat in the ferry port, and employees worked to the sounds of a rippling sea, chugging
ships and seagulls. Malcolm had not been working for McBride ferries for long: when a flood of ads for
records managers hit the press the year before FOI legislation came into force, he took up a post as
records manager with McBride. He had perhaps been recruited a little late. He appeared to be eternally
catching up, writing policy, organizing records, putting procedures in place to deal with FOI. On top of
this, McBride ferries was in some ways a test case: it was covered by the new Act since the majority of its
funding came from the Scottish Government, but many of its private competitors were not, which put
McBride in a difficult situation. While its competitors had access to much of its own company
information, McBride did not have access to its competitors’. There were rumours that the company had
only realised that it was covered by the legislation late in 2004, the year before FOISA came into force,
perhaps accounting for Malcolm’s late recruitment and for McBride’s apparent disorganization. This late
realisation, accompanied by its competitors frequent use of the Act to obtain information that it held,
such as accounts and company information, appeared to leave McBride employees deflated and meant
that the relationship between McBride and the SIC was often strained. McBride was a new and, it
seemed, exceptional case, and the SIC often took some time to reach a conclusion on matters concerning
them, while Malcolm champed at the bit. There were times when Malcolm was sure that McBride could
justifiably withhold information on the grounds of ‘commercial interests’, an exemption that in the SIC’s
opinion was used too frequently by authorities seeking to withhold information. The SIC’s apparent
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inflexibility on the matter appeared only to anger Malcolm, responsible for disclosing information that
could potentially put his colleagues and himself out of job if a competitor successfully undermined
McBride’s bid to continue running the Highlands and Islands ferry routes. While the SIC considered it in
the public interest for information to go out, Malcolm considered it in the public interest for McBride to
continue running its routes and not be replaced: a new private company would bring with it its own
employees, could leave in a few years to the detriment of the local economy and infrastructure, and
besides, McBride was trusted and liked by many islanders, they would see McBride’s demise as a great
loss, Malcolm remarked.
I visited Malcolm in late 2005, when the Act had been in force for almost a year. He greeted me
at the ferry terminal reception desk, and offered me a wrapped sweet from the reception desk counter.
We climbed the narrow stairs to the first floor as I chewed on the sweet, and Malcolm told me about his
new son, whom he had called John. ‘Would you like a cup of coffee?’, he asked, as we reached the top.
‘Yes please’, and so we stopped off in the small kitchen on our way back to his desk. Someone had
neglectfully split some milk, or perhaps a large milk carton had burst in the fridge, and grumbling,
Malcolm slowly mopped up the mess that had been left. On the first floor, Malcolm’s desk formed part
of a square huddle in which he sat with colleagues and from which he looked onto a line of glass offices
where employees of higher rank—including the Company Secretary—sat. Malcolm’s desk was in the
shape of a V, on which his printer and PC were propped and, when he was not sitting at it, underneath
which he neatly tucked his swivelling chair. ‘We’ll speak to the Company Secretary in about half an hour.
I’ve arranged for you to see him’, Malcolm explained, as we sat at his desk and he began taking me
through McBride’s recent experiences. He pointed to newspaper clippings that were pinned to the
partition beside him, looked up policy documents on his computer that he printed out for me to read, and
browsed the internet in search of Ministerial speeches and the SIC’s latest decision. McBride ferries had
been in the newspapers on several occasions since FOISA had come into force: journalists took an
interest in the high volume of requests that McBride had received in the first few weeks of 2005 from rival
ferry companies and solicitors. It was widely known that McBride ferries had received 722 separate
requests from the same solicitor on behalf of a client on the day that FOISA had come into force. It
seemed that some people were aching to use the Act! These, Malcolm had not received until it was too
late, after the twenty day deadline had expired, and so not only had McBride ferries unintentionally not
complied with the Act but had also not seen the applicant’s request for a review waiting in its FOI inbox.
Malcolm and McBride ferries had a tricky relationship with the SIC and his staff. The SIC had let
McBride ferries off relatively lightly regarding the 722 request that it had apparently ignored; the SIC
commented that it had been a careless mistake for Malcolm to set up an FOI inbox that he then did not
check, which was regarded as a ‘technical breach’. However, he upheld McBride’s complaint that the
requests were ‘vexatious’, aimed at disrupting ‘business as usual’: FOI practitioners appeared keen to
discourage users from seeing the legislation as a way of ‘tying up’ key members of staff, preventing a
140
company from doing business. In other ways, however, McBride felt hard done by. The company was
bound to providing competitors with information, in a way that made information appear more like life-
blood, a substance the more of which they released, the more likely they were to truncate their own
operation. The SIC afforded them little protection in a battle that appeared to them inherently unfair.
Despite their attempts to justify the use of exemptions such as ‘commercial interests’, ‘confidentiality’ or
‘personal information’ in order to retain information, these avenues were rarely upheld by the SIC.
Malcolm complained the SIC and his staff tended to take the opinion of the applicant over that of the
company, often despite the company’s own attempts to be helpful and assist both an applicant and the
SIC, which were invariably ignored and never formally acknowledged in the SIC’s written decisions,
explained Malcolm. Malcolm commented on two cases in particular where McBride had refused to
provide an applicant with information, who had as a result taken their case to the SIC. These had yet to
be resolved at the time of our meeting, but might shed some light on the issues that appeared to most
concern Malcolm, as well as transparency and trust.
The first concerned a request for copies of vessel log sheets covering a twelve month period, for
a specified route37. Malcolm decided to refuse the request on the grounds that it would cost too much to
retrieve the information required (it would exceed FOISA’s six hundred pound upper cost limit). The
applicant appealed to the SIC. In his decision, the SIC stated:
‘The relevant log sheets are contained in ‘deck log books’. The deck log book contains a
number of two-sided sheets, one of which (both sides) must be filled out on each day that a
vessel sails. The sheet records the time of each sailing, passenger and crew numbers and
various other pieces of information about the day’s sailings. As a number of [McBride]
vessels operate on the… route, the log sheets requested by [the applicant] would be
contained in a number of log books, which are stored on the vessels themselves’
Malcolm had argued that the cost of retrieving the books from each vessel would exceed the
upper cost limit. However, the SIC responded that if the request was broken down into twelve separate
requests, the cost of responding to each individual request would not exceed the upper cost limit and all
twelve questions might be answered. After he had put the same request in as twelve separate requests,
Malcolm still refused to supply the information. He stuck to his original decision. Malcolm offered his
version of the case:
‘[When we refused to provide the information] …the [applicant] went to the Commissioner
and complained about it and the next week we got another request in for twelve separate
months. And to my mind, that was effectively the same request irrespective of whether it
37 SIC decision number 027/2006: www.itspublicknowledge.info.
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came in on twelve different pieces of paper... I mean the cost would have been effectively
the same, so my advice was to turn it down again…’
The SIC consequently appointed one of his officers to investigate the case. During the
investigation, it emerged that the applicant had in fact wanted the crew and passenger numbers. Malcolm
continued:
‘We can get the crew numbers from a different source […and] don’t have to go through the
expense and hassle of going on board the vessel and comparing all the logs to search out the
information… The [crew] phone in when the vessel leaves the port… and give us the
passenger numbers and the crew numbers…’
On suggesting to the SIC that he could retrieve the information from a different source,
Malcolm’s offer was declined. As far as Malcolm was concerned, the problem was one that was easily
resolved, without going through the difficulty and expense of retrieving the log books. After conducting
an investigation into the efforts made by McBride to locate the information and to ensure they held the
requested log books, the SIC issued his decision. But there was no mention of McBride’s offer to provide
the information from an alternative source, Malcolm explained. This only appeared to frustrate Malcolm,
who concluded that the SIC must be ‘suspicious’ of McBride. The SIC’s investigating officer kept on
asking ‘the same questions’ throughout the investigation, Malcolm continued. But as he explained,
‘…we’ve explained that we aggregate… information by topic and not by route… [and she] knows this’. It
appeared no amount of asking would change the answer Malcolm gave. It was as if the investigating
officer had her own method of organizing information in mind, one that she simply assumed McBride
might have considered and that the company might actually arrange information in this manner. Yet
McBride ferries did not, and so, Malcolm explained, the officer recommended that the company change
its systems so that information might be (more easily) retrieved, although Malcolm insisted that it was not
possible.
It is possible to consider the frustration on both sides, McBride’s frustration at not being heard,
and the SIC’s (and his investigating officers’) frustration at McBride’s, or Malcolm’s, apparent non-
compliance. There were certainly things that McBride, it appeared, could do to make its organizational
process more transparent, information easier to retrieve, and to comply with the Act. At the same time,
part of its apparent disorganisation, lack of transparency, and non-compliance was a consequence of two
modes of thinking, two approaches or perspectives. While McBride appeared suspicious, as if
withholding information, they were at the same time not heard. There was one of way of doing things, it
appeared, which the public largely determined. As guardian and enforcer of the public’s right to
information, the SIC could not take the word of a publicly owned company over that of an applicant, and
as a result did not appear to ‘hear’ what McBride told him. McBride, in essence, was seen neither as
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trustworthy, nor trusted – as perhaps Malcolm rightly concluded. If the SIC was to listen to McBride,
instead of an applicant, the public might loose faith, and, with it, the belief that the SIC shared the
public’s objectives and concerns. This appeared to confuse Malcolm who considered that McBride really
did act in the public interest: they had assisted both the SIC and applicants, and also considered McBride’s
replacement ultimately of detriment to the public. To listen to and trust McBride might be to act in the
public interest as far as Malcolm was concerned. The public in this sense might be considered to
constitute different groups, each with a different interest in a particular issue.
When the decision concerning the vessel log sheets was eventually released, Malcolm meticulously
went through it ‘…to see if there’s anything I can find, that they’ve not put in… stuff that’s missing’. It
appeared that recent experiences with the SIC and his staff made Malcolm mistrustful. It seemed the
SIC’s lack of trust in McBride was a consequence of their different objectives, that McBride would
inevitably approach the same issues from a different angle. Meanwhile, Malcolm checked the SIC’s
decision in case McBride had been misrepresented: information that McBride deemed important might be
unconsidered, left out.
While he and I continued talking, Malcolm searched around for another document, this time the
written version of a speech that Margaret Curran, then Minister for Parliamentary Business, had given at
an FOI conference. Malcolm had gleefully listened to the speech at the conference as Margaret Curran
had explained, ‘…it’s important that public authorities have the right to make decisions and the right to
govern themselves… I’m trying to find it now’, Malcolm said, scrabbling around his desk, flicking through
documents on his computer screen and leafing through desk draws. Soon after the conference, Malcolm
had asked for a written copy of the speech in which he considered Margaret Curran to contradict the SIC
over whether or not an authority had ‘commercial interests’. It was of course in McBride’s interests to
find out: they had attempted to use the commercial interest exemption to protect their own interests,
withhold information from competitors who sought to run the Highland and Islands ferry routes, an
argument that the SIC had so far not upheld. On receiving a copy of the speech, Malcolm realized that
parts of Margaret Curran’s speech had been changed; most disappointingly for Malcolm, the bit about
‘commercial interests’ had changed and now concerned ‘common interests’. She ‘…had changed
‘commercial interests’ to ‘common interest’… look, here’s the e-mail I sent [asking] about it, and the reply
saying that it was not a verbatim speech’. So, it appeared her speech had been slightly amended: in the
written version she appeared to no longer contradict the SIC.
The contradiction was an important one for practitioners who often saw gaps, discrepancies in
what others said, as opportunities in which to offer their own input. While Margaret’s Curran’s speech
pointed to information that the SIC potentially concealed, the changes that she made only highlighted
facts that she appeared to conceal also. It was the SIC’s and Minister’s apparent difference that pointed to
the fact that one or the other concealed information. In other words, both the SIC and Margaret Curran
appeared non-transparent, and to withhold vital information that was of use to those, such as McBride,
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that sought to prevent their own replacement. But while a gap had emerged, it soon closed and the
opportunity for resistance and rebellion dissipated.
Although as far as Malcolm was concerned, there were still often inconsistencies in what the SIC
and his staff said: ‘…one of them says one thing, and directly contradicts themselves at the next meeting
without any indication that there has been a change of approach’, he exclaimed. The only reason for their
difference, he concluded, was that the Office of the SIC (‘OSIC’) had perhaps decided to approach the
same issue from a different angle, the lag-time between meetings explaining the differences in what
different individuals said. There was a sense in which the SIC and his staff were considered
undifferentiated, their difference coming as a surprise and explained in terms of OSIC’s change of
approach. Such changes appeared to leave Malcolm and his colleagues unsure of where they stood, never
able to quite trust the OSIC. And while it was possible for a practitioner to read the SIC’s latest decision
to establish his current thinking, it was also tempting for a practitioner not to take up his perspective on a
particular matter in light of his apparent inconsistency and mistrust of them. ‘Why are they stuck in St
Andrews anyway… I mean, why there?’, Malcolm continued. It was not a question that the SIC had not
been asked before, although according to him, St Andrews was as good a place for him and his staff to be
as any. But for Malcolm, it was too far away:
‘They should be in one of the major cities, not stuck out in St Andrews where no one can get
to. Their staff must also be spending a lot of public money going to and from each place…’
The distance appeared to mean that practitioners felt more out of touch, had less frequent contact
with the SIC and his staff, which left them more uneasy and unsure. It was as if the distance meant more
time passed between each meeting, and that there would be more change in the SIC’s thinking, explained
by Malcolm in terms of change of approach.
Coffee, meetings and conferences
While Malcolm argued that he was left unsure of OSIC’s approach, frequent FOISA conferences and
meetings in the first two years in which FOISA was in force provided practitioners with the opportunity
to meet and speak with decision-makers and also for the SIC and other stakeholder groups to make their
voices heard. These meetings and conferences were a way in which practitioners might keep on top of
recent proceedings, the thoughts and approach of the SIC and in touch with each other. Networking, it
appeared, formed a key part of FOI in Scotland, a way in which practitioners might know of and meet
their evolving obligations under the Act.
Conferences and meetings were held all over Scotland, in well-known exhibition halls with high
ceilings, bright lights and modern architecture, or in large chain hotel conference suites with colourful
carpets and sleek décor, old and ornate chambers with spiral stairs and gilded banisters, or large, creaking
auditoriums. Delegates spent much of their time with their eyes raised to the ceiling, admiring the
144
architecture, as well as chatting to old friends and colleagues about the latest FOI statistics, or request.
Practitioners shared stories and advice, readily passing examples and information on. They at the same
time were present to learn from the SIC as well as other practitioners. From the start to the close of the
meeting knowledge was circulated, offered and received in a social relationship that pointed to
‘knowledge’ as dependent on this relationship.
While often held all over Scotland, most conferences and meetings took place in the city of
Glendale, for this was the easiest place it seemed for delegates to get to. They could last all day or a good
part of the day, many held on an annual basis. Those who attended smaller meetings might bump into the
same practitioners at larger conferences, or make new acquaintances. Smaller half-day meetings took
place once every four to six months, and those who attended might take the opportunity to speak with the
SIC or the Head of the Scottish Government FOI Unit over a sandwich lunch, hang around for a brief
chat with other practitioners, or arrange a private meeting with the SIC at his office in St Andrews.
The SIC was a forceful and passionate speaker. He was a modest man, smartly dressed, good-
looking with short dark hair and tanned complexion. Those attending larger meetings were often
impressed by his oration skills. And as he took to the stage, he often visibly trembled with excitement,
anticipation and adrenaline. It was clear that he had a message to deliver, to a captive audience - people
able to make a difference by promoting FOI within their authority. It was crucial that he made his
meaning and thinking completely clear, that access to information was a right and not a privilege –
something that some civil servants, it seemed, had yet to realise. In many ways, he had an audience who
were keen to listen. While the SIC sought to make himself absolutely clear, those with new
responsibilities to retrieve and disclose information on behalf of their authority also had new
responsibilities to make decisions over public and private (should information go out or be retained? -
what was in the public interest?) that might have otherwise been made by central Government. If they
were sometimes unsure as to what or how to decide, the SIC might provide vital clues. It was on this
basis that individuals often attended conferences and meetings, to obtain guidance. So, while the SIC
aimed to make himself transparent, practitioners it seemed required him to be so.
Transparency, it appeared, was in this sense about devolved decision-making, individual
practitioners were in a position to make decisions over matters that might have been for Government to
decide yet continued to seek guidance from the top in order to make these decisions. It seemed that while
decision-making was devolved, individuals were not at liberty to decide for themselves how to govern;
rather they took on others’ thinking – that of, for example, decision-makers, Government representatives
and the SIC. In other words, it appeared Government itself was in some ways devolved, individuals
making decisions on behalf of others’ whose thinking they carefully replicated. The SIC was an
independent arbitrator, appointed by the Scottish Parliament, and in this sense was in a position to
regulate rather than act as a conduit for the Scottish Government. It was not even Government, then,
whose guidance individuals followed at annual conferences, rather that of the SIC, whose own thoughts
145
and opinions appeared an outcome of his involvement with a network of persons that in some ways
emerged out of conferences and meetings such as these.
Delegates and speakers often wore suits to FOISA events, forming a swarm of black and grey as
people moved to and fro, between conference room and dining hall, dining hall and cloakroom, clutching
conference packs handed to them on their arrival and their name badges clearly displayed. Delegates after
catching an early-morning train, arriving at an all-day conference in time for a modest breakfast of mini
patisserie and a cup of tea or coffee, might take the chance to speak with the SIC’s staff as they put up
their conference stand and lay out brochures, leaflets and pens for the event. Those arriving a little later,
might see the SIC dash through the auditorium foyer before making his way to the conference platform.
Lunchtime and coffee breaks provided an opportunity for delegates to speak to friends, colleagues, the
SIC and his staff, journalists, members of the private and voluntary sector and of the Campaign for
Freedom of Information in Scotland. There were sometimes as many as two hundred practitioners in one
room, forming a neat queue for food and talking. Nancy, Records Manager for the University of
Gordonbridge, and Craig, one of the Records Managers for the University of Dale regularly attended
annual conferences, along with colleagues from the Higher Education sector. FOISA conferences seemed
an opportunity for Nancy to gently catch up with colleagues, compare notes and liaise with individuals
from other sectors in the lunch or coffee breaks. People would move from person to person, joining and
leaving conversations that they might later resume. Craig, on the other hand, was more vocal and would
frequently voice his opinion as a member of the audience when it came to question time at the end of a
conference panel session. He might also have a word with the SIC when he could.
So, delegates did not only attend conferences to listen to the SIC or other conference speakers,
but also to catch up with each other. It was an opportunity for them to discuss in a sociable setting,
difficult requests, their authority’s policy or approach, and the outcome of a previous meeting.
Information circulated quickly, as practitioners learnt from other practitioners, constructing the truth
between them, individuals filling in the gaps that appeared in others’ and their own knowledge. Not only
did individuals appear to readily make themselves transparent but there was unquestioning trust –
information travelled between groups and persons and as information travelled there was no sense that a
gap in knowledge pointed to secrecy and dishonesty because knowledge itself appeared truncated from
social networks. That is, delegates did not leap to conclusions about each other – that they concealed
information, were dishonest and secretive - that they might about an authority or civil servant under other
circumstances. While civil servants and authorities might be considered secretive, delegates did not appear
so. Trust (or lack of it) was not an issue, was neither contemplated nor in question.
Delegates and speakers were from a wide spectrum of organizations, representing a variety of
interests. The different positions on FOI and mixture of interests and professions meant that discussions
between delegates, speakers and decision-makers on and off stage were often charged and fruitful. Should
FOISA be amended or extended, was it of detriment or benefit? Conference speakers might, for example,
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include the current Minister responsible for FOI, someone from the Scottish Executive FOI Unit, a
member of the CFoIS as well as a well-known journalist and solicitors from well-known firms. Some
were better at presenting than others and used PowerPoint slides as they spoke on stage, while others
simply offered their view. As a member of the audience one could spot a presentation that had taken
time, care and effort to prepare especially for the occasion, and one that had perhaps been written for a
prior event. It was the freshness of a presentation that made some easier to engage with than others,
while someone’s ability to ad lib, to respond to the audience as they presented was particularly successful.
On the one hand, it was the immediacy of a speaker’s response that appeared to matter.
Practitioners were in some ways already aware of this: it was crucial to get the timing of a response to an
FOI request right not only because the twenty day limit would fast approach, but a delay would make
persons or organisations less transparent. In other words, a response from a person or authority did not
automatically make them transparent in a way they might imagine, rather a response often had to be
carefully timed, not appear the outcome of a particular relationship between discloser and recipient. A
languid response made those disclosing information appear relationally involved with others, colleagues
and applicants, as if their consistency, regardless of those with whom they were in relation, pointed to the
fact that they were less of a person, less like a subject—and seemed instead autonomous and identical,
which also underlined their ‘transparency’.
On the other hand, a personal response—civil servants acting in their own personal capacity not
that of the organization—also had the effect of transparency as the audience received knowledge, not
information, that was the outcome of a relationship between them and the speaker through which the
speaker established what was useful or relevant.
Practitioners did not always seek to be transparent, however. There were those who avoided the
gaze of the SIC and his staff, and on occasions other practitioners, by concealing themselves in amongst
others, often those with whom they were already familiar. They would avoid articulating their views in
front of others, particularly as members of an audience of delegates. It appeared that most practitioners,
speakers and the SIC’s staff considered that these persons were afraid of saying or doing the wrong thing,
which is why they were reluctant to reveal their thoughts. In fact, their reluctance to speak in meetings
only reflected their reticence - as civil servants responsible for enforcing FOI within their authority - when
disclosing information that their authority held. While it could be said that practitioners did not like to get
things wrong, it could be also said that people were simply reluctant to differentiate themselves from
others - it was a consequence of their differentiation that they might get things ‘wrong’ (see chapter two).
Networking, liaising with other practitioners, hearing the SIC and others speak, while at the same time not
disclosing their own thoughts was a way in which to make the differences that they perceived between
them and other delegates disappear, without these differences becoming obvious to others.
Individuals not only sought to avoid standing out from the crowd, they also sought to become
one of the crowd: the hierarchical division between persons, a consequence of their divided interests,
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setting up a relationship between individual and society, the latter from which they were excluded.
Individuals that existed in society sought also to become ‘society’. It was in this way that they would
avoid making mistakes. The point is, that through mingling, liaising, listening to others, individuals came
into new knowledge that meant they thought and acted on the same basis as others, which not only
enabled them to make decisions about FOI requests but also had the effect of making individuals
themselves disappear, see-through or transparent, and at the same time the collective, group of which they
were part and society, appear. This, then, was a different kind of transparency to that so far described, not
the outcome of people deliberately setting out to be transparent, rather the effect of persons taking the
same interest in the same things (relation) – the same form - so as to erase their differences. It was of
course, in many ways, an ideal: a soon as divisions were erased, new ones appeared. People’s divided
interests in a relation (knowledge) simply meant that they were divided and combined in different ways;
there never appeared a point where everyone considered the same knowledge or relation of utmost value.
However, the point is that such an ideal, which had the effect of making persons disappear – become
transparent - is a vehicle through which to think about other forms of transparency. A point to which I
return later. I first turn to the question of trust.
Trust and Misinformation
Trust, or lack of it, seemed partly due to the fact that persons often operated on quite different bases;
people were unlikely to trust those who did not share their values and interests, the same knowledge or
the same perspective. This appeared, at times, the case between Malcolm, McBride and the SIC. The SIC
appeared to think and act on quite different grounds to McBride, and as a consequence Malcolm
considered that the SIC had neither the interests of the public nor McBride’s own interests in mind when
dealing with an appeal. There were also times when the SIC’s apparently changing approach meant that
Malcolm was reluctant to place trust in him and his staff; different people said different things at meetings
and conferences, he argued, their difference pointing to the SIC’s changed approach rather than their own
differentiation. In this sense, people seemed conceived of as themselves identical rather than motivated
by their divided interests. Such inconsistency meant that Malcolm appeared not to depend on them to do
as they said, was left unsure of the basis on which they operated. It was their lack of communication that
appeared to most concern him, if they communicated their changed approach, he would perhaps be less
uncertain and more trusting. As Anthony Giddens (1990) writes, mistrust appears in many ways an
outcome of lack of communication, information about information: Malcolm’s uncertainly was not a
result of OSIC’s changing approach but lack of information about such change. Above all, however, lack
of trust seemed the outcome of new revelations that pointed to previous or ongoing concealment, and the
fact that what people disclosed was not always everything that they knew. This seemed to make it difficult
for people like Malcolm to place trust in others, to act on what they said: there was a sense in which there
was more to what people actually said. Indeed, it was because knowledge was concealed that Malcolm
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was not able to apply the commercial interests exemption in the way he would have liked. Here, lack of
trust was the outcome of a discrepancy in perspectives or information, explained in terms of secrecy.
Implicit in this was the sense that things were things in themselves—objects—to discover, and that
persons might have the same logic, their differences explained in terms of concealment. Since
concealment appeared in some ways the cause of mistrust, transparency offered one way of reinstating or
encouraging persons to (once again) trust.
Onora O’Neill (2002, 2006), however, disagrees. She argues that transparency is not always the
route to greater trust, and that the root cause of mistrust is lies and deceit, not secrecy. Transparency
might be seen as a way of addressing secrecy, through the revelation of truth, but revealing hidden truths
does not necessary mean that individuals will not continue to conceal information: thus others continue to
mistrust. Transparency, then, does not lie in the abundant disclosure of information, which in some ways
only leads to increased confusion as people receive a flood of often contradictory information from
different and unknown sources, but lies in undermining lies and deceitfulness. She offers the example of
trust between friends and family:
‘…our clearest images of trust do not link it to openness or transparency at all. Family life is
often based on high and reciprocal trust, but close relatives do not always burden one
another with full disclosure of their financial or professional dealings… they certainly do not
disclose family information promiscuously to the world’ (69)
It appears that if there were fewer lies and less deceit, the question of trust would not arise; there
would be no need for people to disclose information, make themselves transparent, to (re)gain people’s
trust. It appears O’Neill sees transparency not as a solution to lack of trust, and instead advocates
addressing the cause of mistrust, which she considers as lies and deceit.
While transparency does not always lead to increased trust, disclosed information is not always
that which is most trusted. More information does not necessarily lead to greater transparency, O’Neill
argues. As information circulates, is sent and retrieved at the click of a mouse, we are increasingly unable
to work out from where or whom information comes. How can we place trust when ‘we cannot even tell
who has asserted, compiled or endorsed the supposed information?’ (O’Neill 2002: 74). While information
in its increased abundance often has no source, appears detached from those from whom it came and thus
its reliability is difficult to verify, it seems valuable information is attached to reliable persons, and comes
from reliable sources. Unable to verify its reliability, persons are less likely to trust the information they
receive, and persons, organizations and processes are less likely to appear transparent. Further, while
persons might be able to trace from where or whom information came, trustworthy information is not
always information that is trusted. It was perhaps for this reason that, in the above case, no amount of
information made McBride transparent to the SIC and vice-versa; McBride seemed neither trustworthy
nor trusted by the SIC and his staff, while the SIC, despite perhaps being trustworthy, was not trusted by
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Malcolm. It is for this reason that O’Neill argues, transparency is as much about the disclosure and
dissemination of information as it is about communication, that is the meaning and possible importance of
information for those receiving it, which might entail associating information or those issuing it with
something or someone already known and trusted. Transparency, then, is not just about making the
absence of social and political relations obvious as it is about the presence of these very relations and the
connections people can thus read between information and persons. In order to travel, knowledge
becomes information and must once again be turned into knowledge. It is in this way that information
might be meaningful. Strathern (2004) might describe this in terms of information that comes into the
‘personal organization’ of the consumer. In other words, for information to be useful, for information to
become knowledge, it must be attached to some person or some thing that persons already deem reliable
and important.
While trust, transparency and reliability were often in question between citizens and central
government, or citizens and public authorities, trust between individuals of the same as well as different
sectors at, for example, meetings and conferences, appeared less of an issue, redundant even. While some
practitioners at FOISA meetings were reluctant to disclose information - they attempted to conceal
themselves and what they did not know – others readily circulated information, as if constructing the
truth between them like a jigsaw out of bits of information. There did not appear to be the scepticism
between practitioners exchanging information in conversations, at meetings, in speeches, and in the form
of conference information packs that citizens revealed of those working for central government and
public authorities. In other words, new knowledge that highlighted gaps in practitioners’ knowledge in
circumstances where everyone sought to establish the facts was not explained in terms of secrecy. This
was partly because there was not the same expectation that people should know, indeed, practitioners
were working the truth out between them. It was also a consequence of the fact that practitioners
appeared, or so others considered, to seek to distribute what they knew as much as establish the facts for
themselves. This was because while information had the potential to disclose the divisions between them,
it also did not differentiate them at all: the knowledge into which people came was in this case a
consequence of divided access and opportunity rather than people’s own divided interests. In other
words, knowledge said nothing about people personally. Knowledge appeared conceived of as an entity
independent of social relations that meant that people themselves appeared as if identical. Thus
discrepancies in knowledge pointed to people’s lack of knowledge rather than their concealment of it—a
consequence of the social relations information might otherwise disclose. In other words, trust—or lack
of it—appeared an excess of sorts. It seemed not to occur to practitioners, either those disclosing or




Transparency is in some ways the antithesis of secrecy: it concerns disclosing information that is
considered to be (deliberately or otherwise) concealed. Examples of secrecy show that secrecy appears to
take the same form, arises for apparently similar reasons, and might also be resolved through similar
means. For some, transparency as an artefact of modern knowledge practices is a way in which to explore
the nature of modernity itself, question the divide between ‘rationality’ and ‘irrationality’ by examining
instances of transparency around the globe (West and Sanders 2002). Yet transparency does not always
entail disclosure. In some cases it is about heightened clarity. Since transparency comes in a variety of
forms (Hood and Heald 2006), it is important to establish exactly what transparency might mean before
making organizations, processes, persons ‘transparent’. The following paragraphs outline debates of what
transparency might entail.
Figure 5. The Venn diagram that Heald (2006) employs to describe different varieties of transparency
151
Transparency appears most often to involve face-to face accountability, for example, when
government bodies and the public are made reciprocally transparent. Yet Roberts (2006) might argue that
often when this is the case, there is transparency between autonomous institutions within a network, but a
distinct lack of transparency between the network and those on the outside38. Relations between different
bodies - government, officials, citizens – might be diagrammatically represented (Heald 2006). The Venn
diagram that Heald employs consists of four overlapping circles, each circle representing a different body
or group (see figure 5). He states that transparency might be upward, where hierarchically subordinate
persons make themselves transparent to their superiors. It might be downward - the former in reverse. It
is possible to have transparency inwards, where those on the outside can see into another body, and also
outwards - which is this in reverse. In other words, persons might have access to information from
persons above or below them in a particular hierarchy, and from within or outwith a particular
organization or group, or any combination of the above. Of particular note is the way in which in Heald’s
description, persons and knowledge appear to neatly reside in discrete domains to which others might
have access, making knowledge itself appear as if employed, circulated, revealed and concealed in
individual units.
Face-to-face accountability might for example be compared with another form of transparency,
that is, the European Union (EU) notion of transparency that, Hood (2006) argues, emphasises the
production of auditable statements and accounts by international bodies that are only intelligible to
lawyers and accountants - with the aim of placing financial and regulatory relationships at arms length
(13). Documents, here, as with face-to-face accountability, facilitate transparency; documents are the basis
of communication, the route to new knowledge, and make possible the verification of others’ thoughts
and actions. However, documents’ lack of intelligibility to persons other than lawyers and accountants
suggests that such bodies are only partially transparent, or that transparency entails only select visibility. It
appears, then, that the kinds of persons and institutions involved influences what transparency itself
involves, the way in which it is performed, as well as the expectations placed on bodies to be transparent.
With regard to the case-studies of Malcolm and McBride, and practitioners at meetings and conferences
above, reciprocal transparency appeared the most common form of transparency. Practitioners liaising
with other practitioners, speakers and the SIC at FOISA conferences and meetings were acutely aware of
how they appeared to others - as transparent, as persons (relational), or as lacking knowledge.
38 This is because the very structure of governing institutions is changing, subverting the effectiveness of newly
adopted disclosure rules. One of these changes is the emergence of ‘networked’ forms of governance, ‘through
which agencies in different governments cooperate to achieve a common goal’ (2006: 21). Roberts offers NATO as
an example of ‘networked governance’. NATO countries, after decades of experimentation, have established a
method of ‘information sharing’. However, deepening the flow of information among NATO governments raises
security issues, and in the drive to give participating countries assurance that information flowing through the
network was be protected, governments took steps to restrict access to that information.
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In other cases, rather than about relations between groups, transparency entails tracing relations
within groups. In this case, rather than about disclosure that dissolves the differences between different
groups, transparency is as much about keeping internal parts separate. This particular strain of
transparency is linked to the EU use of the term, (Hood 2007: 15). Hood is worth quoting in full:
‘It is the doctrine that government should operate accounting regimes that separate out
different kinds of activities, specifically to make it possible to identify who pays and who
benefits from particular programmes and measures, and to distinguish the financial and other
activities of different ‘cost centres’ within government’
In other words, here transparency entails clarification—making entities stand out alone. It
ensures that loss-making activities are clearly identified and specifically subsidised, not covered up in
covert cross-subsidies. According to Hood, clarification is not unusual practice in public service
management, and was a feature of public enterprise management in the 1960s: it appeared more choice
and more options brought with it the burden of keeping things separate, preventing their amalgamation.
That combination and/or separation might be done purely for people to demonstrate that they have
interests in the right relations is a concern: things that are separate, should stay separate, and not get lost
in new relations and endeavours. In other words, audit trails that make transparent the relations between
things should themselves be made obvious or transparent.
Transparency is also about unearthing the context in which cases, speeches and decisions are
made, and thus the basis on which people, in a particular moment, think and act. So, in recovering what is
meant by ‘transparency’ with regard to particular legislation, what it entails, it might be necessary to
unearth the context in which a particular statement about transparency was made by Ministers, officials
and decision-makers (Holsen and Glover 2007). In the same way, persons are often expected to, as they
make decisions, account for the basis (or context) in which they make them: in relation to secrecy,
Birkinshaw (2006) argues that ‘[s]ecrecy… may be necessary; but it has to be justified. Justification is part
of transparency’. Transparency appears to entail a certain self-reflexivity, characteristic of modernity
(Giddens 1990). In an effort to make his moves and meaning transparent, after conducting an
investigation, the SIC would issue a detailed decision that included the points that he either had or had not
taken into account, and presenting each side of the argument, that of the applicant and public authority.
It was these decisions in which FOI practitioners were most interested since a particular decision might
not only inform an authority of its position but also offer guidance on how to make decisions in the
future. Public authorities too were expected to make the basis on which they made decisions transparent,
so that these decisions could be scrutinized, checked and verified by the SIC and the public.
Transparency was not just about unearthing the facts, then, it was about establishing the basis on which
such facts were constructed: persons must not only be self-reflexively aware of how they act, but the basis
on which they act also.
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While transparency is an end in itself - it is about dissolving the differences between persons,
groups, bodies and also clarifying relations and connections – it is also a means to an end. It, in other
words, has instrumental value (Heald 2006b). Transparency ‘might be seen as a core concern, to be
intrinsically valued, or as something to be valued instrumentally, as a building block…’, (Heald 2006b: 59).
Transparency, then, might be considered a route to other core attributes, such as trust, efficiency,
accountability, autonomy, fairness, legitimacy and confidentiality and it is through these that transparency
appears also to acquire its own value. In other words, the value of transparency might be measured in the
effects of which it is instrumental. In the examples above, transparency is supposed to bring about
increased trust, publicly owned companies such as McBride might no longer conceal their moves. Yet
transparency also appeared to lead to mistrust and uncertainty: the more the SIC and his staff disclosed,
the more discrepancies appeared to point to unexplained change and Malcolm was often left confused.
So, transparency does not always – as O’Neill (2002) underlines - lead to increased trust. Indeed,
transparency might come into conflict with some if not all of the core attributes mentioned above, that is
for example, jeopardise trust or inhibit efficiency. As Heald (2006b) explains, once individuals are aware
that every e-mail, every working method, every recorded conversation might potentially be disclosed as a
result of FOI, this could change working practices, discourage people from keeping and preserving
records, which will only lead to inefficiency and ineffectiveness (68-69).
But I seek to highlight another form of transparency that has so far not been described.
Transparency appears predominantly about revealing what is otherwise concealed, dissolving the
differences between persons, and clarification. It is through mingling, liaising with the SIC and other
practitioners at FOISA events that people make efforts to come into the same knowledge, share the same
interests and also the same form. It is in this way, by relying on knowledge that others provide, that
persons in receipt of new knowledge might no longer stand out, and make themselves disappear, see-
through, or transparent. People no longer appear as a person operating in their own right, but a person of
the public authority or larger body they then represent—as if anyone. It is persons as operating in their own
right that that disappear, are made transparent.
And it is in this way also, that the whole, collective or group to which persons belong,
momentarily appears - in the absence of conflicting interests and in light of individuals’ uniformity. As
persons seek to share others’ knowledge, then, it has the effect of making both persons and the collective
of which they are part, transparent. That is, of concealing persons and revealing their collective form.
This, then, would be a different kind of transparency, one that operates on quite a different axis to the
kinds of transparency so far described and might also foreground the very basis on which other kinds of
transparency appear to operate.
Transparent Persons
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In order to disappear, become transparent, practitioners otherwise possibly reluctant to share their
knowledge, appeared reliant on other practitioners to disclose their own knowledge, to themselves be
explicit. Transparency of one kind, in terms of persons revealing what they knew, was in some sense a
route to transparency of a different kind, that is, persons appearing see-through or transparent, their
disappearance a result of their shared knowledge, non-differentiation, and the fact that they were no
longer (individually) seen or stood out. The outcome of transparency, of evenly distributed knowledge, a
‘transparent society’ (Vattimo 1992), then, was that individuals themselves became transparent—no longer
acted in their own right—and might no longer be seen.
While transparency was in one sense about dissolving the differences between persons, for
example, practitioners in FOISA meetings were keen to come into new knowledge in order to comply
with FOISA, there was also the sense in which this was an ideal: gaps in knowledge might be bridged but
new ones would inevitably open up elsewhere as persons took an interest in new relations and new
knowledge. In other words, it was likely that people’s interests in a particular thing (relation), their values
and their knowledge would change, perhaps as a result of their efforts to dissolve discrepancies perceived
between themselves and others. Although momentarily undivided, people’s interests would inevitably
become (once again) divided. It was a result of their changing interests in a particular relation that people
might appear combined and separated in different ways—come into and act on different or the same
knowledge. So at FOISA events, as information circulated and people’s knowledge was completed by
others, in an effort to bridge the gaps between them and in their own knowledge, people could find the
basis on which they dealt with FOI requests constantly shifting, being amended and completed. It was
this of which Malcolm of McBride ferries complained. It seemed as soon as he established the basis on
which OSIC operated, their approach and thinking on a particular issue, they appeared to take a different
tack, their change of approach revealed the differences between what different OSIC staff said at FOISA
events. Malcolm was constantly catching up, establishing the basis on which he should make decisions as
information circulated.
On coming into new knowledge such that people’s interests in a particular person and relation
appeared momentarily divided, individuals that had otherwise disappeared might again become visible as
independent entities. The collective or whole of which they were a part might seem to fragment, appear
absent as a result of the absence of a relationship between people: society appearing, as independent
persons are strung together, as if there was no apparent relationship between people. In essence, while
undivided interests, and therefore shared knowledge, had the effect of making persons transparent and the
collective of which they were a part appear, moment to moment, people’s changing interests, their shared
as well as different knowledge, had the effect of making individuals and the collective of which they were
a part disappear and (re)appear—an effect of revelation and concealment that did not involve disclosure.
There was both the sense that transparency was something that was constantly being done and undone,
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realised and dissolved as people’s divided interests meant that they were both separated and combined but
also, as gaps in knowledge appeared as others were resolved, that transparency might never be realised,.
While differing knowledge and the absence of a consensus might produce a sense of social
fragmentation, the dissolution of the collective and (re)appearance of individual persons, difference was
more often than not explained in terms of secrecy. Malcolm at McBride ferries argued that on changing
the written version of her speech so that she did not come into conflict with the SIC, Margaret Curran
(Lab.), then Minister for Parliamentary Business instead appeared to conceal the truth, the difference
between what she and the SIC said explained in terms of secrecy. In this sense, there was no conflict of
knowledge, rather differences between persons, what they said and did, were explained in terms of
concealment or perhaps lack of information. The information to which people had access, then, was
hidden or partial rather than the truth. In this sense, persons appeared differentiated only by what they
knew (or what they revealed they knew) rather than by how they knew. As Tsoukas (1998) explains,
knowledge that people disclose is often considered as if objectively gathered information. It was for this
reason that trust in relation to information dissemination by practitioners appeared an excess of sorts. In
other words, discrepancies between what people ‘know’, it is assumed, point to people’s lack of access or
deliberate concealment of information rather than their divided interests. Tsoukas draws on Lakoff’s
description of the ‘conduit metaphor… [that] suggests that meaning is a thing and that the hearer pulls out
the same meaning from the same words… [Meaning] exists independently of beings who understand the
words’ (1998: 830). Tsoukas, then, underlines the point that knowledge appears to be considered as if an
object that is passed between people unchanged, that persons are undifferentiated in their interests, the
differences between them explained in terms of lack of information or concealment. It is for this reason
that he argues that transparency is something that might never be achieved: as people come into and
disclose new knowledge as a consequence of their changing interests and relations, they also point to
information that otherwise appeared concealed, that others did not disclose.
So practitioners at FOISA events, as they passed knowledge, explicitly embodied as knowledge
and implicitly as information, between them, might be considered to have been doing one of two things:
either dissolving the differences between them by coming into new social knowledge that meant their
interests were no longer divided (rather they had the same interest in the same thing (relation)), or
circulating information on the basis that their interests were already undivided, in other words persons
appeared to be differentiated by the information to which they had access. These are two different ways
of reading the same activity, and yet also reveal the basis on which ‘freedom of information’ and
transparency appeared to operate as well as the basis on which practitioners themselves fraternized. In
other words, transparency of one kind - the way in which persons appeared to make themselves disappear,
or transparent, by dissolving the differences between them—appeared also to foreground the assumptions
behind transparency of a different kind, transparency as revelation. Above all, and as Tsoukas (1998)
highlights, while information and knowledge were words that are often used interchangeably to depict or
156
describe the same thing, their usage also points to assumptions about persons and knowledge-exhange,
that is, the presence or absence of social relations. Persons might come into and disclose new knowledge,
their knowledge revealing the relations in which they have interest, or exchange ‘information’. Knowledge
(as information) circulated as if an object in which (undifferentiated) persons have undisputed interest.
So, transparency appeared in some sense a way of distributing information in which others were
already considered to be in possession. As information circulated, people might complete others’
knowledge, bridge or fill in the gaps, and it was in this way that between them practitioners constructed
the truth, like a jigsaw out of bits of information. Transparency was above all a way in which people
might come into the same knowledge, know ‘more’, and in essence have equal agency. However, it was a
result of individuals’ divided interests - their different knowledge – that they appeared to withhold or lack
information. Transparency might be thought of in terms of revelation of that which was concealed, but it
also entailed a consolidation of interests that were otherwise divided: those whose knowledge was
otherwise different became shared. So, distributed information that was otherwise explained in terms of
revelation of the truth, pointed also to people’s changed interests and their different knowledge:
transparency did not necessarily mean people came to know more, or even that the truth was revealed,
rather that persons whose knowledge and interests were otherwise different came to know the same.
Knowledge was in this sense displaced and replaced.
As people came into new social knowledge and gaps in knowledge appeared resolved as a result
of one kind of transparency, I argue that individuals themselves also disappeared—became see-through or
transparent—and that transparency in terms of disclosure—transparency-as-revelation—resulted in a
different kind of transparency, transparent persons. The aim of transparency-as-revelation was for the
differences between people to drop away, come into the same knowledge, appear in the same form as a
result of their shared interest in a particular thing (relation). While social relations were of concern to
those who considered that they might lack knowledge, get it wrong, or be embarrassed on disclosing what
they knew, for those who shared the same knowledge and form as a result of their shared interest in the
same thing, social relations appeared to drop away, disappear, along with people’s differences. In essence,
social relations appeared no longer in question. The difference between citizens and Government also
becomes ‘balanced’, transparent and non-existent. The very aim of disclosure, then, was for persons to be
undifferentiated in what they knew, and its very outcome appeared exactly this, undifferentiated persons
who shared the same knowledge, thought and acted similarly. Transparency’s end-point, was transparent
persons, persons who were identical in form and for this reason appeared to disappear completely into the
collective of which they were a part.
Conclusion
There are, of course, numerous instances when people deliberately withhold information from others, in
order to conceal what they know and are in this sense non-transparent to others. However, this chapter
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does not so much explore incidences of deliberate concealment or lack of clarity, rather what transparency
is and what it entails as highlighted in the field as well as by other scholars. I explore the arguments of
those with an interest in Government related transparency and through this offer my contribution and an
account of what a social anthropologist might see in the field by way of transparency. Above all, persons
it seems seek to be undivided. They see divisions between them reflected in what they know and how
they act. It is on coming into the same knowledge, sharing the same interests and outlook that persons
erase the divisions between them, also making themselves disappear and the collective of which they are
part, appear. Individuals might reappear once again, on being divided by different knowledge, but the
divisions between them might also be seen (and often are) in terms of concealment, or their non-
transparency. In this case, persons who are otherwise divided are assumed to be undivided, the
differences between them explained in terms of secrecy.
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Recapitulation: Relations that Unite and Divide
Access to Information
This thesis has been a study of key moments of interaction between FOI policy-makers, practitioners and
applicants as they submit and respond to FOI requests, and between policy-makers and practitioners at
FOISA meetings as they share their experiences of the Act and obtain guidance from other practitioners.
It has explored the key notions that underpin the Act—access to information brings power and agency, and
trust and transparency. It is about changing an entrenched culture of British secrecy to one of openness and truth,
which involves individuals within public authorities making decisions over what constitutes public and
private information.
I have explored these notions both in terms of the official rhetoric that underpins them, and
heuristically, in terms of how the concepts work themselves out in practice: I have provided a description
of incidences of power, agency, transparency and trust, public and private, and culture change as they
emerge in the field. What is often the case, is that the academic theory and official rhetoric that underpin
these terms, do not always mesh with what happens in practice. So I offer more than one view: that of
the academic, the policy-maker, the Act, the practitioner handling the request, the decision-maker, and the
applicant or member of the public. It is these views combined that informed the findings of this thesis.
***
Locating, retrieving and sharing information is a highly sociable business. FOI practitioners frequently
met and talked at conferences and small informal practitioner meetings throughout the year, and liaised
with colleagues about what information was held, who held it and what to disclose—colleagues on whom
they depended to locate and retrieve information. People might discuss the SIC’s latest decision over a
buffet lunch of sandwiches or a request over coffee or on the telephone.
It has been said that the Scottish Information Commissioner (SIC) seeks to implement a ‘burger
bar’ approach to information dissemination. Like a burger bar where the same quality burger is given to
each and every person who walks through the burger bar door, the same information is given to everyone.
FOISA thus makes obvious the absence of social and political relations, and resolves the divisions
between people, (in so doing creating new social entities). The free dissemination of knowledge
foregrounds knowledge as an independent entity; cut lose of social and political networks that might
otherwise direct its route, social relations are neither implicated in its presentation or use. In light of their
absence, knowledge appears a tool that might be accessed, picked up and used, and in the form of
information. This thesis has focused on the subject-object transformations that FOI entails, that are the outcome of the way
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in which individuals—practitioners, applicants, policy-makers—make absent or obvious, by the shared or divided form they
take, the social ties on which they and social knowledge rely.
***
Summary of Argument
It is perhaps worth touching on some core findings emerging from the thesis before recapitulating the
findings from each chapter:
This thesis has centrally focussed on the way in which people—policy-makers, practitioners,
applicants—come into the same knowledge through sharing experiences at FOISA meetings, listening to
the Scottish Information Commissioner (SIC) speak, reading his briefings, or chatting over lunch or
coffee at their desks. Through coming into the same knowledge, people come into a shared or common
basis on which to think and act.
It was by acting on a shared or common basis that individuals made themselves disappear, or
appear ‘transparent’. That is, people appeared in the capacity of the organization and not their own
capacity. However, in light of new knowledge into which they or others came, people would appear once
again divided individuals and the social relations between them were once again made visible—
reappeared, throwing into question a theory of people’s division as indicative of their ‘secrecy’.
As differences were dissolved in this process, different practitioners appeared themselves
undifferentiated, or as acting in the capacity of the organization or larger group of which they were a
member. Their non-differentiation was necessary for FOISA compliance; it was important that
practitioner’s individual personalities were seen not to determine what they disclosed, and for them to be
seen as acting as ‘anyone’ in the authority. But their non-differentiation also seemed to make it easier for
them to disclose information: information was no longer about or perceived in relation to them as discrete
persons. This change of attitude was part of the ‘culture change’.
It was as a result of the perceived non-differentiation of different practitioners that the social
relations on which disclosed knowledge always depended were made absent: complex networks of
relations between practitioners, colleagues, friends within and beyond a single authority that informed
what an applicant actually received, were hidden. Thus social knowledge appeared in the form of ‘de-
socialised’ information. It was through providing equal access to information that individuals had equal
access to political power. FOISA thereby placed citizens and government on the same level—both able
to partake equally in the decisions and actions that government takes.
Whether practitioners, applicants, and other actors could be considered as acting in their own
right, or in the capacity of a larger grouping, they themselves and their personality being ‘transparent’,
determined whether the information they created or handled was ‘private’ or ‘public’. Then, as
practitioners came into new knowledge, this created divisions between them, and between them and
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applicants, and individuals once again appeared to act on a personal basis and the information concerned
seemed once again to be private. As individuals alternated between acting on a common or different
footing, they alternated between appearing ‘public’ and ‘private’—thing or person—a division between
individuals reflecting a division within each of them.
This thesis explores the subject-object aesthetics that are a result of people, in one moment,
acting on a divided basis, and in another, a basis they share in common—in light of which knowledge




In chapter two I ask how are decisions over public and private made under the Act? While FOI provides
access to information deemed public, in accordance with the Data Protection Act, it also includes
provisions for the retention of personal information. DPA provides people with a right of access to their
own personal information and prevents this information being disclosed to others.
Yet practitioners often found it difficult to make a decision over what constituted public
information and what was private or personal. It seemed as if persons would be disclosed by disclosing
information created by them or about them, at every turn. In response to this the SIC replied that people
were often over-sensitive, and that more information could be disclosed than practitioners perhaps
realised. Practitioners such as Duncan, Information Compliance Manager for Lochhead council, in a
position and with the capacity to make decisions over public and private similar to the SIC, found himself
persuading others to release information that they considered personal, that he and the SIC did not.
While practitioners sought guidance on how the line between public and private should be drawn,
decisions over public and private were always made on a case-by-case basis. Information, for example
about an employee’s contracted hours, appeared private in relation to the wider society from whom he or
she seemed differentiated, but when put back in relation to their colleagues with the same hours, the same
information appeared public, and thus was able to be disclosed. Whether information was public or
private depended on the particular relational context in which it was assessed. Since this was the case,
information, and those creating, holding or the subjects of information, would appear public or private in
different moments. Perhaps contrary to expectation, the relationship between public and private was not
fixed and something to be unearthed, but relational—a public-private division between persons reflecting
a public-private division within persons.
Strathern (1992) writes that people’s division and combination—their difference or similarity to
others—is the consequence of the fact that something can always be seen from a different angle. New
knowledge creates dilemmas over how to categorize and order cases, people and things, seen from
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multiple angles, might be arranged, combined and divided along different lines. It is people’s interests in a
particular relation that invokes their division and combination. Indeed, practitioners, end-users, the SIC
himself, often adopted contrasting and conflicting approaches to the same thing, whether information—in
sum or in part—was confidential for example, which for practitioners seeking pattern in the SIC’s
decisions over public and private, was problematic. There were no guidelines it seemed they could follow.
As each new connection (from a different angle) was invoked in relation, connections seemed partial, as if
there was always more to know. This was reflected in Duncan’s particular need for more information
before he could make an informed decision about whether information really could be disclosed.
The combination and division of cases was reflected in people’s own combination and division,
and as a result of their changing interests and relations. As people’s interests in a relation changed, they
underwent endless permutations in form—their own form emerging in accordance with the perspective
they disclosed. Practitioners, end-users, and decision-makers, then, might each adopt a different
perspective in relation to one another, and on the same thing. Each perspective, relayed in the
information produced, might be either ‘public’ or ‘private’. It was categorized differently as people
appeared to act in the capacity of persons or the capacity of a larger body—divided or combined,
differentiated or undifferentiated, person or thing.
As one of many, persons could be disguised—a specific interest, concern or relation, appearing a
general feature of the group. This was a method used by statisticians to conceal ‘persons’ in information.
As with the leukaemia case that Stewart described, obscuring the number of individuals with leukaemia in
a data set would suggest that an ambiguous number of people held the same characteristics in common,
making it more difficult to identify people through their symptoms, thus implying these characteristics
were not singularly theirs.
Culture Change
In this chapter I touched on the official rhetorical concerning culture change, what Members of the
Scottish Parliament write and say on the subject, and what policy and decision-makers consider it will
achieve. I also touched on the responses of FOI practitioners and their colleagues to this change and the
expectations placed on them.
FOISA is designed to bring about a of public sector change of culture, from one secrecy to one
of openness. This change required people in public authorities, FOI practitioners and their colleagues, to
readily disclose information to those who requested it. Such a change requires public authority civil
servants to think quite differently about what they do.
Enmeshed in a network of relations on which FOI practitioners depend to locate and retrieve
information in response to a request, this information is a product of these relations. Practitioners such as
Margaret, an FOI Officer for NHS Glendale, whom I helped prepare for an ‘FOI audit’ regularly met with
colleagues for morning coffee and lunch with colleagues and other FOI practitioners to discuss at great
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length with each other what they had done at the weekend but also FOI requests with which they were
currently dealing. While relations between practitioners and colleagues were sociable, relations between
practitioners and applicants were often equally as warm. Colin, another FOI practitioner for NHS
Glendale was often on friendly terms with applicants, and would regularly exchange e-mails with them
regarding their request for information, or their request for a review. The network of social relations in
which practitioners and applicants were enmeshed was replicated at FOISA conferences and meetings at
which practitioners liaised, discussed their particular concerns and requests with each other and the SIC,
and learnt from the SIC and other practitioners how to comply with FOI. FOISA, it seemed, was both a
model for knowledge sharing—facilitated relations between practitioners, and practitioners and applicants—
and modelled on knowledge sharing—sociable FOI events were a means through which practitioners could
also share and exchange what they knew.
As practitioners shared knowledge at FOISA conferences and meetings, at which they listened to
the SIC talk on culture change and about his latest decisions, practitioners such as Morag, a keen
advocator of the Act, established with others a common or shared basis on which to think and act. FOI
compliance, here, entailed adopting a common footing, and thus the propagation of certain forms, through
shared knowledge. It was important to listen carefully to the SIC and his staff and adopt the same
approach in order to comply with FOISA. Attending training courses and taking exams on FOISA was
another way in which practitioners made sure they complied with the Act, and came into the same
knowledge. Duncan also regularly read the SIC’s ‘briefings’ as a means of ensuring he complied.
Replication seemed to underpin FOISA: information dissemination at meetings was not only a means of
disseminating the message of culture change, but was the culture change itself, made visible in
practitioners’ replicated form and the replication of meetings themselves as organizers of these meetings
looked to prior or larger meetings for guidance.
While new knowledge and a new way of behaving came with the role of FOI practitioner,
practitioners such as Colin, quickly realised that his shared form with the SIC and other FOI advocators
created a new division between him and his colleagues. This division was analogous to that between the
SIC and the public authority. As a result, the division between the SIC (or the law) and the authority (in
its pre-culture change state) shifted to become one that existed between public authority practitioners such
as Colin and his colleagues. While responsibilities for making decisions under the Act were devolved,
handed down to individual civil servants, devolution seemed to bring the same government-citizen
relationship, replicated here in the relationship between Colin and his colleagues. FOISA thus seemed
capable of being put to work beyond its own realm (between different parts, or persons, in the authority as
well as the authority and the public). Culture change, here, entailed the migration of a division.
On the one hand, FOISA was principally socially governed: practitioner’s own personal
relationships with colleagues informed what information they located, retrieved, and disclosed to
applicants, the form and functions of FOISA meetings at which new social forms were adopted and
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further propagated, their roles as FOI Officers. On the other hand, underpinning FOISA was a right of
access to information designed to make social and political relations absent—that is, FOI required that
social relations played no part in how or where knowledge—in the form of information—travelled. The
points is, included in the responsibilities of individual FOI Officers, such as Colin, Duncan and Morag,
was the obligation to make absent the very social relations on which their, and their colleagues, activities
depended. This required great skill.
I draw on the work of Riles (2000), who describes the activities of UN delegates at the Fourth
World Conference on Women in Beijing. She shows how delegates, like practitioners, make their own
part in the generation of documents at meetings one of a non-differentiated delegate rather than a person
with personality. Each level of UN meeting is identical in form and function, and documents generated at
one level of meeting are taken to the next and formed the basis of a new document. Different meetings
were undifferentiated in the same way the different delegates who participated in the meetings were
undifferentiated. The differences between them were a result of the different shared basis that they held
in common—each delegate acting, not in his own capacity, but in the capacity of the country they
represented. The undifferentiated state of delegates, reflecting the undifferentiated state of UN meetings
served to make absent social relations that might otherwise be considered to direct the flow of
information and thus the outcome of the meetings themselves.
Riles’ description of UN delegates provides a parallel example useful for thinking about the
activities and expectations placed on FOI practitioners here. It is, in particular, useful for highlighting the
undifferentiated status of FOI practitioners, who conceiving of themselves as such, were successful at
providing information. Of all the relations he contained, practitioners such as Duncan ensured he always
acted on a common or shared footing with others so as to make absent his particularity. As one of many,
rather than one, acting alone, this brilliant manoeuvre made the social relations, that otherwise might
appear to inform a practitioners’ actions, disappear. Acting on a common or shared basis in everything they
said and did, practitioners made themselves appear independent of social relations that might otherwise be
seen to compromise their credibility. Culture change, here, entailed making individual persons absent.
Secrecy and Truth
Chapter four builds on the previous two chapters, chapter two on private and public and chapter three on
culture change. Drawing on the arguments of the previous two chapters in which I point to two different
ways of knowing—knowing in relation, and knowing in the absence of relations—I ask what happens in
light of the intersection of these two ways of knowing? That is, I explore instances of secrecy where there
is no secrecy, and practitioners are left bewildered by applicants’ accusations that they conceal the truth. I
also explore instances in which people establish different and conflicting notions of the truth, such that
there appears no definitive truth. What is at the root of perceptions of ‘secrecy’ and what governs
knowledge and what is the truth for practitioners and applicants who seek it out?
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This chapter presents different moments in which applicants perceive ‘secrecy’, and offers three
key reasons why practitioners were perceived as ‘secretive’ when there were no secrets. Each key instance,
or type of concealment, is the outcome of carefully managed subject-object aesthetics on the part of
practitioners, which have contrasting and unexpected effects on their relations with applicants. As
mentioned in the chapter above, practitioners such as Colin often made sure they acted on a common or
shared basis so as to comply with the Act and ensure that their own particular relations or personality
were not seen to govern the decisions they made. However, ‘compliance’, here, was a double-edged
sword: practitioners’ concealment of relations was both necessary for compliance and brought accusations
of secrecy from applicants.
It soon became clear to practitioners such as Samantha and Colin, who were FOI Officers for
NHS Glendale, that differences perceived between them and what they each said, different organizations
stated, and even different Acts stipulated, would be interpreted by applicants in terms of secrecy.
Practitioners such as Colin and Samantha, and even different organization or representatives such as NHS
Glendale and the Public Services Ombudsman were perceived by members of the public to be
undifferentiated—to always act on a common or shared basis. As elaborated in the chapter above, this
constituted the ‘culture change’ FOISA was meant to bring about, and would at the same time guarantee
that applicants did get equal access to information: a practitioner’s own personality would be left out of
the decision-making process. But because different persons and organizations were indeed perceived as
undifferentiated, the differences perceived between them by applicants could only be explained (by the
applicants) in terms of ‘secrecy’.
While the knowledge that practitioners such as Colin disclosed in response to a request remained
the outcome of their particular relations with practitioners, colleagues and applicants, their non-
differentiation concealed the particularity of these relations. The social knowledge that they disclosed was
thus received by applicants as objective, ‘de-socialised’ information—although knowledge, here, appeared
as information only because it was separated from the social networks out of which it emerged. As a
result of the fact that both knowledge and persons appeared independent of the social relations on which
they relied, knowledge was also something recipients considered that disclosers either had or did not have,
as if an object that could be collected, applied and put to use.
It was as a result of this that recipients of knowledge such as George, a frequent user of FOI,
considered knowledge that (in this case) I did not disclose in our meetings, but that he presumed I knew,
was due to my secrecy or reluctance to share it. Perceiving knowledge as an object, something that was
either known or not known meant people read ‘secrecy’ into people’s silence or lack of articulation of
what they are perceived to know. In my relations with George, I could not share with him what he
needed me to share. However, as I explained, I would come into knowledge (that he already presumed I
‘knew’) in relation to any material, e-mail correspondence, repeated conversations that he could share with
me. But knowledge was not something that I knew in advance of knowing it. Familiar with a model of
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knowing in which persons and knowledge travel independently of the person and relations through which
they are created, knowledge was conceived by George in the form of an object, not a subject activated in
relation.
While the above instances of presumed secrecy point to secrecy as rooted in the absence of
relations, knowledge seen in the form of an object that might be revealed or concealed, the third instance
was one in which relations were made highly visible. Applicants, such as the one with whom Samantha,
Colin and Hector had to deal, who sought information on post-traumatic stress disorder, sought to read
the relations implied in information that was disclosed to him—in the form of written e-mail
correspondence, conversations and response letters. He was concerned that the relation that Samantha,
Colin and Hector shared in common would make Hector partial as an FOI reviewer. Here, relations
between practitioners diminished relations between Hector and the applicant, giving rise to accusations of
secrecy.
Thus knowledge could be perceived in the form of knowledge—with social relations attached—
or in the form of information—knowledge that was separated and independent of social relations. But
information also carried implied social relations it seems. While who disclosed the information that a
applicant such as George had requested was not something that was generally taken into account, or
should affect what he received, George quickly realised that he did receive different information from
different people within the authority in response to the same request. While in striking up informal
relations with practitioners and taking his request outwith the scope of FOISA, George quickly realised
that a practitioner’s position did determine what he received. Information, here, carried relations in as
much as relations gave meaning to and fashioned what information was given out.
This chapter has explored the way in which, as social relations are made absent, knowledge
appears in the form of an independent entity that can be freely disclosed, and is either known or not
known, concealed and revealed. This informs a way of knowing that is in some cases at the root of
secrecy. But information also embodies relations that applicants can read into disclosed information.
Information appears as both an object (with relations concealed), and an object in the form of a subject
embodying relations. These subject-object aesthetics inform perceptions of secrecy and the truth.
Power and Agency
Power holds a certain fascination; for academics concerned with how power operates and relations of
power between different bodies; and for FOI practitioners, applicants, policy-makers and advocates of
FOISA. Power and agency were notions associated with FOISA, in particular due to the perceived
axiomatic relationship between knowledge and power. This was one on which decision-makers,
practitioners and applicant’s regularly drew. That is, equal information was perceived to provide people
with equal power. In this chapter, I both explore the assumptions underlying the relationship between
knowledge and power (that underpins FOISA), and throw into question the power analytics of Michel
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Foucault who is well-known for his work on power. Could instances of ‘power’ between practitioners and
applicants working and submitting requests under the Act throw into question a theory of social relations
on which Foucault’s power analytics is based?
Power, while often sought by practitioners such as Iain and Robert, who were responsible for
implementing and enforcing FOISA within their council, was also something that the same practitioners
knew they could loose as quickly as they came into it. Power and agency were above all relational. Power
was a consequence of people’s demand for or need of knowledge. It thus depended on who had
‘knowledge’ in any one moment in the eyes of those who sought knowledge out. At the same time,
whether people were perceived as having knowledge depended on whether they were seen as
undifferentiated and as sharing knowing in common with others, or as differentiated, thus as acting on a
personal and private (and hence unreadable) basis. Knowledge, here, seemed more like information—that
is, believable or important because of its separation from the relations through which it was constituted.
Robert knew that whether he was perceived by others to have important knowledge depended on
his association with Iain, who was Council Secretary and considered by other council employees as having
knowledge. However, even Iain could be considered to lack power and agency in relation the larger
organization, his relations with other employees, and in particular, his relation with the SIC. Indeed, in
was in light of a Decision Notice from the SIC that the power relation between Iain, Robert and other
council employees momentarily shifted. As a result of their apparent non-compliance, Iain and Robert,
and their council were differentiated from other councils and other practitioners and in so being seemed
to lack knowledge of the Act, and of their own organization.
Indeed, this was where the SIC’s real power lay, in his capacity to differentiate otherwise
undifferentiated FOI practitioners as they attempted to comply with FOISA. While considering
themselves undifferentiated, revealing the differences between them disclosed particular practitioners as
acting in a personal capacity in relation to the legislation, and thus as lacking knowledge of it. Yet the
SIC’s own knowledge and power depended on his relationships with other people, and whether he was
considered divided or combined, as acting in the capacity of a person or in the capacity of a public body.
At the same time, in light of the divisions that emerged between the SIC and Iain and Robert, as he
concluded in his Decision Notice that they lacked knowledge of the legislation, some practitioners
remarked that it was the SIC who was acting in a personal capacity and the one who lacked knowledge.
The French philosopher Michel Foucault argues that power is attached to the truth, which as
evident in this chapter as practitioners and applicants seek out truth in order to have power and agency.
Power flows through the connections between people, statements, things that point to what is true. So,
while Robert had power in relation to Iain, and Iain had or lacked power in his relation with the SIC, the
power that Robert had was a result of the connections made between him, Iain and the SIC. As power
flows along the relationships between entities, power itself is transcendental.
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However, although Foucault’s power analytics might be aptly applied to the power relations at
work between practitioners and applicants, it is not Foucault’s power analytics that I turn to. Rather, I
argue that Foucault’s theory of power is predicated on particular notions that what constitutes the relation
is that which only connects people, things, entities together in a chain. It is through reconceiving of the
relation that it is also possible to challenge Foucault’s perception of power. Robert in his relations with
Iain and other employees, and Iain in his relations with the SIC, appeared differentiated or
undifferentiated, divided or combined to others in different moments. That is, as acting in a personal
capacity or the capacity of the organization. It was this, it seemed, that determined for others whether
Robert and his colleagues had or did not have knowledge and power. But important to note is the
relation through which Robert and Iain were divided as well as the relation that connected Robert and Iain
and along which knowledge passed. Rather than being solely inter-subjective, Strathern (2005) posits a
relation in which conceptual and inter-subjective relations work together. It is in appearing as at once
divided and combined, and the way in which persons work these two relations in tandem, that makes
knowledge appear as something that emerges and is exchanged within a single relation. Thus power that
flows linking persons, statements, entities together dissipates—for two reasons: power can no longer flow
via the relation (because the nature of the relation changes), and persons no longer appear single, discrete
entities (so there is no individual on which power can act and from whom it flows).
Placing the relation, constituted by people’s division and combination, at centre stage rather than
the person him or herself (from whom knowledge and power appears to flow) changes our outlook on
power. As Robert in his relations with others held knowledge in common and was differentiated either in
light of his new knowledge or knowledge into which others had come, his perspective of the same thing
changed as did his form. While Foucault considers knowledge as that which flows between people via the
perspective or knowledge they share, it is in light of Robert’s changing form that Foucault’s notion of
‘power’, as that which flows between single, whole entities dissipates: shared knowledge here constitutes
people’s shared form, that neither comes from or goes to a single individual, but could be said to be a
collective realization of persons’ varying forms.
Transparency and Trust
In this chapter I explored the arguments of those with an interest in Government related transparency and
through this, offered my contribution and an account of what a social anthropologists might see in the
field by way of transparency. I also explored the relationship between transparency and trust, and in
particular draw on the argument of Onora O’Neill (2002) that: ‘Reasonably placed trust requires not only
information about the proposals or undertakings that others put forward, but also information about
those who put them forward’.
It was clear from the activity of practitioners at FOISA conferences that people sought to come
into the same knowledge, to be undifferentiated, and in so being, comply with FOISA. They replicated
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each others’ form such that different practitioners were no longer differentiated, shared knowledge in
common. That is, as practitioners, such as Morag who sought knowledge from colleagues on how to
respond to a particular request or Duncan who sought advice from the Scottish Information
Commissioner, each came into new knowledge that erased the divisions between them and other
practitioners. In erasing these division and taking on the same form, practitioners made themselves
disappear—or transparent. At the same time, as practitioners’ appeared unified, the divisions between
them erased as a result of their shared knowledge, the collective of which they were a member appeared.
As individuals once again acted on a different footing, on coming into new knowledge through which they
were divided from other practitioners, individuals would once again reappear and no longer be
‘transparent’—or see-through—and the collective of which they were a member would once again
disappear. Considering transparency in terms of people’s own combination (transparency) or division
(non-transparency) is a new way of thinking about transparency. This form of transparency, that I
describe in terms of ‘transparent persons’, made practitioners appear completely undifferentiated to the
point that the social relations between them were made absent, no longer in question. In light of their and
others’ undivided state, the difference between citizens and government also seemed non-existent, and
transparent—these entities themselves balanced.
But people’s own transparency—in terms of their lack of differentiation—required practitioners
and the SIC to share their own knowledge, and be explicit themselves. One form of transparency—the
alternative form I proposed here—required another form of transparency—transparency as revelation and
the disclosure of information in order for practitioners to themselves be transparent. As people were
themselves transparent and disclosed what they knew, transparency produced new concealments as other
people came into this knowledge, which displaced and replaced what they knew.
Considering the MSP responsible for Parliamentary Business and overseeing the implementation
of FOI legislation in Scotland as having contradicted the SIC in her speech at a Holyrood FOI conference
in early 2005, Malcolm concluded that she or the SIC must be concealing the truth: the contradiction
between two sources of information and two persons, explained in terms of ‘secrecy’. Transparency
explained in terms of people’s division and combination, or their shared or divided footing, throws into
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Appendix
Legal Terms in FOISA
The SIC
The Scottish Information Commissioner is appointed by the Scottish Parliament to enforce and promote
FOI law in Scotland. He is also charged with enforcing and promoting the Environmental Information
Regulations (‘EIRs’) in Scotland that provide citizens with a right of access to environmental information.
The EIRs
Environmental information has been accessible in the UK for over 12 years. The Environmental
Information Regulations 1992, which were amended in 1998, gave the public the right to ask for
information which ‘relates to the environment’ and which was held by a ‘relevant person’.
In 1998, the UK signed the Aarhus Convention from which an EU Directive was derived. The new
Environmental Information (Scotland) Regulations 2004 ensure that Scotland complies with the
Convention and the Directive. There are separate regulations for the rest of the UK.
The IC and DPA
Unlike his UK counterpart, the UK Information Commissioner (‘IC’), the SIC is not charged with
implementing and enforcing the Data Protection Act (‘DPA’) in Scotland, which gives people a right of
access to their own and prohibits the disclosure of other people’s personal information.
This rests with the IC, who is charged with enforcing and promoting DPA in the UK and DPA in
Scotland as well as well as FOI in the UK. The DPA covers the whole of the UK including Scotland,
whereas the FOI Acts only cover their respective jurisdictions. The SIC and IC work closely together,
and have established a working memorandum.
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Figure 6. The Scottish Information Commissioner’s website
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OSIC
The SIC has an Office, currently in St Andrews, which is generally referred to as the Office of the Scottish
Information Commissioner (‘OSIC’). OSIC’s website (figure 6) offers comprehensive guidance on how
to use the FOI Act, and what using FOISA entails. On the main page of his website is a link39 to pages
that offer advice on how to ask for information, which I summarize here:
Citizens and What they can ask for…
Anyone can ask for information held by a Scottish public authority, whether they live in Scotland or
elsewhere in the world, (referred to in the legislation as ‘the applicant’).
An applicant can ask for any kind of recorded information held by a Scottish Public Authority,
which is information that is recorded on paper, computer files (including e-mail), video and microfiche.
An applicant cannot ask for information that is not recorded, for example, someone’s opinion that has not
been put on record.
Examples of what someone might ask for include:
-- Why decisions were made to cut back some services at a local hospital, or to combine local primary
schools?
--- How public authorities decide who gets priority on waiting lists for services such as health or housing?
What does the Act cover? A Scottish Public Authority (see figure 7)
Scottish public authorities (‘SPAs’) covered by the Act include local government, the National Health
Service and the police. Scottish public authorities or office-holders from which an applicant can ask
information are listed in the Act. A public authority might set up more than one company to manage its
activities on its behalf, for example, local development projects or commercial activities, and if wholly




Figure 7. What is a public authority and what does FOI cover?
Publication Scheme
All Scottish public authorities are required to produce a publication scheme (figure 8), which is a bit like
a library catalogue. It lists the information that is available and that an authority holds in written or
electronic or another form or that it intends to make available, and where this information can be found.
It also lists whether information is free of charge or available on payment of a fee. Some
information that the authority holds will be available in the form of a link on its publication scheme.
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Figure 8. Scottish Public Authorities are required to have a ‘Publication Scheme’
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Figure 9. Some Scottish Public Authorities have for their own records, a ‘Disclosure Log’
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Disclosure Log?
A public authority also keeps for its own records, a disclosure log (figure 9). This is a list of all the
requests for information that it has received, and information that it has given out in response. A
disclosure log occasionally contains the names of applicants, those who have made requests for
information under the FOI Act, although different authorities have different policies on whether people’s
names (in association with their request) constitutes personal information and should be made available.
Some public authorities make their disclosure logs available to the public on their website and keep a
second version running for themselves with details of open and closed requests, any note of delays, and
who within the authority is handling which request.
How to make a request?
Some public authorities have an online FOI request form available on their websites to be used to submit
an FOI request to them (figure 10). FOI requests are more generally made in the form of written letter or
e-mail (or by fax or audio or video tape) (figure 11). When someone makes a written request for
information, the authority must respond (generally in the same recorded form). It is not possible to make
a verbal request for information, by telephone or in person.
An applicant need not give a reason for asking for information, although it sometimes helps the
authority to provide the information if a person can tell them what they are looking for and why. Nor
does an applicant have to say that they are using their rights under Freedom of Information.
Importantly, an applicant must give his or her name and a contact address (for example, an e-mail
address). If they do not provide a name or contact information, the authority does not have to respond to
their request. This was a turn-around for the SIC who originally stipulated that the use of pseudonyms
were acceptable, although a closer examination of the legislation suggested that they were not.
The authority also has a duty to ‘advise and assist’ an applicant with their request. One way in which it
might do this is by describing the information that an applicant has available to them. It seemed that the
different ways in which authorities categorized information caused some people difficulty when describing
the information they sought.
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Figure 10. Some Scottish Public Authorities have an online request form for people to use to submit their request
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Figure 11. FOI requests are more generally made in the form of a written letter or e-mail (forwarded to the relevant
FOI Officer in the authority)
Charging for Information
An authority can charge for information. If the cost of to the authority is more than £100 but does not
exceed £600, the authority can charge 10% of the cost of providing the information. The first £100,
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however, is always free. The maximum the authority can change in most situations is £50 (that is, if the
cost to the authority is £600).
A public authority is required to provide the applicant with a fees notice that tells him or her the
estimated cost due, how this has been calculated and informs this person of how to appeal against the fee.
Exemptions
The right of access to information held by a Scottish public authority that FOISA provides is subject to a
number of exemptions, some of which are absolute, some of which are class or content exemptions (see
figure 12—summary of exemptions at the Bill stage)40. An absolute exemption is one where the public
interest test is not applied. A public interest test is where a test of whether the public interest in disclosure
outweighs any substantial prejudice likely to result from its disclosure.
In general, a Scottish public authority may withhold information, which is information that: an applicant
can reasonably obtain other than by requesting it under section 1 of the FOI Act; the disclosure of which
is prohibited by or under an enactment or would constitute or be punishable as a contempt of court
(section 26); is confidential information obtained from another person (section 36(2)); constitutes court
records (section 37), and personal information (section 38(1)).
A class exemption is where a whole category of information is protected. For example, there is a class
exemption created by section 29 of the Act, relating to the formation or development of government
policy. However, class exemptions are still subject to a form of the public interest test. The information
must be disclosed unless the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in
disclosure. In a somewhat similar manner, a content exemption means that a public authority must disclose
information unless disclosure of its contents will cause ‘substantial prejudice’ to the interests of those who
are the subject of or hold information. In other words, the balance of substantial prejudice lies between
the public and the persons ‘disclosed’.
40 Source: SPICe research paper 01/17, p. 10
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Figure 12. Summary of exemptions in the FOI Bill: a ‘class’ exemption refers to a whole category of information; a
‘content’ exemption to its contents; an ‘absolute’ exemption is where information is exempt and the public interest
test is not applied. (Source: SPICe research paper 01/17)
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